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Introduction: the past as prologue
This book is inspired by the often puzzling array of continuities and
changes that has characterised German security policy since uniﬁcation
in 1990. Change has been manifest most profoundly in the lifting of
the legal and political barriers which had formerly curtailed the use of
the West German armed forces, a transformation which arguably
reached its zenith in Germany’s military contribution to the war in
Kosovo in 1999. Since then, German perspectives on the use of force
became, especially in the context of the expansion of the US-led war
against terrorism in 2003, more reminiscent of the restrictive, amili-
taristic, foreign policy style of the pre-1990 Bonn Republic. This
mixture of change and continuity also pervades the structure of the
Federal armed forces and the pace of defence sector reforms. While the
Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed force, has become better equipped for
modern out-of-area missions, its post-1989 process of transformation
and modernisation remains limited and largely inadequate due to the
continuation of conscription, coupled with a static defence budget.
On a conceptual level, inspiration for this book derives from the
body of literature in the ﬁeld of security studies on strategic culture.
Broadly speaking, strategic culture focuses on the domestic sources of
security policy and attempts to identify how the past impacts and shapes
contemporary policy behaviour. In contrast to some of the more tra-
ditional approaches in security studies, the strategic culture approach
is interested in the subjective, nationally speciﬁc, aspects of security
and defence policy and the ways in which collective historical experi-
ences, channelled through pervading values and norms, play a role in
deﬁning interests and thus shaping policy choices.
Reﬂecting on the critical junctures and ruptures that characterise
German history over the course of the past 100 years, the aptness of
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strategic culture to a consideration of contemporary security policy is
clear. The deleterious relationship that obtained between the military
and politics in all former incarnations of the German State, the pro-
found rupture brought by the Second World War, followed by the
Western-sponsored rearmament of West Germany point to a highly
fractured backdrop to current security policy. This book argues that in
the protracted phase of West German rearmament, which stretched
from 1949 to 1956, a fresh strategic culture was actively constructed.
This strategic culture emerged out of the intense collective physical and
moral trauma in West Germany, manifest in the notion of Stunde Null,
or ‘zero hour’, combined with the expectations and demands which
emanated from the Western powers in the context of the emerging
Cold War. Aspects of this new strategic culture included the legally
restricted role of the new West German armed forces; the full democ-
ratisation of civil–military relations; the reintroduction of conscription;
and the Federal Republic’s tight integration with multilateral security
institutions. Permeating all this was the widespread conviction that
West Germany should maintain a low proﬁle in security matters above
and beyond the immediate task of defence of national and alliance ter-
ritory, and that the ‘lessons of the past’ and ‘responsibility’ should be
at the forefront of West German security policy thinking.
Bringing the discussion up to date, the idea of German strategic
culture remains pertinent. The ending of the Cold War and German
uniﬁcation represented a further break in Germany’s fractured history.
The events of 1989–90 propelled the new Germany from being a net
beneﬁciary to a net producer of security in Europe as a radically new
security environment emerged. This revolutionary change, the book
argues, served to challenge many of the central tenets of (West) German
strategic culture, as seen in the debates on the legality of Bundeswehr
out-of-area deployments in the early 1990s, the intra-German debate
over Iraq in 2002–3 and also in the emerging controversy over the
relevance of conscription.
Policy-makers in Germany appear to be acutely aware of their strate-
gic culture, regarding themselves as subject to some form of cultural
boundedness which determines their choices and predisposes them to
certain options. Evidence of this can be found in the language of
defence white papers, speeches and debates, which are imbued with
convictions of the ‘weight of the past’, ‘the lessons of German history’,
‘the defence culture of our country’, and so on.
It is surely indisputable that the past has a strong bearing on the
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changes and continuities that have characterised Germany’s changing
perspectives on the use of force since 1989. The nature of that com-
plex relationship is, however, not easy to ascertain. By mobilising the
concept of German strategic culture this book attempts to capture the
link between the past and contemporary security policy. To do this,
three distinct, yet interrelated, questions guide the course of the study.
The ﬁrst relates to identiﬁcation: what is German strategic culture; what
are its constituent parts, contours and substance? The second question
refers to the notion of change: to what extent and in what form has
change in the external security environment after 1989 impacted on
German strategic culture? The third question is associated with the
theme of behaviour: in what ways does strategic culture aﬀect behav-
iour and shape policy choices in both constraining and facilitating
actions?
In order to address these questions, the book is organised in the fol-
lowing way. Chapter 1 introduces and develops the theme of strategic
culture as an approach in security studies. Utilising a number of exist-
ing studies and conceptions of strategic culture, the chapter formulates
a deﬁnition of strategic culture and designs a conceptual framework
adapted to the case of Germany. Chapter 2 places some empirical
matter onto this conceptual frame by focusing on the construction of
West German strategic culture through a consideration of aspects of
the process of rearmament in the 1950s. By extrapolating and exam-
ining both internal and external factors in the rearmament of West
Germany, the book identiﬁes the antecedents of West German strate-
gic culture and draws out its composite elements and characteristics.
Chapters 3 and 4 address the implications for strategic culture of the
events of 1989–90 through an examination of German perspectives on
the use of force: chapter 3 takes as a case study the period up to 1999,
which saw the playing out of the legal–political out-of-area debate, the
transformation of the Bundeswehr and Germany’s engagement in a full
combat mission in Kosovo; chapter 4 continues the chronological
sequence and brings analysis up to date to include a discussion of
German perspectives on the events of September 11 2001, Afghanistan
and the Iraq War of 2003. By thus tracking the post-Cold War trans-
formation of the Bundeswehr’s role in the 1990s it is possible to assess
both the extent and the nature of change in German strategic culture
and also how strategic culture aﬀects policy behaviour.
Further evidence regarding the questions of change and the impact
of strategic culture on policy behaviour is considered in chapters 5 and 6.
Introduction 3
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Chapter 5 takes as its focal point a case study of the reform of the Ger-
man armed forces. By appraising the numerous attempts during the
1990s to transform the Bundeswehr from its Cold War conﬁguration
into a modern military, equipped for a wider array of missions, the
chapter highlights the internal and external impulses for defence reform
and discusses the various factors that have slowed the momentum of
policy change. Chapter 6 reﬂects on a contrasting aspect of security
policy thus far characterised by non-change, namely the practice of con-
scription. This case study provides a vivid illustration of the power of
strategic culture to actively obviate or hinder policy change. The con-
tinuation of compulsory military service in Germany, despite the
enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s mission, constitutes an interesting
case study, especially when considered against the pattern of change
across Europe, where conscription seems to be in terminal decline. The
concluding chapter considers the issues and debates presented in the
preceding chapters through the prism of the book’s key questions and
concerns.
4 Germany and the use of force
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1On strategic culture
The decision making process in matters of defence is not an abstract con-
struct based purely in the present moment but is, rather, steeped in the
beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country –
all of which feeds into its strategic culture.1
[R]ather than obedience or disobedience to an abstract set of stipulative
requirements, in times of war what really makes the diﬀerence is how a
nation state, as a collective identity, ‘behaves’ is the structure of that
nation’s history and experience – its strategic culture, if you will.2
Key issues and developments in German security policy since 1989 form
the overall focus of this book, while the more speciﬁc question to be
dealt with relates to the evolution of German perspectives on the use
of military force in international politics in the post-Cold War period,
using the concept of strategic culture to interpret the subject matter.
As argued in the Introduction, that concept is useful in yielding insights
on both theoretical and empirical issues relating to developments in
German security policy since 1989. The aim of this chapter, conse-
quently, is to consider the concept of strategic culture in greater detail
and to locate it within the ﬁeld of security studies.
Contending approaches
Neo-realism and German normalisation
As the Cold War came to a close, a frenzy of analysis on the future
of German security policy emerged. Consideration of how German
post-Cold War security policy might develop reﬂected a far broader
and fundamental discussion, within the discipline of international
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relations (IR) and the subdiscipline of security studies, about the util-
ity of existing theoretical paradigms and assumptions. At the crux of
reﬂections on Germany lay the debate about how the ending of the
Cold War and national uniﬁcation would aﬀect German foreign and
security policy; more speciﬁcally, disputes arose as to whether the recent
past would serve as a source of continuity or a force for change in the
new Germany’s post-Cold War foreign and security policy behaviour.
The ﬁrst take on this debate drew its logic from the traditional neo-
realist camp in IR. This view tends to see military behaviour as quite
separate from the milieu in which it is formed;3 in other words, neo-
realism is based on a belief that there is a ‘universal science that explains
the generation of military power in all countries, without regard to their
internal societies’.4 Drawing from this assumption, a number of schol-
ars posed a ‘normalisation’ thesis, the essence of which was that in the
context of multipolarity, German foreign and security policy would
develop a far less restrained and benign character. Throwing oﬀ the
constraints laid down by the Cold War, German policy would accrue
a more assertive national ﬂavour, focused on strategic interests and
backed by the threat of the use of force. A number of scholars pro-
duced commentary on Germany from such a perspective: Philip
Gordon, John Mearsheimer, Volker Rittberger and Geoﬀrey van Orden
have, in various ways, sought to draw out neo-realism’s assumptions
to explain and predict Germany’s post-1989 foreign and security pol-
icy behaviour. Underlying such analysis was the assumption that
Germany would seize advantage of the new balance of power in Europe
and would inevitably develop a greater ability and willingness to wield
its power, including military power. Furthermore, Germany would
be actively compelled to elucidate its interests – which might come to
diﬀer considerably from those of its allies – more assertively.
Characteristic of such reasoning in the early 1990s was John
Mearsheimer’s prediction of the ‘Balkanisation’ of Europe and the cen-
tral problem of containing German power. The problems of creating a
counterbalance to Germany would be similar to those experienced in
the 1930s, when Germany, surrounded by weaker East European states,
experienced a resurgence of nationalism.5 Similarly, writing in 1992 the
German historian Michael Stürmer argued that the profound changes
brought to Germany’s geostrategic location would signify abrupt
changes in German policy and perspectives on the use of force. For
Stürmer, like Mearsheimer, the ending of the Cold War would herald
a further break in German history, obligating Germany to ‘embrace
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realism’, ‘clarity of goals’ and a ‘predictability of means’.6 Sustaining
such arguments, others stressed the point that since the Bundeswehr
owed its creation, rationale and role to contingent forces and factors
quite exogenous to Germany, with the ending of the Cold War and the
acquisition of full sovereignty, German security policy was now set to
develop a more normal relationship to the use of military power. In
this vein, in 1991, Geoﬀrey van Orden asserted that German defence
policy, having been ‘unnaturally constrained for 40 years’, can now
‘aspire to a normal level of great power activity, pursuing national inter-
ests which may diﬀer from those of its allies and demanding a voice
commensurate with its economic and political standing’.7 Subsequently,
Philip Gordon identiﬁed a normalisation of German security policy,
which would involve ‘the gradual attenuation of the particular restric-
tions that have inﬂuenced and constrained Germany’s international
actions since, and because of, World War Two’.8
Certainly, German security policy has travelled great distances since
reuniﬁcation and perspectives on the use of force have, in many ways,
changed in a revolutionary way. The changes seen in the role of the
German armed forces, especially after 1994 through the reinterpreta-
tion of the Basic Law, have lessened the extent to which German
security policy can be described as ‘singular’ or indeed reminiscent of
a ‘civilian power’ in the classical sense. Such transformations notwith-
standing, the power of neo-realism as a theoretical tool with which to
understand these changes remains rather weak, principally because it
side-steps the complex and arguably more interesting constitutive fac-
tors of policy such as the domestic context and other less tangible
sources of interest formation. Neo-realism takes its cue from changes
in the international system, focuses on observable capabilities and mate-
rial potential, and consequently makes a rational assessment or
prediction of Germany’s past, present or future policy behaviour. An
appraisal of German security policy more than a decade after the end
of the Cold War shows the serious deﬁciencies in neo-realist prognoses,
especially regarding the ability and actual desire of German elites to
pursue a more assertive nationally focussed ‘normal’ security policy as
Mearsheimer, Van Orden and others have proposed.
Neo-realism’s negation of the historical and domestic constitutive
factors essentially delivers an inadequate analysis, whereas reinstating
and bringing to centre stage the milieu in which German thinking
about security and the use of force is produced, as an alternative, prom-
ises a far richer understanding. Importantly, here, analysis of German
On strategic culture 7
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security using such an approach would question one of the chief
assumptions of neo-realist analysis, namely the inevitability of Ger-
many’s ‘emancipation’ from history as a by-product of the end of
bipolarity.
How might such an approach to Germany be conﬁgured? What fol-
lows is a survey of the various attempts within the ﬁeld of security
studies to understand national security policies by adopting a cultural
variable. This survey will then provide the basis on which an approach
to understanding German security policy through the prism of strategic
culture will be synthesised.
Strategic culture and security studies
Strategic culture was ﬁrst introduced to the ﬁeld of security studies in
the 1970s.9 Born of a concern with the ‘skewing’ eﬀects of ethnocen-
trism prevalent within US strategic thinking, Jack Snyder, writing for
the RAND Corporation, warned of the dangers of assuming that the
Soviets would have the same set of values and beliefs as the US strategic
community. Crucially, Snyder challenged the view that the Soviets
would play the same nuclear war ‘game’ as the US, as existing ‘generic
rational actor paradigms’ and game theoretical modelling suggested.10
As part of his critique, Snyder promoted a form of analysis of Soviet
behaviour and strategic thinking which could take more fully into
account the particular Soviet historical experiences of war which, he
argued, shaped Moscow’s perspectives on contemporary security
issues. Subsequently, he saw that a unique Soviet strategic culture had
developed through a particular historical process, forming a perceptual
prism through which strategic issues were viewed by Soviet decision-
makers. This Soviet strategic culture, Snyder maintained, was passed
on to subsequent generations of policy-makers through a socialisation
process. It aﬀected policy by setting the parameters of national debates
and consequently guided and shaped policy choices. Snyder deﬁned
Soviet strategic culture as the sum total of ‘ideas, conditioned emo-
tional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of
a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or
imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy’.11
Snyder’s notion of strategic culture prompted other scholars to build
on his assumptions and ideas, and that has led to the emergence of a
not insubstantial body of literature on strategic culture. Subsequent
waves and phases of thinking about strategic culture, while clearly
8 Germany and the use of force
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advancing the concept and bringing it into the mainstream of security
studies, has resulted in a rather atomised research agenda. Strategic cul-
ture analysis advanced in the 1970s and 1980s, driven primarily by a
concern with misunderstandings and misrepresentation in super-
power relations and especially in connection with nuclear strategy.
Writing in 1979 Ken Booth sought to alert strategists to the ‘fog of cul-
ture’ and its distorting eﬀects on the making and study of strategy.
Echoing Snyder’s words, Booth argued in Strategy and Ethnocentrism
that better strategies would result only if assumptions based on
‘rational’ strategic man were supplanted by those based on ‘national’
strategic man. In a similar vein, Colin S. Gray equated strategic culture
with the notion of ‘national style’ in a comparison of the US and
Soviet Union.12 Gray deﬁned strategic culture as ‘referring to modes of
thought and action with respect to force, which derive from percep-
tions of the national historical experience, from aspirations for
responsible behaviour in national terms . . . the civic culture and way
of life’.13 For Gray, strategic culture was the milieu within which strat-
egy is debated; it provided a ‘semi-permanent inﬂuence upon policy
behaviour’ and, in the absence of a ‘new historical experience’ that chal-
lenged existing modes of thought and action, national style would be
an enduring explanation of state behaviour. While being one of the
strongest advocates of strategic culture and its explanatory potential at
this time, Gray was also sensitive to the problems and weaknesses of
the concept. He saw that strategic cultures produced tendencies but did
not totally determine behaviour and that if seen as too deterministic,
strategic culture could be overused to explain anything and everything,
and so become analytically useless in its tautology. Gray posed a fur-
ther set of questions and continued to call for the reﬁnement of the
concept, especially in terms of how to address the issue of change or
fragmentation within a strategic culture. With such fundamental ques-
tions surrounding strategic culture at this time, the concept remained
highly vulnerable.
The introduction of strategic culture into the parlance of security
studies in the 1970s undoubtedly created a momentum which in no
small way informed the wave of culture-inspired challenges to prevail-
ing modes of analysis that transpired after the end of the Cold War.
In this primordial period the concept of strategic culture was very much
in gestation, with analysts tending to overemphasise the utility of the
concept without suﬃcient accompanying thoughts on methodology
and the actual functioning of the nexus between policy behaviour and
On strategic culture 9
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strategic culture. Writers also tended to make sweeping statements
about time periods rather than pinpointing speciﬁc formative periods
and the sources of a strategic culture. Nevertheless, this ﬁrst wave of
strategic culture analysis was important in that it began to question
dominant modes of analysis and to raise some crucial questions about
the sources of a state’s behaviour in the security realm. What followed
after 1989–90 was the advent of strategic culture literature, which, while
drawing on the work of the 1970s and 1980s, sought to address many
of the problems associated with the concept.
Conceptual developments in the 1990s
As noted earlier, at the core of the re-examination of theories within
the discipline of IR after 1989 lay a fundamental reassessment of the
utility of neo-realism as the dominant paradigm in security studies.
Out of this reappraisal emerged a resurgence of interest in culture in
security studies, inspired to a large extent by the rise of construc-
tivism, with its emphasis on identity and interests as being socially
constructed.14 On the back of these developments came a new genera-
tion of literature applying to various regions and case studies the
concept of ‘strategic culture’, as well as cognate notions of security
culture, political–military culture and national security culture.
Perhaps the most noteworthy major study on strategic culture to
have emerged in this period was Alistair Iain Johnston’s Cultural
Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, which
attempted to deal with a number of the key altercations within the
strategic culture school. Johnston pointed to the pros and cons of
various existing strategic culture studies, and sought to formulate an
entirely new approach. Essentially his aim was to construct a notion
of strategic culture that was falsiﬁable; Johnston therefore sought to
separate strategic culture from strategic behaviour in order to assess
the impact of the former on the latter.15 A host of other authors writ-
ing in the 1990s sought to further the study of strategic culture by
applying it to national or regional case studies, as a means of inves-
tigating continuities and change in national security policies or of
ﬁnding more authentic answers as to why certain policy options and
not others were pursued. In 1992 George Tanham wrote an article
on Indian strategic culture, which, although not particularly strong
conceptually, raised interesting ideas about the connection between
certain cultural beliefs and Indian security policy.16 Alan Macmillan
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also advanced the idea of a distinctively British strategic culture as a
tool with which to understand signiﬁcant choices in British strategic
history.17 A further piece worthy of note is Desmond Ball’s 1993 study
of the strategic culture of the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Ball noted that
strategic culture analysis had given too much attention to the strate-
gic cultures of states and especially to studies of the US and the Soviet
Union. To address this, Ball posited that while national diﬀerences
did certainly exist between the states of the Asia-Paciﬁc region a broad
study of the area as a whole would be more useful.18
Peter J. Katzenstein’s edited collection of 1996 made a further impor-
tant contribution to the development of strategic culture and related
concepts. The Culture of National Security brought together many of
the concerns and preferences for sociological issues of identity and its
nexus with security by developing the notion of ‘political–military cul-
ture’. Through the contributions of some notable scholars, the volume
sought to explicitly tackle what were seen as the deﬁciencies of con-
structivism by adding greater empirical content. The thrust of the inves-
tigation was to illustrate how ‘social factors’ could often shape policies
in ways contradictory of those which other theories would normally
suggest.19 In this pursuit Katzenstein et al. identiﬁed two determinants
of national security policy-making: the ‘cultural–institutional’ and the
broader ‘national identity’ aspect. The volume made a welcome contri-
bution to thinking on culture and security, and also went some way
towards developing a convincing and workable methodology with
which to overcome the imprecision of earlier strategic culture works
without relying on the overly positivistic approach of some of the later
ones.
The ‘cultural’ sources of German security policy
Within this broader revival of cultural explanations of national secu-
rity policies and the critique of neo-realism, a substantial body of
literature focusing on German security policy has emerged. The fact
that Germany provided the inspiration for such approaches comes as
no surprise given that for many scholars Germany’s behaviour in the
realm of foreign and security policy after 1990 had largely confounded
the expectations of the neo-realists and, in particular, the emphasis
on the resurgence of German military power and unilateralism. Thus,
seeking an alternative and more authentic form of explanation, scholars
On strategic culture 11
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have capitalised on the growing body of culture-inspired theories and
concepts.
In 1998 Thomas U. Berger considered national security policies in
both Germany and Japan through a culturalist perspective in a major
volume entitled Cultures of Amilitarism.20 Rather than use strategic
culture – which Berger rejected because, he argued, it did not pay
enough attention to broader societal and cultural shifts and their
impacts on national defence – the concept of ‘political-military cul-
ture’ is mobilised, being deﬁned as a subset of a broader culture
dealing with those elements that shape defence and security policy
formation. Berger attempts to track and explain the emergence and
longevity of the profound antimilitarism in (West) German security
policies both before and after the ending of the Cold War. Berger
rejects monocausal explanations of German antimilitarism such as
those based on the notion that the damage inﬂicted by Nazi atroci-
ties runs so deep in its psyche that German society is now unwilling
to sanction the use of force, or that it is the Federal Republic’s entan-
glement in multilateral frameworks that stymies its ability or desire
to develop a more independent defence capacity. Nor does Berger
accept reasoning based on the features of Germany’s geostrategic posi-
tion and role as a trading state or the notion that US tutelage in
security matters precludes the perceived need in Germany to develop
a more active security policy. Crucially, Berger sees that these forms
of explanation are all important ‘structural determinants’ of German
approaches to national security, and that they have, at diﬀerent
points, helped facilitate the conditions for it to emerge and be sus-
tained, but they do not fully explain the strength of Germany’s aversion
to the use of force. Moreover, Berger holds, there were events and
periods when it would have been possible to pursue more independ-
ent and active military policies, but Germany (and Japan) chose
instead to enact only incremental changes that did not serve to ques-
tion the underlying antimilitarism. Explanation of this phenomenon
is best sought by invoking the idea of a ‘culture of antimilitarism’,
the existence and functioning of which, Berger sees, has been con-
ﬁrmed by the ending of the Cold War which opened opportunities
for Germany to expand and break from its restrained security policies,
opportunities that have not been pursued.
Taking this further, Berger saw that what best accounts for Ger-
many’s antimilitarism is its ‘struggle to draw lessons from its troubled
past’. These lessons, he holds, were shaped by the political debates of
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the early post-war period, which ultimately ﬂavoured the antimilitary
sentiments prevalent in West Germany. Central to this antimilitarism
was a fundamental reappraisal of German identity, as a result of the
nation’s confrontation with the atrocities of Nazism and dealing with
collective guilt. These factors then compelled the political leaders of the
new Federal Republic to approach rearmament in a way that would
clearly limit the size and remit of the Bundeswehr. Berger’s mobilisa-
tion of political–military culture is accompanied by an elaborate
conceptualisation of how this culture impacts on behaviour. He seeks
to avoid the problems of tautology and to this end sees that a politi-
cal–military culture inﬂuences policy in a number of ways: by supplying
the goals and norms of political actors; by determining how actors per-
ceive the domestic political environment; by inﬂuencing actor’s
assessments of the international environment; and by conditioning their
ability to garner national resources for military purposes. These propo-
sitions are then conﬂated in to a ‘culturally bound actor model’, in
which he positions socioculturally deﬁned norms and perceptions (the
political culture) as integral to the process through which national
interests are deﬁned. The culture acts as the milieu through which
objective domestic conditions and capabilities, as well as pressures in
the international system, are mediated, prior to policy execution by
actors engaged in the policy process. Seen in this way, Berger’s notion
of the national interest is not taken as a given, but rather as a ‘con-
struct emerging out of contingent historical, social, and rational
processes that can vary considerably across diﬀerent states at diﬀerent
points in time’.21
On the issue of change Berger sees that transformations in the inter-
national system may lead to change in the culture, in the sense of
‘change in the normative and interpretative schemes of its political
actors’, though this will most probably be neither quick nor easy, and
cultures may therefore represent a force of inertia. Change will occur
as the ‘cultural core’ responds to ‘historical pressures’, and it will be
incremental in nature with new institutions not being created de novo
but being ‘likely to follow previously established patterns’. Lastly,
Berger sees that only in very traumatic situations will change in the
core values and beliefs of a given culture be abrupt, and then only
in instances of total discreditation and when society is under great
strain. At the crux of Berger’s reasoning is the hypothesis that if
new policy initiatives are proposed which violate ‘existing cultural val-
ues’ then resistance to them will become evident in the form of
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demonstrations and party-political altercation. If, on the other hand,
major changes occur without generating any resistance, Berger holds
that the relationship between political–military culture and defence
policy can then be seen to have been falsiﬁed or at least weakened.22
In his conclusions, Berger sees that Germany’s behaviour in the secu-
rity realm is testimony to the existence and functioning of a
political–military culture. This has been further conﬁrmed after the
ending of the Cold War, when during the Gulf War the ‘antimilitary
animus’ ‘continued to pose potent barriers to increased activism in
the area of national security’.
John S. Duﬃeld’s World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, Interna-
tional Institutions, and German Security Policy After Uniﬁcation, also
published in 1998, made a further valid contribution to understanding
the cultural sources of German security policy.23 Duﬃeld’s exposition
attempts to explain the profound continuities and restraint prevalent
in German security policy after the Cold War by way of a framework
of analysis that combines inﬂuences from Germany’s external envi-
ronment as well as its domestic political setting. At the international
level Duﬃeld identiﬁes a dense web of institutions which have both
actively constrained German security policy while also providing chan-
nels through which Germany could pursue its interests in ‘predictable,
non-threatening directions’. These inﬂuences at the international level
are bolstered, Duﬃeld holds, through the eﬀects of Germany’s ‘distinct
post-war national security culture, which was little changed by uniﬁ-
cation and the end of the Cold War’. This culture comprises a
discernible set of beliefs and values relating to scepticism about the use
of military force, a preference for multilateralism, a desire to be per-
ceived as a reliable partner and an aversion to leadership in security
matters, values which are widely shared by elites and society at large.
The combination of these international institutional and domestic cul-
tural factors, Duﬃeld argues, determines the continuities and the
restraint in Germany’s security policy since 1989.
On the back of this hypothesis Duﬃeld’s study proceeds with the
construction of a framework of analysis to explain national security
policy. Within this survey, Duﬃeld details a number of categories under
the main headings of ‘the international setting’ and ‘the domestic
setting’. Under the latter the notion of ‘national pre-dispositions’ is
posited, in which he incorporates the important role played by politi-
cal culture. Duﬃeld’s conceptualisation revolves chieﬂy around the
notion that political culture is the property of a collective rather than
14 Germany and the use of force
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd  30/06/2004  16:25  Page 14
of the sum of the individuals comprising it; that it is distinctive vis à
vis other political cultures; and, ﬁnally, that it is highly stable in com-
parison to ‘material conditions’. From this outline of the general nature
of a political culture Duﬃeld draws out the speciﬁc components that
are relevant to national security policy. These consist of worldviews,
issues of loyalty and attachment, conceptions of the national inter-
est and the eﬀectiveness of the use of force and appropriate political
behaviour.
Subsequently Duﬃeld, like Berger, constructs a detailed model of
how he sees the relationship between culture and behaviour. Firstly,
the existence of a given culture delineates the scope of what it is
that policy actually focuses on by highlighting certain issues and mar-
ginalising others. Secondly, a culture aﬀects the perception and
interpretation of the external environment, thus shaping the design
of security issues. Thirdly, by shaping conceptions of the national
interest, the functioning of a culture helps to determine policy objec-
tives. Fourthly, a culture delineates and limits the range of legitimate
policy options open to policy-makers. From this understanding of the
nexus between culture and behaviour Duﬃeld concludes: ‘The over-
all eﬀect of national security culture is to predispose societies in general
and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies
over others.’ 24 Sometimes culture will not determine policy options
so tightly, but will narrow the range of policies that are likely to be
adopted, because the conditions of a culture’s inﬂuence will depend
on the external context; in instances when the international environ-
ment is characterised by complexities and uncertainties or when a
policy issue involves a large group of actors the inﬂuence of culture
may be high.
In his ﬁnal analysis Duﬃeld attributes many of the continuities and
forms of restraint prevalent in German security policy since 1989 as
determined, in large part, by ‘peculiar national pre-dispositions’. Some
of these, he suggests, reside in the constitution, especially in its pre-
1994 reading regarding out-of-area Bundeswehr deployments, while
others are institutionalised in the armed forces’ limited capacities or in
German public opinion. However, he regards Germany’s post-war
political culture, especially in the form of elite attitudes, as a far more
fundamental and comprehensive source of the national predispositions
shaping security policy. Duﬃeld’s reasoning is grounded in his asser-
tions that German society and elites hold a very distinctive set of beliefs
and values of relevance to national security issues and that the actuality
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of this speciﬁc political culture has constrained Germany’s potential for
unilateral and aggressive security policies, instead facilitating the con-
tinuation of a security policy characterised by restraint. The particular
elements of this culture that have been so inﬂuential are viewed by
Duﬃeld as the widespread antimilitarism and a rejection of unilateral-
ism, and an attendant preference for multilateral solutions. These
elements, Duﬃeld holds, certainly reinforced one another during the
Cold War period, and largely after 1989 as well. However, on the issue
of Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments after 1989–90 these elements
oﬀered contradictory prescriptions, as diﬀerent sectors of society and
elites came to interpret and apply them in diﬀerent ways.
German strategic culture: a framework for analysis
This brief overview of some of the key studies that have attempted to
mobilise the concept of strategic culture and related ideas over the past
three decades conﬁrms the highly stimulating yet rather disparate
research agenda that persists. The survey demonstrates the variety of
ways in which strategic culture has been interpreted and employed as
a tool with which to understand national or regional security policies
and policy behaviour. It also brings into focus just how vibrant and
appealing the key assumptions of the strategic culture approach are for
further conceptual development and reﬁnement, and for empirical
exploration, in the case of Germany. Clearly the devising of an analyt-
ical framework with which to examine contemporary German security
policy using strategic culture must take into account the strengths of
existing studies, while at the same time engage with some of the
questions they raise.
Questions and controversies persist within the literature on issues
relating to the referent group for strategic culture, namely whether the
focus should be on states, societies, elites or, perhaps, the armed forces.
A second contestation relates to the origins and roots of a strategic cul-
ture: where do they lie, what are the most important sources and how
might these be traced and proﬁled? A third concern revolves around
the question of how to establish the existence of the core beliefs and
attitudes relating to the use of force that lie at the centre of a strategic
culture. A fourth unresolved issue relates to the relationship which
strategic culture has to actual policy behaviour, or to the inﬂuence of
the former on the latter, including the thorny issue of whether that
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inﬂuence is falsiﬁable or not. A ﬁnal, enduring, question is that of
change in a strategic culture, speciﬁcally how and under what condi-
tions change might come about. Such questions are far from arbitrary.
As Alistair Johnston noted:
Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policy
makers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how
diﬀerent actors perceive the game being played . . . Done badly [it] could
reinforce stereotypes about the predispositions of other states and close
oﬀ policy alternatives deemed inappropriate for dealing with local
strategic cultures.25
What follows is the basis of an analytical framework with which to
explore German security policy through the prism of strategic culture,
one on which the remainder of the book proceeds.
Deﬁning strategic culture and its composition
A strategic culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and prac-
tices regarding the use of force, held by a collective and arising gradually
over time through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic
culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its incep-
tion, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and
inﬂuenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or
piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.
A strategic culture comprises three elements. Firstly, there are the
deeper, basal, qualities that have their origins in the primordial or form-
ative phases of a given strategic culture; these are here called
foundational elements. Foundational elements comprise basic beliefs
regarding the use of force that give a strategic culture its core charac-
teristics. Importantly, foundational elements are highly resistant to
change. Extending out of these foundational elements are the observ-
able manifestations of the strategic culture: the longstanding policies
and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strate-
gic culture’s core to the external environment, essentially by providing
channels of meaning and application. These aspects of strategic culture
– here called regulatory practices – are less resilient to change. Midway
between the foundational elements and regulatory practices are the
security policy standpoints, the contemporary, widely accepted, inter-
pretations as to how best core values are to be promoted through policy
channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices.
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Change in a strategic culture
The existence and functioning of the three components mean that a
strategic culture is in a continual state of self-evaluation vis à vis exter-
nal realities, as well as changes within society. Naturally in times of
continuity and stability this evaluation will be muted and less evident,
whereas in times of great turmoil or rupture, evaluation, through elite
debate and other forms of contention, may be highly visible as the
strategic culture goes through a phase of adjustment, renewal or even
collapse, depending on how valid existing core values are.
Change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: ﬁne-
tuning and fundamental, with the former variant being the more
frequent. Change in the form of ﬁne-tuning may occur when issues
have arisen, from either domestic or international sources, that have
challenged or at best sat uneasily with the established foundational ele-
ments of the strategic culture. Challenges which pressure the existing
strategic culture and policy modes will be interpreted, or ‘read’, by elites
in diﬀering ways, especially at times of great uncertainty. Whereas dur-
ing periods of certainty and stability a dominant ‘reading’ of the
meanings of foundational elements and preferred policy modes prevails
and is largely uncontested, at times of ambiguity a number of oppos-
ing readings emerge, all vying for dominance. In this context a strategic
culture is ﬁnely tuned, or adjusted, to match existing core values to
new situations through reworked security policy standpoints as seen
through observable changes in security policies and practices.
Fundamental change of a strategic culture is a far less common phe-
nomenon. It is more abrupt in nature, occurring when trauma is
suﬃciently severe as to nullify the existing strategic culture, giving rise
to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading subsequently to new
policies and practices. This fundamental change to or collapse of a
strategic culture is best described as a situation of ‘collective infancy’.26
Related to this theme of change is the issue of policy inertia: even in
the event of a foundational element being challenged, certain practices
or policies may resist change or adjustment. The normal functioning
relationship between foundational elements and regulatory practices
may be disturbed if a certain policy practice has become so ingrained
that it can be a force for inertia, appearing as a lag or even an ill-suited
policy to pursue.
This conceptualisation of change begs the question as to how a strate-
gic culture is actually transmitted among its agents and through time
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to new generations. Arising out of the past a strategic culture can be
seen as a part of what sociologist Maurice Halbwachs called ‘historical
memory’ and which he regarded as part of the collective memory. A
strategic culture as the embodiment of past collective experiences, tied
to war and the use of force, ‘is stored and interpreted by social insti-
tutions’.27 Hence the substance of a strategic culture reaches the actor
both through written records as well as through commemorations that
serve to reinforce memory. This means that subsequent generations,
who had not lived through the initial or formative experiences that gave
rise to a strategic culture, are nevertheless subjects of it.
This way of thinking about the transmission of strategic culture is
in line with the notion that institutional practices shape and sustain
knowledge. So long as a strategic culture is deemed viable, its material
manifestations will be sustained and thus serve to shape the content
and structure of knowledge, this will permit only certain new possibil-
ities to be considered by decision-makers since they inherit an existing
form of knowledge which will serve to frame their options and dispose
them to act in a certain role.28 However, subsequent generations are
not irretrievably tied to the existing strategic culture. By assessing the
relevance and utility of their strategic culture they may seek to restruc-
ture the institutions that provide them with the knowledge to think
about and design security policies; as Halbwachs posits, new genera-
tions are engaged in a process of ‘counterposing its present to its own
constructed past’.29
The functioning of strategic culture
What the relationship between strategic culture and behaviour might be
is a perennial issue which revolves around the question of whether or
not strategic culture is regarded as a falsiﬁable concept. Two lines of
discord run on this issue: there are those who seek a falsiﬁable notion
of strategic culture which leaves room in analysis for non-strategic cul-
tural variables and their inﬂuence on behaviour, thereby attempting to
break the nexus between strategic culture and behaviour. Conversely
there are those who see strategic culture as a non-falsiﬁable concept:
the link between it and behaviour cannot be severed because strategic
culture is the all-encompassing milieu through which behaviour is
mediated – in other words, all behaviour is culture-dependent. On the
important issue of falsiﬁability this book complies more with the latter
position, regarding strategic culture as a concept that deﬁes falsiﬁcation.
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In adopting this stance, the study will not attempt to pit strategic culture
against other explanatory factors, variables or theories.
In their attempts to construct a falsiﬁable concept of strategic cul-
ture, some authors have suggested that policy behaviour can occur
outside of the milieu of strategic culture. Such behaviour, outside of
familiar patterns, which contradicts the existing strategic culture will,
it has been argued, prompt dissension and opposition; if this does not
occur, then strategic culture can be seen to be falsiﬁed or at least weak-
ened. However, it is argued here that even when policy behaviour
appears to be at odds with the values and norms of a strategic culture,
this does not entail the debasement of that strategic culture; moreover
the existence of altercation and protest against new policies does not
necessarily imply a weakening or falsiﬁcation of strategic culture. The
relationship between strategic culture and behaviour is much more
nuanced, and the key to understanding this is the relationship between
the foundational elements, the security policy standpoints and the
regulatory practices.
The three types of component that make up a strategic culture are
in a dynamic relationship, which means that a strategic culture can and
will alter. Change occurs most commonly in the form of ﬁne-tuning
as policies mutate to address any desynchronisation of the strategic cul-
ture and to reaﬃrm the connection between the external environment
and the foundational elements. The foundational elements of a strate-
gic culture therefore set the outermost parameters of a state’s realm of
possible behaviour, a sphere of legitimacy, in short, determining what
is ‘normal’ for it to do. In this sense the foundational elements, through
the security policy standpoints, deﬁne interests and priorities, which in
turn determine certain policy preferences and choices above others by
setting an agenda excluding some options while including others. This
provides a framework of reference for policy actors that ultimately
shapes their conception of a situation and provides them with a
bounded repertoire of goals and tools. If the policies they pursue are
to be successful, policy-makers must act within the constraints of the
strategic culture.
Policy-actors, then, are neither cultural dupes nor prisoners but are
fully aware of their strategic cultural context. They cannot contradict
foundational elements, but they can try to modify regulatory practices
to meet the way in which they interpret, or read, the foundational
elements in a new context. Hence the idea that behaviour can exist out-
side of the strategic cultural context is false, unless a complete collapse
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of a given strategic culture occurs. Seen in this way a strategic culture
will not only constrain behaviour by precluding certain options but
will facilitate behaviour in various intensities, which may, on ﬁrst
inspection, seem at odds with the existing strategic culture.
The context in which a state ﬁnds itself is also crucial in deter-
mining how a strategic culture aﬀects behaviour. At times of stability
and certainty the inﬂuence of strategic culture on behaviour may not
be visible at all, since the culture is in synchronisation with the exter-
nal environment. At times of ﬂux, however, when the strategic culture
itself is under pressure, the nexus between strategic culture and behav-
iour may become more direct, and may be seen in the way
policy-makers seek to maintain a clear and familiar policy path to
follow, often through recourse to historical precedence, former suc-
cessful policies and lines of argumentation imbued with lessons of the
past. This idea that context matters is similar to Anne Swidler’s ideas
on the relationship between a general culture and behaviour. Swidler
posits that in ‘settled times’, when there is no tension between a cul-
ture and the external environment, cultures independently inﬂuence
action from a distance, whereas in ‘unsettled’ times, periods of shock
or trauma, when that culture is dislocated from the broader environ-
ment, it will exert a direct inﬂuence, guiding behaviour, almost as an
ideology.30 This idea can be transposed quite successfully to West Ger-
many during the Cold War – the ‘settled period’ – and the united
Germany after the Cold War – the ‘unsettled period’.
Who is the referent of a strategic culture?
Who or what is the appropriate referent or focus of analysis in the study
of strategic culture is again a contested issue, for essentially whose strate-
gic culture are we are talking about? Should one consider purely the
views of elites in either the security and/or military spheres? Or should
broader public opinion also be brought under analysis? Most strategic
culture analysis focuses on elites, whether they be purely the military or
those in the broader political–military decision-making sphere. In the
existing literature there is in general little discussion about mass beliefs
or opinion, and where it does exist it is generally conﬂated with elite
opinion. The position taken here on the question of the referent of a
strategic culture is that political–military elite voices within the ‘national
strategic community’ 31 are of greatest relevance, while the broader
public sphere is seen rather as the general contextual milieu.
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Elites, or ‘strategic cultural agents’ as they are called here, are reﬂ-
ective of broader societal moods and act as ‘gatekeepers’ of a strategic
culture, since they are at the forefront of decision-making. Holding a
more detailed awareness and knowledge of security issues, they are
agenda-setters and thereby push and pull the national discourse in cer-
tain ways. Furthermore, in terms of the debate elucidated earlier on
the most appropriate level of analysis, elites blend and mediate between
the international, domestic and individual levels. This elite preference
is bolstered here because it is believed that public opinion is not only
problematical to conceptualise but, more importantly that it is of lit-
tle importance in connection with security policy-making. It is also
posited here that elite and broader public opinion may not correspond
totally, especially at times of great change when elites respond instantly
and subsequently will attempt to shore up public support, which may
have lagged, in line with their position.
Conclusion
Strategic culture clearly provides a rich conceptual foundation with
which to consider German security policy and perspectives on the use
of force. With an emphasis on how historical experience and collec-
tive memory shapes policy behaviour, strategic culture as a concept
has great resonance in the case of contemporary Germany. From its
initial articulation in the 1970s, strategic culture has undergone con-
ceptual reﬁnement and empirical development to an extent that it
now oﬀers a viable alternative to the more traditional rationalist
approaches in the ﬁeld of security studies. Despite this, the chapter
demonstrated that strategic culture is a contested concept, its explana-
tory power questioned and research agenda rather disparate. To address
these issues, this chapter has built on a number of existing studies
that mobilised strategic culture or related concepts to create a viable
conceptual framework which can be applied to the case of Germany
in understanding changing perspectives on the use of force, and also
to further the conceptual development of the notion of strategic cul-
ture. This subsequent framework for analysis establishes a number of
factors, the most important of which are how a strategic culture and
its constituent parts may be identiﬁed, how a strategic culture might
change in diﬀerent contexts and how it links with policy behaviour
and aﬀects choices.
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This framework forms the basis for the remainder of the book, begin-
ning with the identiﬁcation of the origins of West Germany’s strategic
culture, before looking at the issue of change and the eﬀects on policy
behaviour.
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2Stunde Null and the ‘construction’
of West German strategic culture
Interest politics alone . . . cannot account for Germany’s paciﬁstic military
security policy, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation of Bonn’s
approach to national sovereignty or its aversion to unilateralism. One
must look beyond material and political interests to the politics of national
identity in post war Germany, which unfolded in searing domestic polit-
ical debates over rearmament, reuniﬁcation, and European integration
carried out under the watchful eyes of neighbouring countries and allies.1
As shown in the previous chapter, the identiﬁcation of a strategic cul-
ture should proceed with the pinpointing of the formative period of
its creation. The formative period in the emergence of the Federal
Republic’s strategic culture is arguably far easier to locate than that of
other cases. It is the ‘collective infancy’ represented in the notion of
‘zero hour’ (Stunde Null) in 1945, which signiﬁed a strategic cultural
discontinuity and social trauma so profound that ‘aﬀective and evalu-
ative schemes had to be re-learnt’ in the new West German State,
including matters relating to the place of the armed forces within pol-
itics and society and the use of military force.2 This relearning was
determined partly by domestic contextual factors and partly by inter-
national impositions and demands. Importantly, what was a critical
moment in German history was turned by the architects of rearma-
ment and by the creation of the Bundeswehr into a critical juncture
for the wholesale construction of a fresh strategic culture.
The aim of this chapter is to draw out the antecedents of what came
to be (West) German strategic culture and to identify the key debates
and processes at work during its formative period. A detailed micro-
study of the rearming of the Federal Republic is not needed here, as it
has been more than adequately accomplished elsewhere.3 What is
required, rather, is an account, through the lens of strategic culture, of
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the creation of the Bundeswehr, together with a fusion of the interna-
tional and domestic contexts of West German rearmament. The chapter
shows that the forging of a new strategic culture in West Germany
occurred through two principal channels: the imposition of the will
and demands of the allies as to what kind of role the Federal Repub-
lic should play; and post-war domestic conditions in West Germany.
Thus the emergent strategic culture was a result of what was externally
demanded and what was internally oﬀered. Essentially this conﬁgura-
tion excluded certain options while necessitating the inclusion of others.
The context: Stunde Null
Stunde Null implies the total physical, moral and psychological devas-
tation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of the Second
World War. The wake of Stunde Null brought with it a forced rethink
of conceptions of identity, power and nationhood, since previous deﬁ-
nitions had proved profoundly disastrous for both Germany and the
international community. Although the very notion of Stunde Null is
contested, it is argued here that, in the ﬁeld of security policy and the
organisation of the armed forces, the term accurately conveys the clear
break with the past that prevailed after the Second World War and on
which new policies and practices were constructed. One of the most
obvious manifestations of Stunde Null was the central importance
accorded to political rather than strictly military ideas in shaping the
process of rearmament and the creation of the new armed forces. Bork
and Gress speak of Stunde Null as a ‘basic emotion’, central to which
was ‘a scepticism, indeed a rejection of all things military, contempt
for the older generation and a broad rejection of political ideology’.4
To understand the meaning of something that has been called a basic
emotion, although not easy, is vital in understanding the domestic con-
text of West German rearmament. To fully understand and, more
importantly, to see how it impacted on and inﬂuenced the rearming
of West Germany, Stunde Null’s constituent parts must be unpacked
and disaggregated into exogenous and endogenous factors.
Exogenous factors
The exogenous factors of Stunde Null imposed on Germany compre-
hensive and wide-reaching preventative measures to rid it of the
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capacity, potential and will to either ﬁght another war or raise armed
forces. This was a fundamental part of the larger debellation of West
Germany after the Second World War. In the blueprint for Germany’s
unconditional surrender the allies spoke of their determination to
destroy German militarism and Nazism. In pursuit of these aims and
in the design of their rule over occupied Germany the allies declared
that it was not their intention to destroy or enslave the Germans,
but rather to give them the opportunity to prepare for the recon-
struction of their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis. The
subsequent political principles laid out by the allies for the government
and treatment of Germany in the initial control period embraced the
complete ‘disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elim-
ination or control of all German industry that could be used for military
production’. In realising this,
all German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo,
with all their organizations, staﬀs and institutions, including the General
Staﬀ, the Oﬃcers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’
organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations,
together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the mil-
itary tradition in Germany, shall be completely and ﬁnally abolished in
such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of
German militarism and nazism.5
These aspects of allied policy towards Germany amounted to a ‘mili-
tary emasculation’, aimed at destroying the roots of German militarism,
viewed by the allies as residing predominantly in the general staﬀ and
the oﬃcer corps.
Endogenous factors
It is important to note that the allied policies of demilitarisation were
viewed largely as legitimate by West German society, a signiﬁcant diﬀ-
erence from the situation after the First World War when allied
punishment and reparation were deemed ‘unjust’, thus helping nurture
the continuance of the German general staﬀ and its political role. This
time the obliteration of Germany’s sources of military power was nei-
ther publicly disputed nor resented, being instead accepted by and made
the oﬃcial policy of the new Federal Government. As von Friedeburg
noted, in the construction of West Germany’s new identity and inter-
national rehabilitation, its peaceful economic and social reconstruction,
military forces seemed totally irreconcilable.6
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Stunde Null brought with it an exhaustion of nationalism, in the
form of a disavowal of Germany’s militaristic past. The profound eﬀects
on German society of defeat in what had been an abnormal war resulted
in the feeling of ‘Never again’. This widespread determination to never
again allow the military to play a central role in the destiny of the
nation or to see military power play a deﬁning role in foreign policy
necessarily disposed a large sector of society to actively resist the rearm-
ing of West Germany. This public feeling was manifest in the idea of
Ohne Mich, or ‘count me out’, a broadly based movement which came
to characterise domestic reticence about and opposition to military
issues. A further crucial aspect of Stunde Null was the defamation of
the soldier, as seen in the collapse of the respect and prestige attach-
ing to the vocation of the soldier and delegitimising of military values
and traditions.
The manifestations of these external and internal aspects of Stunde
Null were apparent in the Basic Law, which, in its initial conception,
did not plan or make provisions for future armed forces. At its incep-
tion, the Federal Republic was a state without an army. It was not
until the processes of rearmament were concluded that a mass of
security and military-related laws were incorporated into the Basic
Law in March 1956. What was present in the constitution in 1949
was a three-tiered construction of checks and balances, directly relat-
ing to the past, which together remained the cornerstones of the
Federal Republic’s security policies. This triad of constitutional clauses
was constituted by:
• article 26, which sees as unconstitutional ‘[a]cts tending and under-
taken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relation between
nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war’;
• article 24, which permits the Federal Republic to enter a system of
mutual collective security; and
• article 4, which declared: ‘No one may be compelled against his con-
science to render war service involving the use of arms.’
In both its exogenous and endogenous manifestations, the eﬀects of
Stunde Null were diametrically opposed to the rearming, in whatever
way, of the ﬂedging Federal Republic. However, the imperatives of
rearmament rapidly accelerated and, together with Konrad Adenauer’s
disposition towards the regaining of sovereignty through alliance
with the West, the task in hand became not so much if or when
rearmament would occur, but how.
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The rising imperatives of rearmament: ‘the requirements’
. . . like undertakers performing an amputation on a corpse. For ﬁve years
we have been blowing up bunkers, cutting holes in air raid shelters, dis-
mantling factories, silting harbours, banning the production of toy
soldiers and pop-guns and re-orienting the German mind. Having
stripped Germany of every possibility of defense, the irony of the sudden
appeal to the Germans to get in there and defend what we believe in is
obvious. It is like mentioning a rope in the home of somebody who has
been hanged.7
The imperative of realising West German rearmament was from the
very outset conceived of within a broader Euro-Atlantic setting. Even
prior to Adenauer’s initial oﬀers of a West German defence contribu-
tion and the subsequent deliberations over the European Defence
Community (EDC) and then NATO membership, it was clear to many
that rearmament was inevitable and the imperative was to make sure
that West Germany was on the ‘right side’. With the exacerbation of
East–West tensions in late 1947, US planners remained faced with the
most alarming forecasts of potential conﬂict in Europe based on the
operation plan ‘Oﬀtackle’. Premissed on this plan, almost all of West-
ern Germany would be ‘occupied even in the best case scenario’, and
Western Europe as a whole would have trouble holding a defensive line
at the Pyrenees. With the profound dearth of manpower in Central
Europe, the logical remedy, in the view of the US and the UK, was the
rearmament of West Germany. In this context, a West German con-
tribution was deemed an essential anchor in the West’s security, as a
means of sharing the defence burden and of resisting emerging ten-
dencies to create a neutralised zone in the heart of Europe. In West
Germany, although the reappearance of uniformed Germans was still
largely an illegitimate idea, the Christian Democratic leadership was
predisposed to meet British and American interests in order to secure
its own objectives, namely the acquisition of sovereignty, international
rehabilitation as an equal through integration with the West, as well as
solid allied security guarantees. In essence, the raising of a West Ger-
man defence contribution was to be the ‘epoxy’, or glue, that bonded
a mutually advantageous set of policies.
Stunde Null and West German strategic culture 29
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd  30/06/2004  16:25  Page 29
Internal discord: an armed force for what?
The real intensity and the nature of the Soviet threat, its bearing on
the security of the Federal Republic and what would be the best means
of dealing with it were issues of dispute in the party politics of the new
West German State. Party-political discord over rearmament revealed
the innate diﬀerences between the Christian Democratic Party (CDU)
and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on their perception of the form
that West German grand strategy should take and the best means to
prioritise and realise national unity. For those reasons it is worth
sketching out the principal diﬀerences between these positions before
moving on to outline the ideas that won through.
Adenauer’s approach to the rearming of West Germany must be
understood in the context of his Politik der Stärke (‘policy of strength’),
but this was tempered by his conviction that West German rearma-
ment was to be avoided unless absolutely necessary. In an interview in
the Cleveland Plain Dealer on 3 December 1949, Adenauer reaﬃrmed
his position that the rearming of the Federal Republic could be con-
sidered only if ‘there was no way out’,8 and was then plausible only in
the context of a European army, with a German contingent under Euro-
pean command, since for Adenauer ‘neutralisation, non-alignment, no
alliances, were sordid words’.9
In the wake of the interview, Adenauer’s conception of rearmament
gained greater clarity. Three interrelated factors determined his attitude:
• the acquisition of sovereignty as a consequence of rearmament;
• security against the rearmament of the Eastern Zone by Soviet Rus-
sia;
• the establishing of a European Federation entry into NATO.
From this point onwards Adenauer became less ambiguous about his
desire to actualise a West German defence contribution. Again, what
he was never ambiguous about was his conviction that West German
rearmament could occur only in the context of a broader West Euro-
pean framework, and that a West German armed force would have
anything but an exclusively defensive function.
With the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, which Adenauer
likened to West Germany’s geopolitical situation, he was able to put
more boldly the oﬀer of a West German contribution to the defence
of Western Europe, together with demands to end the occupation of
the Federal Republic as a quid pro quo. On 29 August 1950 Adenauer
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presented two memoranda to the Allied High Commission: one on the
security of the Federal area, internally and externally; and another on
questions relating to new structures for the occupation of the Federal
Republic. The ﬁrst outlined developments in the GDR, the creation of
the Kasernierten Volkspolizei (KVP) and spoke of some kind of Federal
police force to guard against internal subversion, at the same time call-
ing on the allies to strengthen their own forces in the region; while the
second made it clear that a defence contribution could be made only
by a sovereign Federal Republic. Crucially for Adenauer, a less than
sovereign West Germany under less than equal terms of allied tutelage
would not be enough; moreover, continued occupation, in any shape
or form, and the mere illusion of sovereignty might engender the type
of anti-Western feeling prevalent in Germany after the First World
War. In short, Adenauer saw that ‘the rapid development of the army
was the means to a political end, integration with the West’; and this
close alliance with the West presented the Federal Republic with the
only possible route to the ultimate goal of reuniﬁcation. In 1950,
when addressing the Bundestag on the issue of rearmament, Adenauer
lucidly presented the situation as he saw it: ‘the German defence con-
tribution was necessary, the West wanted it, and the Germans owed it
to civilization to produce it’.10
Adenauer’s vision of rearmament, sovereignty and integration with
the West was severely criticised by other voices and from the SPD.
Strong anti-rearmament sentiments lay behind Gustav Heinemann’s
resignation from his position as minister for internal aﬀairs in 1950.
Heinemann’s argument contrasted starkly with that of Adenauer, see-
ing that it was social rather than military rearmament that West
Germany should move towards, which would thus enable the possibil-
ity of uniﬁcation with the East and the construction of Germany as a
neutralised zone.
Unsurprisingly, the opposition’s ﬁrst response was a blanket refusal
to even consider the prospect of rearmament, and as debate proceeded
on the issue the SPD’s line of argument ran against that of the CDU
on almost every count. It was the primacy of domestic politics, national
unity and socio-economic reconstruction that guided the party’s posi-
tion on rearmament. Moreover, party leader Kurt Schumacher saw
that such considerations should not be the business of the ﬂedgling
Federal Republic as was dictated by the occupation statute.11 In oppo-
sition to Adenauer’s Politik der Stärke, the SPD at this time viewed
rearmament as possibly squandering chances to realise national unity
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by exacerbating Cold War tensions. The route to national unity and
international rehabilitation could be secured only by resisting the
entanglement of the Federal Republic within Euro-Atlantic structures
and, initially, by repelling rearmament, until social conditions were
improved and a European political authority had been created. The
SPD’s position came to be increasingly at odds with the CDU’s and
was increasingly intransigent, being heavily ﬂavoured by anti-militarism
and the pursuit above all else of national unity. By the time that NATO
membership for the Federal Republic had become a possibility, the SPD
was declaring that should West Germany enter the alliance all chances
for national unity would be dead.
Discord between the CDU and the SPD persisted on security ques-
tions even after the rearmament of West Germany had been sanctioned.
As seen in the ﬁerce Bundestag debates in early 1956 over the struc-
ture of the new armed forces, the issue of manpower mirrored the two
parties’ overall positions on the broader matter of rearmament. The
SPD held the position that the Bundeswehr should be designed to bal-
ance the military presence in the GDR. Subsequently, for this task, a
large standing force on the basis of universal conscription would not
be necessary; indeed the return of conscription would compromise fun-
damental human rights and also require an amendment of the
constitution. As the SPD conceived it, conscription would not be
required to guard against the re-emergence of the armed forces as an
isolated state within a state; moreover it would actively impede eﬀorts
at reunifying the two Germanies.
Meanwhile, in line with his strategy of equality and integration
through rearmament, Adenauer favoured a large land-based force, and
that necessitated the reintroduction of conscription. Without con-
scription, the argument ran, not only would the projected manpower
structure of 500,000 men be unattainable, but the Bundeswehr would
be unable to augment to around 1 million without a substantial
reservist element ensured by conscription. This preference was bol-
stered, according to the CDU, by historical precedence, encapsulated
in the belief that despite all attempts by politicians, professional armed
forces in the Federal Republic would inevitably emerge as a danger-
ously isolated ‘state within a state’. Conscription was viewed by the
party also as commensurate with the new democratic ethos of West
Germany.
It was Adenauer’s ideas and the paradigm that ‘size matters’, the
embedding of the FRG within Euro-Atlantic structures and the creation
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of a 500,000-strong Bundeswehr based on conscription, that ultimately
won through. The law on compulsory military service was passed in
July 1956, closely followed by the alternative Civic Service Act. This
conﬁguration served a couple of objectives: it ﬁrmly embedded the
Federal Republic, as an equal, within the Western camp; and it awarded
West Germany political capital and a degree of sovereignty.
Institutionalising West German rearmament
Concern over the rearming of West Germany and its institutional set-
ting in line with US plans was apparent in the French ‘Pleven plan’, as
announced on 24 October 1950. The Pleven plan’s proposed Euro-
peanising of the German problem through the creation of an EDC
implied the dilution of West Germany’s role. Aside from presidential
ceremonial guards, there would be no independent West German
forces; there would be a single European uniform, and command and
control would be directed from a supranational level, with ultimate
authority in the hands of a Board of Commission. This body would have
extensive powers, embracing the range of functions normally fulﬁlled by
national ministries of defence, the army, navy, air force, the treasury and
the chiefs of staﬀ. The Pleven option, which foresaw the dispersal of
West German soldiers under non-German command, would mean sin-
gularisation for the Federal Republic, since the potential for West Ger-
man input to decision-making was from the very outset low, with West
German soldiers being automatically denied high-ranking positions.
Although Adenauer put his personal credibility behind the EDC proj-
ect, and was hugely disappointed when it collapsed, he was also keen
to realise the accession of the Federal Republic to the Atlantic Alliance
as an equal member. As detailed earlier, for Adenauer, NATO mem-
bership always entailed as much political capital as it did military
security for the Federal Republic, by awarding him diplomatic and
political leverage. The rejection of the EDC treaties by the French
National Assembly on 31 August 1954 was to enable this possibility.12
As noted above, even before the EDC option was dead and buried,
Adenauer pursued the NATO and sovereignty option. According to
Schwartz, Adenauer ‘regarded unlimited sovereignty as just as impor-
tant as NATO membership’.13 Adenauer’s preference for West
Germany’s NATO membership converged neatly with US and British
designs. In London and Washington plans had already been drawn up
on ways in which the Federal Republic’s entry in to NATO could be
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realised. Soon after the French rejection of the EDC British diplomacy
took forward the NATO option. The path eventually pursued was the
‘European Solution’, involving an extension of the 1948 Brussels Pact,
which had made the Western Union into a Western European Union
(WEU), incorporating both Italy and the Federal Republic. The
WEU–NATO path paved the way for permanent British and American
military contributions to continental Europe and also ensured West
Germany’s entry in to NATO with the right balance of control and
manoeuvrability.14 Despite ongoing SPD objections and the attempted
mobilisation of union protest, the Bundestag ratiﬁed the Paris treaties
in February 1995 and the Federal Republic entered NATO in May of
that year. Subsequent to this, the Parliament passed a bill enabling the
Government to raise an army of 6,000 volunteers. In assuring the rear-
mament of the Federal Republic through membership in NATO,
together with the acquisition of sovereignty, Adenauer proclaimed that
‘we have reached the target we had set for ourselves very quickly’.15
Designing a new armed forces: Soldat aus der Retorte
Even before the rearmament debates really took oﬀ, thinking about the
prospect of a rearmed West Germany and what the substance of a new
armed forces might be had already begun in military circles in Ger-
many. General Graf Kielmansegg, one of Adenauer’s military advisors
and a main protagonist in the internal design of the Bundeswehr, saw
rearmament as ‘inevitable’ already in 1946. What Kielmansegg and
other early thinkers had to assure was that West Germany was on the
right side and also to measure the likely internal and external demands
and constraints on a new armed forces. Although Adenauer had little
empathy with the military as a whole, and with the oﬃcer corps in par-
ticular, he was acutely aware of the meaning and the political inﬂuence
a substantial armed forces would bring to West Germany. Since, as
detailed above, Adenauer was conscious of the inherent connection
between armed forces and sovereignty and for Adenauer a state without
armed forces was ‘no state at all’.16
Already, in 1948, Adenauer had begun to seek advice from former
soldiers, most notably Generals Schwerin, Speidel and Heusinger, on
the possibility of a future West German defence contribution. These
former Wehrmacht senior oﬃcers and generals had respectable cre-
dentials and, importantly, shared Adenauer’s vision of a new large West
German ‘post-national’ armed force located ﬁrmly within the Western
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camp as an equal partner. Many of these discussions and plans were
subsequently conducted within the frame of an embryonic defence
ministry in the Dienstelle Blank, headed by Theodor Blank who had
been assigned the position of ‘Commissioner of the Chancellor for
Questions Relating to the Augmentation of Allied Troops’. The accu-
mulation of much of this early thinking and dialogue with ex-military
oﬃcials was incorporated within the Himmeroder Denkschrift.17
The Himmeroder Denkschrift
Drafted in October 1950 and declassiﬁed in 1977, the Denkschrift
represents the ﬁrst systematic West German thinking on the design
of a new armed forces. What comes across in the Denkschrift is an
unyielding desire to fundamentally rethink the soldier’s relationship to
state and society, to deal with the past and to root any new military
ﬁrmly within a post-national setting and the legal–constitutional frame-
work of the emergent Federal Republic. In this sense the Denkschrift
demonstrates that the draftees were intensely aware of the changed
domestic and international contexts in which a new armed forces had
to be conceived.
The three core aims of the meeting at Himmerod were to clarify:
• if, given the military and psychological prerequisites of the Western
allies, a West German defence contribution could be made.
• how, in terms of organisation and command functions, a West Ger-
man contingent could be realised in the context of a West European
army; and
• in what form the build-up of West German troops could take place.
The contents of the Denkschrift echo Adenauer’s motif of Politik
der Stärke, seeing that the overcoming of Soviet aggression could be
achieved only through the raising of military strength in Western
Europe, including a sizeable West German contribution. The
Denkschrift was also explicit in its identiﬁcation of a Euro-Atlantic
framework as the only context in which security for the Federal Repub-
lic could be attained as well as that within which any West German
defence contribution should thus be realised. Further deﬁning fea-
tures of the Denkschrift included the necessity of identifying clear legal
constraints on the new military in terms of limiting its role to Europe
and also in terms of placing the armed forces under the jurisdiction of
the Federal government and under the scrutiny of both the Bundestag
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and the Bundesrat. The Denkschrift also outlined the need to trans-
form the relationship of the soldier to state and society, to which end
a new Inneres Gefüge, or inner structure (the pre-cursor to Innere
Führung, or moral leadership), was debated. The draftees were clearly
mindful of the historical precedent and were adamant that any new
German contingent should not become an isolated state within a state,
subject only to its own rules and traditions. This time the individual
soldier and the armed forces as a whole should be supportive and
also equipped to enjoy democracy. To this end the Denkschrift spoke
of the necessity of legally reducing the basic rights of the soldier only
during the speciﬁc time of service and at the same time expanding
to an unprecedented level the possibilities of democratic political
participation for the soldier.
What is striking about this thinking is that the impetus came entirely
from the Germans and, even more surprisingly perhaps, from the Ger-
man military. Although Adenauer and other politicians had input to
the design of civil–military relations and the armed forces’ internal
structure, it was really a major concern only for the military, who
realised that success for the Federal Republic and its armed forces
was clearly going to be dependent on a radical rethink of the role of
the armed force, its position in society and its relationship to politics.
The ideas proposed at Himmerod were deemed too revolutionary by
the allies who wanted to reinstitute the German soldier of the Second
World War whose courage, discipline and stamina they had come to
know. This new thinking on internal structures, it seemed to the allies,
could actually weaken a new West German armed forces. One of the
chief proponents of the Bundeswehr’s internal design noted that ‘it took
some time to convince [the allies of] what German military thinkers
actually envisaged and to persuade them of the merits of a thorough
reconstruction of civil–military relations’.18
Constructing rearmament: ‘the outcomes’
The sections above presented the often opposing ideas as to if, how and
in what form West German rearmament should proceed. The
antecedents of the new West German strategic culture came from the
fusion of an exogenously imposed will and set of demands, together
with endogenous factors, namely the widespread anti-military senti-
ment present in West German society, together with eﬀorts from sectors
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of the political elite to rehabilitate the Federal Republic as an equal in
Euro-Atlantic institutions and to achieve sovereignty.
Although the broad institutional frameworks for West Germany’s
rearmament were in place by the mid 1950s it took some time to actu-
ally realise it. The Bundestag passed a bill in July 1955 for the raising
of 6,000 volunteers and it took a further year to implement the
Soldatengesetz. Furthermore, although the conscription bill was passed
by Parliament in July 1956, it was not until the following April that
the ﬁrst conscripts were inducted. Such delays meant that rearmament
fully in line with initial plans did not transpire until 1965, when twelve
West German divisions were assigned to SACEUR (Supreme Allied
Command Europe).
Institutional frameworks: embedding West German security policy
The institutional embedding of West German security policy was com-
prised of political, strategic and spatial elements.
As a direct reﬂex to the past, rearmament took place in a setting of
multilateralism, entailing a break with a traditional military vocation,
namely one based on purely nationally based decision-making and
command and control structures. Under article 24 of the Basic Law,
which allowed West Germany to ‘enter a system of mutual collective
security for the purpose of preserving peace’, the founding of the Bun-
deswehr was a crucial step in the rehabilitation of West Germany
through its membership in NATO and the WEU within the Western
community. Thus the Federal Republic’s security identity became a
‘substitute identity’, intimately bound up with the greater Western
cause as demonstrated by its ‘penetrated’ security decision-making
framework and the subordination of all West German troops to
NATO’s allied command. The removal of national central command
structures was a prerequisite for the allied sanctioning of rearmament,
given the anti-democratic nature of previous German general staﬀs.
Instead command was provided by an ‘integrated military commander’
(eventually SACEUR), which acted as the ‘guardian of German mili-
tary interests’.19 The nulliﬁcation of the German general staﬀ was
equally important as a prerequisite for domestic consent as recognised
in the Himmeroder Denkschrift.
The Bundeswehr was conceived, legally activated and legitimised on
the premiss that it was an armed force solely for the defence of West
German territory and that of its NATO allies. This was based on a
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conﬂict scenario of the Warsaw Pact as aggressor and NATO as the
framework for the Federal Republic’s response. This scenario necessi-
tated nuclear deterrence and forward defence, with the Bundeswehr to
act as a ‘trip-wire’ geared to dissuade any potential aggressor from the
threat or use of military force by virtue of its combat eﬀectiveness and
high level of operational readiness. In the words of a former Bun-
deswehr Generalinspekteur, the Bundeswehr had ‘to be good enough to
ﬁght in order not to ﬁght’.20
The political and strategic aspects outlined above translated into a
legally stymied territorial role for the Bundeswehr. Since the Federal
Republic’s ability to raise forces and enter into a collective security sys-
tem was restrained by the provisions of article 87a, which saw that the
Bundeswehr could be deployed only for defence purposes or for some
other reason explicitly outlined in the Basic Law, the remit of the Bun-
deswehr was tightly deﬁned as relating only to the territorial defence
of the Federal Republic and its NATO allies. Such a remit precluded
unilateralism and collapsed national interests into those of the alliance
as a whole. Despite West Germany’s entry in to the United Nations in
1973, this spatially restricted deﬁnition of the Bundeswehr’s remit was
further tightened by the Federal Security Council’s later decision in
1982 which ruled against the legality of deployments ‘out-of-area’, thus
conﬁrming the limited territorial role of the Bundeswehr.
Civil–military relations: at the heart of the matter
The institutional frameworks outlined above deﬁned the outer param-
eters for the creation of the Bundeswehr; these satisﬁed the demands
and expectations of NATO allies by oﬀering them a viable large ﬁght-
ing force totally wedded to and serving the alliance. Despite this clear
institutional framework, which also furthered Adenauer’s policy of
‘strength and equality’, patterns and practices of civil–military relations
and the position of the soldier in both state and society also had to be
reconceived if domestic complicity was to be assured. The success of
the Bundeswehr in terms of acceptance and legitimacy at home would
stem naturally from the degree of threat perception, but only if a res-
olute break with the ‘unhealthy’ civil–military relations that had
previously existed was made.
This very diﬃcult task, given that militaries tend to rely for their
self-image and legitimacy on lengthy histories and traditions, could be
achieved only through a range of balancing and checking measures,
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with the aim of creating a soldier who considered himself – and was
considered by society – to be supportive of democracy. The new armed
forces were not to be held above, forced below or allowed to perpetu-
ate themselves within the new State, but were rather to coalesce with
the Federal Republic via an extremely broad interface of civil–military
relations. Unlike earlier incarnations of the German military, which
had been either too weak or too strong, the Bundeswehr was to ﬁnd
equilibrium with state and society chartered through constitutional law.
As was emphasised at Himmerod, of paramount importance for
future civil–military relations, societal acceptance and the viability of a
new military was a satisfactory dealing with the past. An optimal bal-
ance of the past with a view to the future, meant the salvaging of the
best and workable parts of the past, together with a thorough appraisal
of the soldier’s role in German history as well as the embracing of new
ideas and formulas. Former Generalinspekteur Ulrich de Maizière
describes the birth of the Bundeswehr as a ‘new creation with a tradi-
tion’,21 typifying the balance of old and new apparent in the forging of
the Bundeswehr. Although the idea of Stunde Null is largely an accurate
one for thinking about West German rearmament, and certainly the
Bundeswehr did, to an extent ‘enjoy’ the grace of ‘zero hour’, it must
be stressed that much of the past continued to play an important role
in the design of the new armed forces.
In the years after Himmerod when the actual architecture of the Bun-
deswehr was being constructed, the diﬃculties of achieving an optimal
balance of old and new became clear, given the exigencies of realising
the Bundeswehr as soon as possible, the actual resources and manpower
available, together with the doubts raised by the allies as to the desir-
ability and feasibility of fundamental civil–military reform.22 Of prime
importance was the requirement to enact the rehabilitation of the
German soldier and to somehow desegregate his honour from the
crimes of National Socialism. This was, to an extent, satisﬁed when
both Adenauer and Eisenhower stated their personal recognition of the
courageous endeavours of the German soldier and importantly made
a distinction between the German soldier and the ideological servant
of Hitler.23 This was crucial given that in terms of personnel, the Bun-
deswehr, up until the 1970s, largely had to rely on soldiers who had
served in the Wehrmacht and the Reichswehr. The restoration of hon-
our instilled a sense of worth and bolstered the self-image of the soldier,
becoming an important factor in the formulation of a workable tradi-
tion for the Bundeswehr. Tradition for the Bundeswehr would have to
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present a de-gloriﬁcation and a disrobing of German militarism of its
pomp and ceremony. The military in the Federal Republic had to escape
from its reactionary past and somehow become a ‘mascot’ of the new
democracy; this, moreover, had to be achieved at a time when most
of its leading manpower were former Wehrmacht soldiers and when
even the basic credentials of the new State were still in a process of
gestation by society at large.
In the formulation of a workable tradition for the Bundeswehr the
best parts of the past were to be salvaged while the less workable aspects
were to form a standard by which the future soldier could gauge the bal-
ance of conscience, rights and duties central to his vocation. Parts of
military life prior to the Third Reich and, most importantly, the great
Prussian reforms under Scharnhorst formed part of a workable past; but
military history was to be read through ongoing criticism and contin-
ued scrutiny. At the core of the emergent tradition lay the plot against
Hitler’s life of 20 July 1944, symbolising the Bundeswehr’s accent on
honour through conscience rather than honour through obedience.
Together with the centrality of the Basic Law, a dynamic sense of history
was created for the Bundeswehr, bridging the old with the new.
Reconceiving the soldier in state and society
Reconceiving the soldier in the West German State and its society
involved two interconnected issues: the legal embedding of the Bun-
deswehr within a functioning democracy; and the reordering of the
military’s Innere Ordnung (inner order).
The notion of Primat der Politik (primacy of politics) as the leitmo-
tif for the embedding of the Bundeswehr within the democracy of the
Federal Republic was manifest in a dense and multifaceted set of prac-
tices and institutions that served to anchor and navigate all aspects of
security policy-making into constitutional law. The context of rearma-
ment precluded from the very outset the creation of an armed force
solely under the jurisdiction of martial law or solely subject to parti-
san politics. Instead, the dictates of Primat der Politik meant that the
armed forces and security policies were situated ﬁrmly within the exec-
utive and surrounded by a dense web of civilian control. Crucially the
Oberbefehl, or supreme command, resided in the hands of a civilian
defence minister and consequently of the chancellor at times of crisis;
while the highest-ranking soldier, the generalinspekteur, quite unlike
the general staﬀ of former times, was to act only as a military ‘advisor’
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to his civilian superiors. Legislation on defence matters, including
manpower structures and defence budgets, were securely a matter for
the Bundestag and further enhanced by the Defence Committee.
Augmenting the Primat der Politik were the functions of the Wehrbeauf-
tragte, the parliamentary ombudsman for the armed forces, again
empowered with extensive rights of access and scrutiny in assessing the
correct implementation of Innere Führung in the Bundeswehr.
Also within the paradigm of Primat der Politik, adjudicating the bal-
ance of rights and duties in the life of the soldier was the new
Soldatengesetz (Soldier’s Law), which was essentially to ensure that
democracy was not suspended in the military. The Soldatengesetz out-
lined the primacy of the soldier’s identity as a citizen, with all the
freedoms that this entailed, while at the same time it speciﬁed the essen-
tial constraints on the soldier, in accordance with his profession, that
require a limitation of his full rights during, but only during, the period
of service: ‘Der Soldat hat die gleichen staatsbürgerlichen Rechte wie
jeder andere Staatsbürger. Seine Rechte werden im Rahmen der Erford-
nisse des militärischen Dienstes durch seine gestetzlich begründeten
Pﬂichten beschränkt.’ 24
Bürger in uniform and Innere Führung
The leitmotif for the intellectual, political and moral reform of the mil-
itary, were Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform).
The ideas of Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform were direct reﬂex-
ive responses to the past, aimed at instilling in the soldier a high level
of ‘thinking obedience’ to guard against Befehl ist Befehl (orders are
orders) being used as an excuse for atrocities, and to prevent the estab-
lishment of the military as a Fremdkörper (alien body) or a state within
a state again, by bridging the chasm between the military and society
that had characterised all previous German states.
Behind these notions, developed principally by Baudissin, lay the
desire to fundamentally reorder the military’s and the individual sol-
dier’s place in and relationship to state and society. For Baudissin in
the age of total warfare and ideological conﬂict ‘spiritual armament’
was as important for the success of the Bundeswehr as were material
capabilities. For the soldier to accomplish his mission he would have
to be fully furnished with those freedoms and rights to the military
defence of which he commits himself; he was to be ‘given the feeling
that he is a member of a free nation standing on the side of freedom’.25
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Baudissin stressed the notion that ‘German defence can be expressed
only in the symbol of armed democracy’ and that ‘the potential which
the German armed forces will add to European and Atlantic defence is
closely connected with the extent to which the free way of life has mean-
ing for Germans and the extent to which the German soldier identiﬁes
himself with it’.26
Put simply, Innere Führung is the programme and ethos for the
internal order of the Bundeswehr and it is through adherence to the
Basic Law and Innere Führung that the soldier as a Bürger in Uni-
form can be realised and maintained. Both notions are by deﬁnition
dynamic in nature precluding, again as a direct reﬂex to the past, the
emergence of the armed forces as a stolid, or worse, reactionary
entity. Innere Führung, best understood as an ‘anti-ideology’, entails
‘civics education and moral leadership’, and is the tool through which
the Basic Law gains meaning for the soldier by delineating both the
possibilities and limits to his vocation, providing the link between val-
ues and standards in the Basic Law to leadership, education and
training in the Bundeswehr. Innere Führung was aimed at ameliorat-
ing the tensions thrown up by the demands of military service and
life as a full citizen; it ensures the operational readiness of the Bun-
deswehr on the one hand and the rights of the servicemen on the
other. Through Innere Führung the old ‘warrior’ vocational model of
the soldier was replaced by the representation of the soldier as more
a ‘technician’, thus reducing the diﬀerences between the military and
civilian society.
The Bürger in Uniform was the ideal and the reality which Innere
Führung was to create. As already outlined, the Bürger in Uniform was
to be a fully ﬂedged member of society imbued with full rights of polit-
ical participation and responsibility – to be circumscribed only by law
and only for the duration of military service, the aim here in the basic
architecture of the Bundeswehr being to dispose of the ideological caste
of the military and to initiate the ﬂourishing of a wide array of polit-
ical and social ideas. This new political soldier, created with a view to
the past and the dangers of both apolitical neutrality and overt politi-
cisation of the military, was to engage fully with civilian politics in his
right to vote and to stand for oﬃce.
Essentially, the Bundeswehr was to be as far as possible a mirror
of society and was to be welded to that society through a broad inter-
face of institutions and mechanisms. The place of the armed forces
within society at large has continually been stressed: ‘the federal armed
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forces, in so far as their tasks permit, take part in the intellectual,
political and technical development of society’.27 Through its range of
practices, the Bundeswehr was intended to be reactive rather than
reactionary, inclusivist rather than exclusivist, and pluralistic rather
than monistic, and capable of emulating the broader liberal demo-
cratic credentials of the Federal Republic. The accent, then, was on a
broad civil–military relationship and one that was inherently porous.
Conscription: a linchpin
Wir sind dabei ein Werk der Demokratie zu schaﬀen. Die Wehrpﬂicht ist
das legitime Kind der Demokratie.28
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the adoption of universal male con-
scription as a basis for the Bundeswehr went far beyond being an issue
of mere manpower. Conscription was a linchpin, coordinating external
and internal requirements for rearmament; fulﬁlling both strategic
demands for a large armed force within NATO and domestic require-
ments for a democratically viable armed force. Vibrant party-political
debates in the 1950s on manpower structures replicated and symbol-
ised opposing political conceptions and priorities on national unity, the
importance of the Western alliance, the nature of the Soviet threat and
conceptions of national interests. To reiterate, conscription was seen as
a prerequisite by the Government right from the start in its concep-
tion of a large land-based armed force ﬁrmly grounded as an equal
partner within the Western alliance driven by the desirability of Bund-
nisfähigkeit (alliance credibility).29 In contrast, the opposition’s design
for rearmament envisaged a far smaller armed force with the expressed
aim of balancing the military of the GDR.30
The conception of the Bundeswehr that won through was, as out-
lined earlier, premissed on Adenauer’s paradigm of ‘size and strength’.
This necessitated the introduction of military service since such a large
armed forces could not be achieved through volunteers alone, espe-
cially considering the desired augmented crisis strength of over 1
million soldiers. Thus compulsory universal conscription for a period
of twelve months was introduced in September 1956. Conscription
was further legitimised by the Government on the grounds that it was
a manifestation of the democratic credentials of the new armed forces.
It was elected as the best means to preclude the Bundeswehr’s isola-
tion from society, to ensure the congruence of military and societal
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values, and to guard against the emergence of the military as a state
within a state. As Theodor Blank argued, conscription would be vital
in ensuring the democratic integrity of the armed forces:
Ein Berufsheer steht immer in der Gefahr, ein ‘Staat im Staate’ zu wer-
den. Das militärische Eigenleben, wenn es nicht durch den laufenden
Zustrom von Wehrpﬂichtigen aufgelockert wird, kann trotz allen guten
Willens der politischen und militärischen Führung und der parlamen-
tarischen Kontrolle zu einer Isolierung der Soldatenführen Der
unmittelbare Kontakt zum ganzen Volk, der allein die auch militärisch
notwendige Eingliederung in die staatliche Gesamtordnung bewirkt, wird
nur dann im wünschenswerten und notwendigen Ausmass vorhanden
sein, wenn alle Männer verpﬂichtet sind, in dieser Armee zu dienen.31
Further justifying its position, the Government referred to the long tra-
dition of conscription in Germany, placing the short and culpable
existence of the Berufsheer as an interruption to this tradition. Con-
scription was placed as something almost natural to the German
condition, while the professional armed force was the creation of an
absolutist state; a reactionary or even ‘depraved’ type of armed force.
This line of justiﬁcation was drawn out by President Heuss in his
famous dictum positioning conscription as the legitimate child of
democracy, aiding and furthering the democratisation of the State by
turning the defence burden in to a matter for all citizens. For Graf
Baudissin and the other architects of the Bundeswehr too, conscription
would be the means through which Innere Führung and Bürger in
Uniform would gain real meaning and substance.
The SPD too was inclined to see the new armed forces as a break
with German militarism, and it supported and provided input to the
new internal order of the Bundeswehr and the practices of civil–mili-
tary relations. However, conscription for the SPD, as already discussed,
was neither strategically necessary nor a prerequisite for the democra-
tisation of the Bundeswehr. Conscription, it was argued, was a totally
reactionary idea and did not recognise the advent of the nuclear age in
warfare; it would also impede the reuniﬁcation of Germany by deep-
ening its division. Furthermore, Fritz Erler challenged the notion that
a professional armed forces endangered democracy and would neces-
sarily develop into a state within a state. For Erler, the Geist of the
whole military, whether a conscript or a professional force, would stem
from leadership styles, rules and laws, rather than sources of manpower.
Conscription was introduced and legitimised as strategically neces-
sary, but equally as the ultimate manifestation of the Federal Republic’s
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Western democratic identity, ultimately becoming the ‘clamp holding
together the armed forces and society’.32
Mapping West German strategic culture
After identifying the key disputes, processes and solutions that prevailed
during the formative period of West German strategic culture, it is now
possible to map its contours and substance, in line with the framework
developed in the previous chapter.
A ﬁrst step is to record the ideas and policy options that were rejected
or not even spoken of during this early formative period; this will con-
ﬁrm what West German strategic culture ‘was not about’. Again in the
case of the Federal Republic this is relatively easy to ascertain, since the
space for manoeuvre available to West Germany at this time was nar-
row, given the constraints imposed on it by allied dictates, coupled with
widespread domestic reticence and opposition to rearmament. Thus
from the very outset the range of possibilities was slim. The following
ideas and provisions have been drawn out as those which were excluded
from the process of rearmament from the very outset:
• that Germany was neither answerable nor responsible for the damage
inﬂicted by it during the war;
• a reticence to accept the imposition of the allied will or to resent it;
• the re-establishment of unilateral security and military policies;
• a striving to return as a leader in European security;
• the seeking of a security alliance with the Soviet sphere;
• rearmament and reinstallation of the role of the soldier without
conditions;
• the re-establishment of armed forces outside of parliamentary
scrutiny;
• that military force remained a viable tool of foreign policy in the
pursuit of national interests;
• that citizens should be compelled to perform military service; and
• that the mobilisation of armed forces could be premissed on national
sentiments.
Having identiﬁed what West German strategic culture was not about,
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it is now expedient to outline what is was about, in other words what
was included from the very outset.
Foundational elements
Chapter 1 detailed the foundational elements which provide the deeper
– basal – qualities, or fabric, of a strategic culture that have their origins
in the primordial or formative phase of development. These founda-
tional elements, which comprise basic beliefs and values regarding the
use of force, give a strategic culture its core characteristics and are
highly resilient to change; these tenets, or ‘higher issues’, refer to those
values and beliefs that are to be secured, protected and promoted. The
foundational elements of West German strategic culture are identiﬁed
as follows.
First, there is historical rupture. ‘Zero hour’ (Stunde Null) is posi-
tioned as a deﬁning point which negates much of previous German
history, especially recent history which is regarded as the ‘domain of
shame and guilt’;33 these psychological aspects became a crucial ingre-
dient in German security policy after 1945. Second, the use of force is
no longer regarded as a justiﬁable tool of foreign and security policy,
especially in the pursuit of national interests and twinned to this is the
value assigned to the pursuit of stability and consensus-building. Third,
the redundancy of militarism is evident in West German strategic cul-
ture: the military was no longer seen, by others or by itself, as the
embodiment of national consciousness, identity and pride; moreover
the vocation of the soldier was defamed and state and society was emas-
culated of all aspects of military culture. Fourth, an exhaustion of statism
and nationalism prevailed: the nation state was rejected as the sole
organising principle and referent of allegiance; indeed the State was
seen as part of the problem and no longer the solution. This is mani-
fested in the rupture with a ‘traditional’ military vocation, one based
on national defence, grounded in realpolitik, enjoying sovereignty in
policy-planning and policy-making.
The linkage to policy preferences: security policy standpoints
The foundational elements of strategic culture, as posited in chapter 1,
steer policy preferences by excluding certain options while including
others; they delineate the range of legitimate options and lay out a ﬁnite
repertoire of possible options for the policy-maker to pursue. This
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occurs through the emergence of security policy standpoints which act
as intermediary factors, or ‘transmitters’, between foundational ele-
ments and regulatory practices. The intermediary security policy
standpoints of West German strategic culture are:
• an aversion to singularity, unilateralism and leadership in security
matters; a predilection to multilateral solutions and to conceive and
promote interests through these;
• a predisposition to promote stability in the security sphere;
• a preference for non-confrontational defence and deterrence, and an
opposition to war-ﬁghting strategies, while emphasising the broader
political role of armed forces;
• a general restraint on the use armed force, coupled with strong anti-
military sentiments;
• an aspiration both to pursue a responsible, calculable and account-
able security policy, and wherever possible to ‘make amends’ for
previous wrongdoings;
• a commitment to the full integration of the armed forces within
civilian politics and society, exerting strong political control over the
armed forces and embedding them within multilateral structures;
• a determination to pursue compromise and build consensus on both
domestic and international security policy decision-making levels.
These standpoints translate further into active policy choices – the reg-
ulatory practices of West German strategic culture.
Regulatory practices: governing premises and normative devices
The regulatory practices of West German strategic culture are expres-
sions of the foundational elements; they are observable manifestations,
which are the policies and practices that actively relate and apply the
substance of the strategic culture’s core to the external environment.
Regulatory practices are less resilient to change, and are split into two
types: governing premises, the broader institutional boundaries that gov-
erned West German security policies since 1949; and normative devices,
which apply speciﬁcally to the territory of civil–military relations.
West Germany’s governing premises are expressed in
• the spatially stymied, legally deﬁned, role of the Bundeswehr,
foreclosing out-of-area deployments;
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• the embedding of West German armed forces within NATO com-
mand structures; and
• the strategic and legally sanctioned design of the Bundeswehr for
defence–deterrence purposes.
The normative devices can be summarised thus:
• an ombudsman for the armed forces and a civilian defence minis-
ter ensure parliamentary control of the armed forces;
• a limited political role for the Bundeswehr generalinspekteur;
• Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform; and
• conscription and conscientious objection.
The cocoon of the Cold War
Despite numerous challenges, shifts in the international sphere and
developments in West German security policy in the decades after rear-
mament, the tenets of West Germany’s strategic culture, as detailed
above, persisted throughout the Cold War. This was due in no small
part to the fact that a cross-party consensus emerged on key foreign
and security questions, thus rendering West German strategic culture
more robust and centripetal in nature. In the post-1950 period, espe-
cially from 1959 onwards, once the SPD had embraced EEC
membership, earlier altercations over NATO and alliance strategy, as
well as the issue of the Bundeswehr and its structure, tended to dissi-
pate. This is not to say that challenges to existing modes and practices
did not arise; but when they did West German elites chose policy
options that were consonant with the existing strategic culture. Cru-
cially, any attempts to question or fundamentally disagree with existing
practices prompted debate and often ﬁerce criticism. Among the
numerous issues in respect of which West Germany’s freshly con-
structed strategic culture served to steer policy options, the question of
the Bundeswehr’s remit and NATO’s nuclear strategy in the 1980s stand
out as examples.
Altercation over the Bundeswehr’s remit surfaced when the Federal
Republic became a member of the United Nations in 1973, a move
which brought onto the agenda the issue of deploying soldiers for UN
peace missions. Those in favour of West German involvement in this
area argued that the Federal Republic’s economic strength should lead
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to a greater willingness to contribute, militarily if needed, to global
security. Although this idea went against the grain of West Germany’s
existing practices, proponents pointed to article 24 of the Basic Law
which permitted Germany to ‘enter a system of mutual collective secu-
rity for the purpose of preserving peace’. Others, however, argued that
West Germany’s willingness here was constrained by article 87a, which
stipulated that the Bundeswehr could be used only for defensive pur-
poses. A consideration of this debate through the prism of strategic
culture is instructive. It reveals a minor tension between two central
tenets of West German strategic culture – that of ‘reliable ally’ and
‘responsibility’ in security matters on the one hand, and that of ‘defence
function only’ on the other; and when calls came for greater West Ger-
man participation it was the latter tenet that predominated. The
out-of-area issue in its pre-1989 context seemed thus to conﬁrm that
the mainstay of strategic culture remained in place. In sum, prior to
the ending of the Cold War no alternative strategy was pursued: the
Bundeswehr’s remit was not stretched beyond its original NATO ‘in-
area’ defensive role, and, as the 1985 Defence White Paper saw it, ‘the
central mission of the Bundeswehr has not changed’.
As NATO strategy developed through the 1980s a chasm emerged
between West German elite and broader societal perceptions in the
face of what appeared to many to be the onset of a war-ﬁghting strat-
egy, epitomised in the proposed stationing of so-called ‘Euro-missiles’
on West German soil. In the face of widespread public dissent, the
SPD-led Government stuck with a pro-alliance, pro-US, policy, sanc-
tioning the deployments as a means to enhance security through
deterrence and seeing no ‘constructive alternative to the existing secu-
rity policy’.34 This case seems similarly to reveal a number of points
in relation to strategic culture – ﬁrst and foremost, that Bonn’s behav-
iour was again consistent with the postulates of strategic culture.
Crucially, West Germany’s position on the Euro-missiles sought to
further the primacy of deterrence by bolstering its credibility and thus
reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. Bonn’s policy sought also to
maintain the coupling, or aﬃnity, of West European defence with
that of the US. In essence, by following the US-led NATO line through-
out the period, as well as pursuing a concomitant policy of seeking
détente and arms’ control, West German leaders were adhering to the
core values of their strategic culture.
Throughout the period of the Cold War the foundational elements
of West German strategic culture remained a self-reinforcing ‘protected
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space’, and their substance was not questioned. Historical rupture, the
core from which policies subsequently emanated, remained in place
and was not challenged: the notion steered policy choices, and when
pre-1945 traditions and policy perspectives were advocated they were
swiftly discarded in favour of post-1945 ideas and practices. This rup-
ture is closely tied to the continued prevalence of anti-statism and
anti-nationalism, and any move to revert to statist–nationalist per-
spectives was rebuked, with the articulation of a clear preference for
and a commitment to continued multilateralism. Akin to this, the nega-
tion of unilateralism and avoidance of singularity reinforced West
Germany’s continued search for tight embeddedness, as an equal,
within cohesive Euro-Atlantic structures. Furthermore, these institu-
tional frameworks facilitated the articulation of a calculable, responsible
policy style aimed at the promotion of stability. This enduring com-
mitment to the furtherance of West Germany’s tight institutional frame
continued even during the era of Ostpolitik which, under Brandt, did
not question the Federal Republic’s membership of NATO and the EEC.
A stolid repulsion of militarism also prevailed during this period, as
seen in continued eﬀorts to sustain and further West Germany’s for-
mula for civil–military relations. Anti-military sentiment endured as a
visible facet of security policy, together with a manifest evasion of the
use of force as a reﬂexive tool of security policy. Indeed, general
restraint remained a deﬁning characteristic of the Federal Republic’s
overall stance on security policy up until the ending of the Cold War.
How can these broad continuities and the persistence of strategic
culture be explained? An answer is that the Cold War acted as a
‘cocoon’, actively precluding deviation from existing modes of thought
and policy options. Bonn’s Western allies were largely content with the
Federal Republic’s security policy proﬁle. This was matched by West
Germany’s limited manoeuvrability as determined by the East. On the
top of this, the West German leadership and the broader population
were disposed to pursue a low-key set of policies, which was under-
pinned by a ﬂourishing and stable socio-economic system, something
that Germany had never previously enjoyed.
The question that ﬂows from this concerns the eﬀect of the ending
of the Cold War on the existing strategic culture. More speciﬁcally, how
did the events of 1989–90 and the demise of a relatively settled period
inﬂuence Germany’s strategic culture, now writ large on the newly uni-
ﬁed state in the context of a less predictable and ‘unsettled’ period?
This question is addressed in chapter 3.
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3Germany and the use of force I:
adjusting to life after the Cold War
What does a nation do with its liberated power in the post-bipolar age
when the 40-year-old strategic threat has disappeared that previously
posed all the major questions and delivered most of the major answers? 1
The Bundeswehr has always been less a manifestation of statehood than
a means of defending against the Soviet threat. With this threat gone, the
very existence of the German military is in question.2
The ending of the Cold War gave rise to a range of pulls and pressures
both from within and from outside of Germany to respond to the
changes in the European security environment and to rethink the exist-
ing tenets of West Germany’s security policies. The statements quoted
above from Josef Joﬀe and Wolfgang Schlör capture the fundamental
quandaries that confronted German thinking about the use of force and
the role of the armed forces in the wake of the events of 1989–90. At
stake at this time was how the new Germany’s perspectives on the use
of military force could be re-orientated, away from the orthodoxy of
the previous forty years, to ensure Germany’s standing as a credible
and important ally equipped to deal with unprecedented risks and chal-
lenges in line with the pervading strategic culture. The steep learning
curve and incremental policy adjustment that occurred during the
1990s are examined in this chapter through the prism of the changing
role of the Bundeswehr during the period between the wars in the Gulf
and Kosovo of 1990 and 1999. In this time-frame the pace of change
was relatively swift, as German security policy exhibited an increasing
willingness to use armed force as part of a broadened repertoire of
security policy tools.
As this chapter demonstrates, the magnitude of the challenges for
German thinking about the use of force that were posed by the ending
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of the Cold War surpassed the fracture that had occurred in West Ger-
many over the intermediate nuclear force debates in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, when the consensus was challenged over NATO strategy.
The dilemmas thrown up by the ending of the Cold War exposed some
fundamental issues at the core of German strategic culture, raising the
question of the relationship between Germany’s past and contempo-
rary security policy choices, while also disturbing the balance that had
existed between the expectations of and the demands on German secu-
rity policy from both inside and outside of the Federal Republic. The
events of the late 1980s and early 1990s threw into confusion and dis-
cord what had been central tenets of West German security policy: a
robust cross-party consensus, a legally deﬁned remit for the armed
forces; the Bundeswehr as a conscript force; and the guiding principle
of deterrence above the active use of force.
Armee ohne Feindbild
As a result of the demise of the Soviet threat, the Bundeswehr became
an Armee ohne Feindbild, or armed force without a concept of an
enemy. Having been an armed force created, legitimised and organised
purely within the context of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr, more than
any other West European armed force, clearly faced a more funda-
mental set of tasks relating to re-orientation and reform. Indeed the
challenge after 1989–90 amounted to the imperative of comprehen-
sively reconceiving and recasting the Bundeswehr and its mission as an
armed force, but also its place within society and politics at large.
The acquisition of sovereignty in security matters, together with the
incorporation of numbers of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) 3 and the
capping of the Bundeswehr, under the proviso of the Two + Four
Treaty, from 500,000 to 370,000 provided the numerical parameters for
the task of redesigning the Bundeswehr. Further impulses derived from
the reworking of NATO into a predominantly political as opposed to
military entity and a shift from ﬂexible response and forward defence
towards a more diversiﬁed remit. The consequences of the ﬁrst Con-
ventional Forces in Europe Agreement, which removed the Soviet
Union’s ability to launch a surprise attack on Western Europe, some-
thing that had always been a basic assumption in Western security
planning and speciﬁcally in the Bundeswehr’s design and posture, pro-
vided a further structural change inﬂuencing Germany’s thinking about
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security. Concurrently with these exogenous changes, notions of a ‘mat-
uration’ of Germany in foreign and security policy terms came to the
fore, with a growing number of German and non-German elites inter-
ested to see the new Germany shouldering a greater part of the burden
in European and global security. In the midst of this, the CDU-led
Government in 1991 commissioned an expert report which, in its con-
clusions, surmised that the Bundeswehr’s role could and should be
expanded beyond national territorial defence to ‘make military contri-
butions to international security within the collective defence alliance
of NATO, the United Nations and possibly also the EC/WEU and future
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) commit-
ments in order to preserve territorial sovereignty’.4 Such thinking was,
however, ahead of its time. The evolution of German security policy
and, as part of this, a greater willingness to use armed force emerged
over time in an incremental fashion, the journey beginning with
Germany’s (non-)involvement in the Gulf War of 1990–1.
The trajectory of change
Change was initiated by the eﬀects the Gulf War had both on German
thinking about security and on the thinking of Germany’s allies about
Germany’s role as a security actor, the combined eﬀects of which
brought about a reappraisal of the role of the Bundeswehr and its
geographical remit. This in turn prompted a CDU-led strategy of pro-
gressively stretching the boundaries of armed forces’ use through
increasingly bold deployments. This strategy was checked, though not
stopped, by the constitutional debates of 1994 about the legality of
‘out-of-area’ missions. Since then and as seen most vividly in the
cases of Kosovo and East Timor, a trajectory of change was initiated in
the 1990s, with existing taboos breached, old convictions revised
and the role played by military force becoming a more routine and
uncontroversial aspect of German security policy.
Political catharsis and the Gulf War
The massive international eﬀort to halt Saddam Hussein has suddenly
confronted West Germans with all their deeply confused emotions about
the role of their country’s military.5
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The Germans were geared to show they weren’t a danger, and they then
were asked to do something very much outside of familiar patterns.6
Military participation in the Gulf was ostensibly ruled out by rather
than for the Germans. Constituting the ﬁrst post-Cold War exogenous
shock to established practices and policies, the conﬂict brought with it
a marked intensiﬁcation in the international expectations placed on
Germany.7 At the same time, the war had a cathartic eﬀect among Ger-
man elites, unleashing a debate on the status and purpose of German
military power after the Cold War.8
German participation in the Gulf on a level akin to that of Britain
or the United States was never on the agenda. Almost like a reﬂex, the
legal strictures restraining Germany’s use of armed force were espoused
by the leadership, who amid managing the uniﬁcation process, were
keen to demonstrate continuity in Germany’s foreign and security
policies, not least because the Soviet Union had yet to ratify the Two
+ Four Treaty. This stance was fortiﬁed by domestic reticence over and
active protest against not just German participation but the allied
campaign more broadly. The possibility of a UN-mandated military
contribution to the international eﬀort was mooted, however, by parts
of the governing CDU. In mid-August the Government proposed the
deployment of 4–6 German minesweepers in a WEU naval force located
in the Persian Gulf, thus potentially breaching the spatial limits of the
Bundeswehr’s remit. Pressure for this commitment came most vocally
from Kohl, his advisor Horst Teltschik and Defence Minister Gerhard
Stoltenberg, who argued that Germany should consider this deploy-
ment on the grounds of alliance solidarity and as a repayment to the
US for facilitating German uniﬁcation – dubbed a ‘moral and political
debt’. The key argument levied here was that the prevailing status of
the Bundeswehr was unsatisfactory, and in a changed international
environment Germany had no choice but to assume a greater degree
of responsibility, one commensurate with the country’s economic
power.9
Failing to mobilise support for a Gulf deployment, however, and hav-
ing concluded alongside its coalition partner that the Basic Law did not
permit such a contribution, Kohl presided over less sensational moves,
including the sending of mine-sweepers to the Mediterranean and Ger-
many’s assumption of the role of paymaster and provider of logistical
support.10 Even the dispatching of eighteen Bundeswehr Alpha jets
under the auspices of NATO’s Allied Mobile Force to Turkey was chal-
lenged by opposition parties and became possible only after a great deal
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of internal debate and on the back of relentless Conservative petition-
ing that the jets were to act as a deterrence and the move was a necessary
duty to Turkey, which was, after all, a NATO ally. Still the SPD con-
tended that the Government’s deployment to Turkey was overtly
oﬀensive in nature, was not in line with the Basic Law and not in accor-
dance with NATO’s collective defence mechanism. Despite this and
the overwhelming public opposition to German involvement at any
level, Kohl pushed forward the move, stressing that if Germany did not
fulﬁl its allied duties NATO as a whole would be endangered.
A discernible shift in both policy and the public mood emerged in
January 1991 in response to the presentation of Saddam Hussein as a
contemporary incarnation of Hitler and revelations that German ﬁrms
had been players in the arming of Iraq, which had now begun to tar-
get Israel. From that point onwards Germany showed a greater
readiness to deploy its armed forces as part of the international eﬀort,
as seen in the sending of German minesweepers to the Persian Gulf
after the war, as well as Bundeswehr assistance in the relief mission for
Kurdish refugees between April and June 1991. Importantly, these
actions went beyond the spatial limits of the Bundeswehr’s remit, eas-
ing in a new precedent, while being justiﬁed on humanitarian grounds
and linked to notions of German ‘responsibility’.
The catharsis occasioned by the Gulf War was made up of ﬁve inter-
connected elements:
• Discord emerged between external demands and conditions within
Germany. Policy-thinking was caught between expectations and
fears at home and abroad, and sought to do justice to both. As a
result, the sanctity of existing constitutional constraints on Bun-
deswehr deployments and Germany’s eurocentrism became jaded,
with both allies and portions of the German elite showing dismay
and frustration at the invoking of strict spatial limits, lack of Ger-
man commitment and solidarity with the West, and reliance on
cheque-book diplomacy.
• Diﬀering and often contradictory readings of Germany’s new secu-
rity environment and prescriptions as to how German security policy
and use of the Bundeswehr should best be pursued came to the fore.
What transpired in the course of the conﬂict was a tension, even a
dialectic, among certain foundational elements of German strategic
culture: namely, how a parochial stance of restraint was to be main-
tained if other core values, such as solidarity with the alliance or
responsibility towards Israel, could not be served this way. Also, how
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could a renewed singularity be evaded if Germany maintained a
stymied military role, potentially at odds with that of her NATO
allies?
• What emerged was a dominant CDU-led paradigm for what post-
Cold War German security should be about and how it was to be
practised. This paradigm, which was actually already in gestation in
the 1980s and was subsequently practised and promoted in the
numerous post-Gulf War deployments, actively stymied the oppo-
sition’s voice in security matters, and later eﬀectively impelled parts
of the SPD towards the CDU’s position.
• The Gulf War made plain that between the excesses of paciﬁsm and
militarism there was a potential option for the use of German mil-
itary force; that new security challenges could not be deﬁned so
neatly as it had been, signifying that Germany’s response could not
formulated as a straight ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
• The Gulf War also revealed the still active internal constraints on
Germany becoming a state ‘like any other’, which could use armed
force, legitimately and unproblematically, in the pursuit of national
interests. The conﬂict made plain that Germany’s conception of its
interests had more to do with ‘higher issues’, such as credibility in
the alliance, concern over Israel and the transparency to others of
its actions, than it had to do with more conventional notions of a
state’s interests.
An incremental approach to the use of force
In the wake of the Gulf War it was the CDU’s reading of the appro-
priate and most responsible path for Germany to pursue that was
realised, ﬁrst through Bundeswehr deployments in Somalia, Cambodia
and Yugoslavia. Essentially, the CDU attempted to alter the existing
interpretation of the Basic Law through actual Bundeswehr deploy-
ments in order to set new precedents for the role of the armed forces.
Although the Bundeswehr’s missions in these countries were not of a
combative nature, they clearly set new parameters and stretched what
had been the existing interpretation of the Bundeswehr’s role.
The UNTAC mission to Cambodia in May 1992, with around 140
Bundeswehr soldiers, saw Germany participating actively in a UN peace-
keeping mission, and with the opposition’s approval. The Cambodia
deployment signiﬁed Germany’s growing willingness to shoulder part
of the security burden and was viewed by the new Defence Minister
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Volker Rühe as ‘ein Beitrag zu einem neuen Kapitel deutscher Verant-
wortung’ (a contribution to a new chapter in German responsibility).11
Under the auspices of UNOSOM II,12 in May 1993, the German
Government sanctioned the second Bundeswehr Blauhelm-Mission in
Somalia, making available armed forces consisting of 1,640 men for
transport, logistic and engineering work for an undertaking that had a
more overt peace-enforcing intent than the ﬁrst. Importantly, the Ger-
man Government interpreted the Bundeswehr’s participation as purely
humanitarian, though UNOSOM II was manifestly a peace-enforcing
operation. Foreign Minister Kinkel, for example, deﬁned the Bundes-
wehr’s deployment in Somalia as distinctly humanitarian, and as such
sanctioned and legitimised by paragraph 2 of article 87a of the Basic
Law.
Since July 1992 the Bundeswehr had been engaged in the former
Yugoslavia as part of the monitoring of the Adriatic embargo, which
was generally viewed as legitimate and certainly within the designated
NATO area/non-combatant perception of the Bundeswehr’s role.
However, the AWACS missions to control and enforce the no-ﬂy zone
over Bosnia did not comply with existing criteria and was considered
by the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei, Liberal Party) as an illegal
action. Domestic obstruction from the FDP not only challenged
Germany’s new commitment to her NATO allies but the NATO eﬀort
as a whole, since around one-third of AWACS personnel were to come
from the Bundeswehr. This prompted the CDU to argue again that any
German intransigence on the matter might threaten the credibility and
coherence of the alliance as a whole.
Debating ‘out-of-area’ deployments
The so-called out-of-area debate, ostensibly about the legality of
deployments beyond NATO territory and the requisite constitutional
clariﬁcation, clearly revealed the opposing political stances on the cru-
cial issue of what Germany’s new security role should and could be. The
legalistic debate centred around articles 24 (entry to a system of collec-
tive security) and 87a (defensive purposes or for any other explicitly
outlined role only) of the Basic Law, which in the existing interpreta-
tion, as discussed in chapter 2, had codiﬁed the Bundeswehr’s role as
limited to one of defence within NATO area only or for overtly human-
itarian operations.13 The rupture of 1989–90 gave renewed political top-
icality to the issue of the spatial remit of the Bundeswehr, with some
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quarters arguing that a wider role was now both desirable and possible
within existing legal provisions. Essentially, Germany could now fulﬁl
its UN obligations and take part in a wider range of tasks under UN or
WEU mandates without constitutional change or amendments. Con-
versely, for many, the existing interpretation of the Bundeswehr’s role
still held and what was now needed was the setting of clear political
parameters for the Bundeswehr’s remit to avoid the unwanted extension
of its role. A further line of argument pressed for an actual change to
the constitution as a means of legally sanctioning and thus facilitating
Germany’s involvement in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.
The Government’s response to the ending of the Cold War saw the
CDU–CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union) pushing for an enlargement of
the Bundeswehr’s remit without the prerequisite of a constitutional
clariﬁcation. Essentially, the gaining of sovereignty brought with it a
renewed responsibility, which, according to Chancellor Kohl, enabled
Germany through article 24 of the constitution to go beyond mini-
malist ‘Blue Helmet’ missions to active military support in line with the
UN charter. Within these goals both the CDU and the CSU stressed
the continuing centrality of NATO’s role. At the heart of this position
were, most notably, Kohl and his Defence Minister Rühe, whose con-
ception of the role of the Bundeswehr it was that eventually won
through.
The Conservative drive for an extended role for the Bundeswehr
served three speciﬁc aims.
• It would enhance the broader European project by strengthening a
European aptitude in security matters.14 Rühe, in particular, was very
vocal on this matter: urging Germany not to ‘think nationally in a
narrow way’, he went on to say that for Germany to renege on this
matter would hinder ‘others from developing a European capability
to act’.15
• Greater participation fulﬁlled the desire to evade a new German sin-
gularity in security matters. By demonstrating a greater readiness to
fulﬁl alliance commitments through deployments, the divergences
between countries like Britain and France and Germany would be
reduced. Rühe stressed that Germany’s credibility rested on its par-
ticipation in actions, and that Germany’s distinctiveness in security
matters was clearly undesirable.
• Germany could execute a responsible foreign policy only were its
power to be acknowledged, and sometimes being responsible would
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necessitate a willingness to use armed force. Writing in April 1991
Karl Lamers had warned that if Germany ‘were to act obliviously to
her power this would be irresponsible and raise mistrust, and that
Germany, without forgetting history, must move to being as nor-
mal as possible’.16 Similarly, drawing his conclusions from the Gulf
War, Kohl contended that for Germany ‘there could no longer be a
niche in world politics, no ﬂight from responsibility; we intend to
make a contribution to a world of peace, freedom and justice’.17
Until 1992 FDP thinking on security matters was dominated by the
leitmotif of Genscherism, which, guided by a more benign, civilised
vision of international politics proﬀered a holistic conception of secu-
rity, espousing notions of a Weltinnenpolitik (world domestic policy),
together with the nurturing of collective security and pan-European
institutional frameworks, placing great faith in a rebirth for the UN
and seeking the empowerment of the CSCE framework, incorporating
the Soviet Union as an equal partner.18 In this vision, both NATO and
the EC were to become more pan-European in their design, the ulti-
mate goal being the creation of a European Federation.19 On the role
of the Bundeswehr, the party advocated the changing of the constitu-
tion to ﬁt new realities of the post-Cold War era, to mandate a limited
remit for the Bundeswehr that would include participation in UN sanc-
tioned missions globally, something which had to be legally deﬁned,
clearly and decisively. In short, at this point the FDP’s standpoint was
that the Bundeswehr, once its new remit was constitutionally sanc-
tioned, should be deployed in overtly humanitarian and peacekeeping
missions, though not in a peace-enforcing role. After Genscher’s depar-
ture, which undoubtedly gave the CDU more room for manoeuvre,
Klaus Kinkel as new party leader and foreign minister wielded less
power than his predecessor in terms of both coalition politics and for-
eign and security policy. Any notion there may have been of a strong
Liberal presence in security policy was largely thwarted, since this Lib-
eral position, or reading, did not ﬁt with or was unable to adjust to
the dominant reading prescribed and practised by the CDU–CSU.
In 1990 the SPD appeared to be pulling in a direction very diﬀer-
ent from that of the CDU–CSU, calling for a reduction in the
Bundeswehr to a ﬁgure below 250,000,20 together with a far narrower
interpretation of the Basic Law for the Bundeswehr’s remit. At its
Bremen conference in 1991 the SPD supported, in principle, the idea
of a change in the Basic Law to make it possible for the Bundeswehr
to engage out-of-area in a non-combatant peacekeeping capacity,
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stressing the need for a new consensus to emerge in society at large
which could only then lead to a constitutional amendment. This stance
was then gently reversed, beginning at the Wiesbaden Party Confer-
ence in 1993, by which time the party had to take account of the
Government’s ongoing and increasingly bold deployments of the Bun-
deswehr in Cambodia and Somalia. Although still espousing very broad
notions of security, privileging peacekeeping and collective security,
and rejecting any moves that would re-militarise both German and
European security policies, the Wiesbaden interpretation of peace-
keeping certainly diﬀered from that of 1991. While Gulf War-type
scenarios were rejected outright and the notion that the Bundeswehr
should ever become a freely deployable intervention force deplored,
the SPD’s conception of Bundeswehr peacekeeping did come to include
the enforcing of UN embargoes. The party’s position and voice were
also hampered by fairly hefty internal dissensus. Among those inclined
to activism, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Karsten Voigt and Rudolf Scharping
argued that Germany should go beyond peacekeeping to participate
in UN combat missions; their voices were challenged by the paciﬁ-
stic wing of the party, which, in pursuit of an amilitaristic German
security policy, sought to construct a party position premissed on a
non-military security proﬁle, a more limited remit for the Bundeswehr,
together with a ﬁrm commitment to disarmament across Europe.
As the Government’s boldness grew in deploying the Bundeswehr,
the SPD was prompted to seek constitutional clariﬁcation, to set clear
legal limits and a restriction on the deployment of the Bundeswehr to
UN peacekeeping only. In an attempt to halt the CDU–CSU’s strategy,
the SPD contended that Germany’s participation in the June–July 1992
embargo was a further move towards a dangerously reﬂexive military
policy and that the manoeuvres in the Adriatic were not humanitar-
ian, but were rather part of the Government’s attempts to bolster the
Bundeswehr’s extended remit.
Although issues of security and peace had always been at the core of
Green ideology, Bündnis90–Die Grünen had little inﬂuence in the early
stages of the out-of-area debates, suﬀering from an inability to trans-
pose their principles into practical policies. On the fringes of party
politics, it was the former Communists – the Partei des Demokratis-
chen Sozialismus (PDS) – who protested against expanding the
Bundeswehr’s remit in any shape or form. In applying its anti-mili-
taristic principles, the PDS proﬀered moves for a grand demilitarisation
of Germany.21
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Given the prevailing dissensus among party positions premissed on
the diﬀering readings identiﬁed above the issue became a constitu-
tional matter. The ﬁrst step in the legal debate over the role of the
Bundeswehr was taken in 1993 when the FDP (which had, in fact,
supported the mission) and the SPD saw that Germany’s engagement
in the AWACS mission was outside of existing constitutional bound-
aries and that the position of the Bundestag had been infringed. In
this round of the constitutional wrangle the result served to empower
the CDU’s stance, with a majority of 5 judges to 3 seeing that the
Government was legally entitled to take the decision to allow Ger-
man troops to support the implementation of the UN resolution. The
issue of Bundeswehr deployments was then taken once more to the
Constitutional Court in 1994 when the SPD campaigned against the
Government’s decision to partake in UNOSOM II, and in NATO and
WEU naval forces in the monitoring of the UN embargo against
Yugoslavia in the Adriatic.
The court’s ultimate decision
In mapping the trajectory of change in Germany’s post-Cold War secu-
rity policy, the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 July 1994 is of
central signiﬁcance. This decision essentially ratiﬁed the CDU–CSU
strategy of incrementally extending the Bundeswehr’s remit, without
recourse to constitutional amendments. The decision gave a clear
green light to further Bundeswehr deployments by dismissing SPD and
FDP objections to the Bundeswehr’s involvement in Somalia and
Yugoslavia. Importantly, the decision made no distinction between
peace-enforcement and peacekeeping deployments, and it sanctioned
the Bundeswehr’s use in NATO and WEU missions to carry out UN
Security Council decisions or actions under direct UN authority. The
court’s decision, based on article 24, paragraph 2, article 59, paragraph
2 (ﬁrst sentence) and article 87a of the Basic Law,22 decreed that
Bundeswehr participation in UNOSOM II, in NATO and WEU naval
forces in the Adriatic in UN-mandated monitoring of the embargo
against the Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia and the AWACS
mission imposing the UN no-ﬂy zone over Bosnia were verfas-
sungskonform (conformed to the constitution). This meant that, at least
in theory and according to the Basic Law, the Bundeswehr could be
deployed in a whole range of missions, including future Gulf War-type
scenarios, provided that the Government sought Bundestag approval.23
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An important upshot of the constitutional resolution of the out-of-
area issue was that the debate about Bundeswehr deployments lost its
legalistic character, though it remained intensely party-political and
highly contentious. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court’s ﬁndings
did not initiate an end to Germany’s restrained style of security pol-
icy, nor did it signal an abrupt and irreversible change to established
perspectives on the use of force at both elite and public levels. Straight
after the Karlsruhe decision Defence Minister Rühe declared that
deployments would be judged on a case-by-case basis and that Ger-
many would continue say ‘no’ more than ‘yes’; Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel also stressed that the substance of German foreign policy would
remain ‘non-military’.24
From IFOR to SFOR: Germany gets to grips with the use of force
German security policy post-Karlsruhe reﬂected a sustained restraint,
as seen in November 1994 when the Government showed great reserve
when asked to supply Tornadoes to help NATO protect the withdrawal
of peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) from the former Yugoslavia. When
pressed in December, the Government did oblige, justifying the move
on grounds of alliance solidarity, but stated also that no German
ground troops would be committed.
In Spring 1995, Germany felt a greater compulsion to act and impor-
tantly made the switch from purely ﬁnancial assistance to the
deployment of fourteen jets to a NATO base in northern Italy. Although
this move was signiﬁcant in demonstrating a willingness to use force,
the deployment was painstakingly deﬁned to avoid embroilment in
actual combat and restricted to ‘protecting and assisting’. The Bun-
destag supported this move on 30 June 1995, with 386 Abgeordnete
(members of Parliament) in favour and signiﬁcant numbers of the
opposition – SPD and the Greens – supporting the deployment. The
deployment was framed by its proponents as intimately tied to ‘broader
and higher issues’, namely the creation of a common European foreign
and security policy, and the credibility and perception of Germany
around the world.
The success of the Government’s strategy of gradually but decisively
extending the Bundeswehr’s remit appeared to be further consolidated
with enhanced parliamentary support for IFOR in November 1995.
This time the majority in the Bundestag in support of deploying the
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Bundeswehr had grown to 543. As in previous deployments, the Bun-
deswehr was not to take part in a combat mission between warring
sides, but was rather to act as part of NATO’s back-up support, sta-
tioned outside Bosnia as a ‘junior partner’. Again broader and higher
issues were clearly at stake guiding the deployment, with Defence
Minister Rühe claiming that it was ‘immoral not to be involved’.
Rühe drew conﬁdence from the broad parliamentary acquiescence
in respect of IFOR: ‘In a few years a new consensus has formed with
regard to the core tasks of German security policy and to the job and
the role of the German armed forces. I both welcome and I am thank-
ful for this development.’ 25 This consensus appeared to be validated
once more when on 13 December 1996 the Bundestag sanctioned Ger-
many’s participation in SFOR, which replaced IFOR, with 499 members
of Parliament supporting the motion. Again support came from large
numbers of SPD and Green parliamentarians who voted with the
Government. Signiﬁcantly, in SFOR the Bundeswehr was actually
deployed inside Bosnia as an ‘equal partner’.26 Again, Rühe drew
weighty conclusions from the Bundestag’s decision, declaring that on
the
13 December 1996 the deputies in the Bundestag quietly liquidated the
remainder of Germany’s political and military special role (Sonderrolle)
which Germany had played for half a century due to its history; the lat-
ter also serving as pretext for a policy after uniﬁcation which neither
matched the realities of world politics, nor Germany’s new position and
increased weight.27
Continued party-political discord: the basis of a fragile consensus
It is evident that the CDU-led Government’s incremental approach of
enacting more and more Bundeswehr deployments in the 1990s suc-
ceeded in forging a new reality. This had the eﬀect of marginalising
those voices that had previously called for the continuation of a more
limited role for the armed forces. What in eﬀect happened was that
elements of the SPD and the Greens moved more in line with the CDU’s
reading of how best German ‘responsibility’ in the security ﬁeld could
be met and what role the Bundeswehr should play. Greater Red–Green
approval and support for the governing coalition’s position as seen in
IFOR and SFOR, and in Kosovo in 1999, ﬂowed from the Constitu-
tional Court’s endorsement of the Government’s interpretation of the
Basic Law, as well as the skilful handling of the policy adaptation by
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Defence Minister Volker Rühe. Above all it was the ongoing bloody
war in the former Yugoslavia, in which all non-military measures to
stop ethnic cleansing had proved ineﬀectual, that prompted the shift
in perspectives to support the CDU–CSU’s programme. However,
despite this, an all-inclusive enduring consensus on the Bundeswehr’s
new role remained elusive at this time, suggesting that the CDU’s
proclamations of a new consensus in security policy were somewhat
premature. Certainly, German security policy had developed consider-
ably through the 1990s, though there remained in Germany factions
strongly in favour of restraint, presenting barriers to a fuller normali-
sation of security policy. In other words, the notion prevailed that the
use of the German armed forces would continue to be governed on a
case-by-case basis and that the main role of the Bundeswehr would
remain that of national and alliance defence. Echoing such sentiments,
Rühe himself maintained in 1997: ‘Eine darüber hinausgehende Inter-
ventionsfähigkeit wollen wir nicht’ (‘We do not want a total outright
intervention capacity’).28
The party-political scene continued to be marked by contrasting con-
ceptions of the remit of the Bundeswehr and its place in Germany’s
security policy. Although part of the governing coalition, the FDP
diﬀered in its security concept from its coalition partners, perhaps not
so much in terms of ends as in institutional means. Liberal security
thinking remained preoccupied with notions of German responsibility
and duty, and of the need to play a more active role in assuring global
security. After the Constitutional Court’s decision in 1994, Foreign
Minister Kinkel, for example, argued that because of its past Germany
has a moral duty to preserve peace and participate in collective actions,
often with force:29 non-participation was viewed by the Liberals as an
irresponsible policy, a dangerous Sonderweg. Where the Liberal posi-
tion departed from that of the CDU–CSU was in the its vision of the
role that the Bundeswehr should play, globally, in support of missions
mandated by the UN and the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE).
The declarations of the SPD’s Foreign Policy Congress of June 1997
revealed just how far the SPD had been forced to deal with the CDU’s
strategy. The party had come a long way from ‘humanitarian support
operations’ and ‘peacekeepers only’ under UN command to a more
‘calculable, reliable and Euro-compatible stance, which would allow
for ‘Bosnia-style peacekeeping operations’ 30 within the framework of
the UN or OSCE. The party’s Hannover congress of December 1997
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conﬁrmed this shift, with the party declaring that the Bundeswehr
should be available for all kinds of military operations that have the
blessing of the UN, thus erasing the former delineation made by the
SPD between ‘yes’ to peacekeeping and ‘no’ to peace-enforcement. This
shift notwithstanding, the SPD continued to proﬀer a far more pro-
grammatic stance on the role of the Bundeswehr, with the aim of tightly
controlling the extended use of the armed forces. Even after the Karl-
sruhe decision and the party’s strong support for SFOR and IFOR, the
SPD remained critical of what it saw as the Government’s open-ended
approach which could lead to a security policy in which the Bun-
deswehr was all too readily deployed. In addition, a sizeable grouping
within the party still clung to more paciﬁstic arguments, rallying against
the more realist segment of the party that ‘not all of today’s risks can
be solved with military means’.31
As with the SPD, the Green’s position on the role of the Bundeswehr
was deﬁned by opposition to the dominance of the CDU–CSU para-
digm, the celerity of events, especially in the former Yugoslavia, together
with its desire to become Regierungsfähig (ﬁt to govern), all of which
prompted a sizeable turnabout in the Green’s position on the use of
force. The ﬁrst manifestation of this was in 1993 when the Green’s
Regional Council voted for both German participation in UN missions
in cases of outright aggression and genocide and for UN military inter-
vention in Bosnia. Since that time, sizeable portions of the party voted
alongside the Government and the SPD in support of Bundeswehr
deployments in both IFOR and SFOR. Its ‘realist’ party leader, Joschka
Fischer, later to become Federal Foreign Minister, assisted the Greens’
move away from a stance based on rigid abstention to the use of force
and disengaged paciﬁsm. In a policy paper in which he called ‘for a
redeﬁnition of the Greens’ foreign policy principles’, Fischer pleaded
for the party’s principle of non-violence to be adjusted in the light
of massacres in Bosnia.32 The party’s apparent turnabout in support of
Bundeswehr deployments was a transient phenomenon however.
Fischer had his aims thwarted, with the oﬃcial party programme on the
use of force remaining uncompromising.33 Once more, and with a view
to the Federal elections in September 1998, the leadership attempted to
redeﬁne the Greens’ foreign policy principles at the party’s congress in
Magdeburg in March 1998. However, once again the leadership’s aims
were thwarted when the congress voted against the motion. Just as in
the ﬁrst draft of the Green’s election programme ‘Green Is the Change’,
the 1998 version still aimed at abolishing both NATO and the
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Bundeswehr.34 The Greens’ position was that only in cases of genocide,
and then only with a UN mandate, should the Bundeswehr be used.
Of perhaps less consequence at this stage of developments was the
perspective of the former Communist Party on the use of force: the PDS’s
stance resulted in the most uncompromising policy of any of those in
the German political spectrum, one that was, in some ways, similar to
the fundamentalist Green position which had prevailed during the Cold
War. The PDS advocated the active demilitarisation of international
politics, the abandoning of the Bundeswehr being a ﬁrst step in this pur-
suit. Apparently unaﬀected by the progress of the CDU–CSU-led
enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s remit in the 1990s, the PDS rejected
the idea of combat missions under the UN or ‘any other ﬂag’; instead,
the OSCE, as a regional organisation of the UN, should be developed to
become the central structure of a European Peace Order.
The politics surrounding the purpose and role of the Bundeswehr in
the 1990s is quite revealing. While on the surface German security pol-
icy had undergone a revolutionary change, domestic perspectives on
the use of force remained splintered in nature, despite the decision of
the Constitutional Court in 1994 and the signiﬁcant levels of support
gathered by the Government for Bundeswehr deployments in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. Clearly, a full-ﬂedged robust consensus, similar to that
which had previously governed the use of (West) German armed forces
prior to 1989, had not by 1998 transpired. The new German perspec-
tive towards the use of force was characterised by a greater disposition
to consider using the Bundeswehr in a wider range of missions. Con-
sensus and agreement to actually deploy armed forces, though, would
be governed by strict criteria, which would include the presence of a
UN mandate, a multilateral framework, a clear mission statement, as
well as an unambiguous humanitarian dimension. Events of the fol-
lowing year which eventually led to the war in Kosovo, signiﬁed a
further critical juncture in the transformation of German security pol-
icy, challenging the existing criteria which had evolved over the
previous nine years about the use of force and compelling Germany to
breach a further taboo in the use of the Bundeswehr.
Germany and Kosovo: a Rubicon crossed?
Germany’s engagement in Kosovo was the Bundeswehr’s ﬁrst combat
mission since its inception, speaking volumes for the evolution in
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German perspectives on the use of force that had transpired since
1989–90. But the signiﬁcance of Kosovo as part of the trajectory of
change also derives from the fact that it was a Red–Green Government,
having come to power in 1998, that sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s
deployment. The positions taken by the new SPD Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder and his Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer were radi-
cally diﬀerent from the lines pursued by both the SPD and the Green
Party at earlier points in the decade. This seeming qualitative change
in the role of the German armed forces was heralded as a ‘deﬁning
moment in the politics of the new Germany’,35 a Zaesur (rupture) in
German foreign policy 36 and a move that would lead Germany to arrive
at NATO’s ﬁftieth anniversary celebrations as ‘a full partner with a new
attitude’.37 Germany’s involvement in Kosovo certainly was qualitatively
diﬀerent to any other previous deployment, principally because this
time the Bundeswehr was engaged in an oﬀensive military operation
against a sovereign state without a clear mandate from the UN.38 Given
the importance of the war in Kosovo to the transformation of Ger-
many’s security policy, the next section goes into some detail about the
context and evolution of the conﬂict and Germany’s involvement.
Germany’s commitment to the Kosovo region had become apparent
back in 1997 when, as part of the Contact Group, both Paris and Bonn
pushed for greater diplomatic eﬀorts to help ease growing tensions
between Albanian Kosovans and Serbians who considered Kosovo to
be a full part of Greater Serbia. With a view to ameliorating these ten-
sions, Germany and France promoted the idea that Milosevic might
reduce the Serb military presence in the region if sanctions were relaxed
on Belgrade. Belgrade’s intransigence on the matter, however, led
NATO to issue warnings of military action should Milosevic maintain
his position in Kosovo. However, at this stage of events the alliance
appeared to lack the mettle to carry through these threats, and so
embarked on a protracted negotiation with Milosevic, continuing to
warn that if Serbia’s posture in the region remained unchanged then
NATO would strike. The only concession won by NATO at this point
was Milosevic’s agreement to allow an OSCE unarmed observer force
into Kosovo, under the protection of armed forces, which included a
small Bundeswehr contingent, stationed in Macedonia.
Despite the alliance’s continued predilection for a diplomatic solu-
tion, NATO began to muster support among members in the event
that bombing should become a necessity. When Germany was asked if
it would be prepared in principle to make a contribution to a NATO
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operation against the Serbs, which would be devoid of a UN sanction,
the outgoing CDU–CSU–FDP Government responded positively. This
unequivocal ‘yes’ was reaﬃrmed by the new Red–Green coalition,
once in oﬃce in October 1998, and also gained the full support of the
Bundestag.39
In the meantime, an armistice was brokered in October 1998 between
Milosevic and US Special Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke,
thus bringing renewed optimism for a diplomatic solution to the conﬂ-
ict. However, this interregnum was brutally interrupted by the
discovery, on 15 January, that there had been a massacre of Albanian
peasants in the village of Racak, carried out by Serb forces. This event
was a critical juncture in the run-up to the war and was decisive in
shifting the mood in the West towards ﬁnding a solution, and with it
came fresh threats of bombing from the alliance. This renewed dedi-
cation to resolve the crisis, but with a strong preference to avert a
military engagement, was also fuelled by NATO’s forthcoming ﬁftieth
anniversary, which would have been somewhat overshadowed had not
the alliance been seen to be doing something credible. The subsequent
Rambouillet talks thus illustrated that no one was yet ready to press
the button and that the threat of force was better than the use of force.
The talks held during 6–23 February and then in Paris in mid-March
brought the Albanian Kosovans and the Serbs to the negotiating table
with the aim of hammering out an agreement on an autonomous
Kosovo, coupled with the withdrawal of Serb troops. After some delib-
eration, the Albanian Kosovans signed the agreement, thereby acceding
to the notion of an autonomous rather than a fully independent
Kosovo, whereas their Serb counterparts were not prepared to sign such
an accord. Crucially, Belgrade was resistant to the removal of its troops
from Kosovo. The ultimate failure of all political eﬀorts to resolve the
crisis led NATO to fulﬁl its earlier threats of military action, and an
air oﬀensive was launched on 24 March 1999. Germany’s contribution
to the air-strikes came in the form of four Tornado aircraft stationed
in Placenza,40 which although relatively small did represent a new
form of deployment, diﬀering substantially from previous Bundeswehr
missions.
When commenting on why Germany should commit to the NATO
operation Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated that Germany had a
‘moral obligation’ 41 to be fully involved and that ‘there was no other
option open but to end the murdering in Kosovo’.42 Schröder argued
that the principle of ‘never again war’ inherent in German security
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policy had to be superceded by a ‘higher principle’, namely that of stop-
ping the killings and deportations of Albanian Kosovans.43 Defence
Minister Rudolf Scharping made similar comments when explaining
the rationale behind Germany’s involvement. Scharping saw that just
as the massacre in Srebrinica in 1995 had forced a turnabout in German
thinking on the use of force in Bosnia, so the nature of the conﬂict in
Kosovo made Germans see things diﬀerently, and that it was Germany’s
responsibility to use force to end the war.44
A key characteristic of German policy over Kosovo was the ongoing
emphasis on diplomacy. Given that at the time Germany had possession
of the EU and WEU presidencies, the new Government played a deﬁn-
ing role in the diplomatic activity to resolve the conﬂict without
recourse to military action. In this sense the Government pursued a
‘dual-track’ approach, combining a ﬁrm commitment to NATO’s aer-
ial bombardment, together with intensive diplomatic eﬀorts aimed at
averting military action. Inherent in Germany’s diplomatic behaviour
were strong traits of multilateralism through the use of international
institutions and bodies (i.e. G8, the EU, Quint) as means towards a solu-
tion. Through the special Kosovo summit in April in Cologne
particularly, Germany, as president of the EU, took forward the idea of
a broad stability pact for South-East Europe, promoting the importance
of bringing the countries of the region into closer forms of co-opera-
tion with the EU. Germany was also active within the Quint grouping
and, later, the G8 through the Bonn summit in June by forging a set of
conditions, and garnering international support for them, for the ces-
sation of the war.45 Additionally, Germany sought to forge cooperative
standpoints and consensus, thereby legitimising and legalising sanctions
and conditions. This was evident especially in Germany’s success in
bringing the UN into the equation by inviting General Secretary Annan
to the EU special summit on Kosovo in Cologne. Lastly, Germany pur-
sued an inclusivist strategy of seeking to involve both China and Russia
in the process towards the resolution of the conﬂict. A peace plan pro-
posed by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in early April, though not
accepted by Germany’s partners, encapsulated Germany’s whole
approach to the conﬂict. The plan proposed a twenty-four-hour break
in NATO bombing on the condition that Milosevic began the with-
drawal of Serb troops from Kosovo. It also promoted a co-operative
approach to conﬂict resolution, in that it sought to incorporate both
China and Russia in to the decision-making process with the aim of
internationally isolating Serbia. Inherent to the plan was a desire to
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garner international legitimacy for the alliance’s mission and to stabilise
the region as a whole through substantial socio-economic measures.
Conclusion
The mapping of developments in German security policy after 1989–90
reveals a clear trajectory of change in perspectives on the use of armed
force, seen most clearly in the increasingly bold Bundeswehr deploy-
ments of the 1990s, both within and outside of the European theatre.
Germany’s involvement, ﬁrst in Kosovo and then East Timor, under
the auspices of the UN’s INTERFRET mission, seemed to draw a
ﬁrm line under the process of change – by the end of the decade the
re-orientation of the German armed forces seemed both complete and
successful.
Much had indeed changed, though this chapter has sought to
demonstrate that, on further inspection and through a more nuanced
reading of the politics surrounding the use of the Bundeswehr, far from
residual constraints relating to the use of force remain in place within
Germany and that, crucially, these forces and factors continue to inﬂ-
uence the deployment of its armed forces. Determining the use of the
Bundeswehr is the rather complex and incomplete consensus which
underpinned the various deployments in the 1990s. Cross-party agree-
ment was forged in the case of Bundeswehr deployments in Bosnia,
Kosovo, East Timor, and so on, because of the close ﬁt of the exigen-
cies of such crises with existing ways of thinking about the use of force
in Germany, and which, crucially, were in line with the postulates of
German strategic culture. Future conﬂict scenarios and security chal-
lenges may not, however, gel quite so well with German thinking.
With a focus on German responses to September 11 2001 and the
‘War on Terror’, chapter 4 aims to substantiate this claim by showing
the limitations to the trajectory of change in German security policy and
the power of strategic culture in shaping perspectives on the use of force.
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4The momentum of change.
Germany and the use of force II:
from Afghanistan to Iraq
Germany’s engagement in Kosovo in a combat capacity appeared to
have shifted the parameters of German security policy and perspectives
on the use of force, apparently to ‘solidify the new consensus’ over
foreign and security policy.1 Indeed, Kosovo did seem to conﬁrm that
the trajectory of change already apparent in the 1990s was leading to
a normalising of Germany’s relationship with the use of force. How-
ever, in the light of events between 2001 and 2003 such conclusions
appeared to be somewhat premature and the extent of the new secu-
rity policy consensus exaggerated. Certainly, Schröder’s declared
‘unconditional solidarity’ with the United States in the immediate wake
of September 11 2001 and the subsequent deployment of Bundeswehr
soldiers to Afghanistan in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom
were ﬁrm expressions of Germany’s commitment to having a role in
international security and accepting the utility of armed force. How-
ever, the subsequent transatlantic spats and divisions within Europe
over US policy towards Iraq revealed, in a very vivid way, the limits to
and peculiarities of Germany’s approach to the use of force.
This chapter continues the analysis of the evolution of German secu-
rity policy, with a focus on the role of the armed forces between 2000
and 2003. This time-frame takes in Germany’s leadership role in Mace-
donia, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as the
US-led war on terror as its enlargement to include Iraq. German secu-
rity policy during this time exhibited traits of both old and new
thinking; furthermore it was characterised by an interplay of short-term
domestic political goals with more entrenched long-standing beliefs and
values about the use of force and role of multilateralism. As a conse-
quence, the 2000–3 period brought to the fore the fragility and
complexity of the elite-level political consensus and extent of public
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support which had grown up around and sanctioned the enlargement
of the Bundeswehr’s role during the previous decade.
Commencing with an examination of Germany’s role in Macedonia,
the chapter moves on to discuss Germany’s response and conduct in
the wake of September 11 2001, framed by Schröder’s notion of ‘unlim-
ited solidarity’. The deployment of a sizeable Bundeswehr contingent
to Afghanistan, made possible only through a Vertrauensfrage (vote of
conﬁdence) in the Bundestag, was a further indicator of the intricacy
of the German perspective on the use of force. Analysis then turns to
the widening focus of Bush’s war on terror to include Iraq and the Ger-
man response to it, which, from the very beginning, ruled out the
possibility of the Bundeswehr’s involvement in any ‘military adventure’.
The fall-out from Iraq for Germany’s international relations following
Donald Rumsfeld’s relegation of Germany to ‘Old Europe’ brings the
chapter to a close. Throughout, attention will be paid to the ‘domes-
tics’ of German security policy-making as a means of substantiating the
claim that a new and robust consensus on the use of force remained
elusive and how policy in the early part of the twenty-ﬁrst century was
formulated on the back of an incomplete and complicated national
consensus.
Leadership in Macedonia
Beginning in 2001 the Bundeswehr began what became a series of
deployments in Macedonia when in March ethnic Albanians clashed
with the army and police of Macedonia. Against the backdrop of the
wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, Ger-
many responded swiftly to the possible eruption of violent conﬂict.
After the EU and NATO had brokered a ceaseﬁre and established a
framework for the resolution of the conﬂict, Germany pledged troops
to the NATO-led force tasked with weapons’ collecting and safeguard-
ing UN and OSCE observers who were in place to monitor political
reforms. Schröder’s resolute commitment to German intervention in
Macedonia, which was called for in the name of NATO solidarity as
well as to prevent a second Kosovo, was not fully supported within the
governing coalition. Swathes of SPD and Green members of Parliament
questioned the proposed deployment, as too much of an emphasis, it
was claimed, was being placed on the use of military force, which they
did not see as the best way to stabilise the region. Furthermore, the
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CDU contended that it would support the operation only if the Bun-
deswehr was awarded more resources to carry out the mission
eﬀectively. Eventually, Germany’s participation was secured only
through the support of the opposition parties, and the Bundestag
approved the deployment by 497 votes to 130 on 29 August 2001.
Operation ‘Essential Harvest’ was widely regarded as a success,
though its initial one-month duration was viewed as having been too
short. The proposed successor mission, ‘Amber Fox’, was to be a full
UN mission (Essential Harvest had been only ‘praised’ by the UN). In
the new mission, Germany was to play a leading role, supplying as
many as 600 soldiers. The proposal met with broad Bundestag approval,
opposition coming only from the PDS and ﬁve members of the CDU.2
The mission was again viewed as a great success and a tribute to the
Bundeswehr’s leading role; reforms in Macedonia, however, did not
move as swiftly as hoped, so that Germany’s participation in the region
was extended a number of times.
On the surface the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Macedonia may
seem to have conﬁrmed the continuation of the post-Kosovo trajectory
of change, involving a closer acquaintance with the use of force; nev-
ertheless, as noted above, the proposal to deploy led to animated debate
in the Bundestag, reminiscent of debates in the mid-1990s, and the
decision to deploy had been far from consensual. Political parties were
initially divided internally on the issue, especially the Greens and the
SPD, while the CDU linked its support to a call for more defence spend-
ing. The CDU also called for the rule relating to the parliamentary
majority required to sanction Bundeswehr deployments to be aban-
doned, as a means of empowering the executive’s decision-making
capacity, making Germany more responsive at times of international
crisis. The case of Macedonia and the domestics of the debate demon-
strate very clearly that, despite Kosovo, no clear-cut consensus on the
Bundeswehr’s role had been reached and that the use of force remained
highly contested.
While Germany was undertaking a leading role in Macedonia, inter-
national attention shifted to the US with the dramatic events of Sep-
tember 11 2001. One of the many eﬀects of that day was the emergence
of a fundamental diﬀerence between US and German perspectives
regarding the use of force and how best to combat the sources of global
terrorism. The transformation that US foreign policy underwent after
(and arguably even before) September 11 brought into focus the pecu-
liarities and continuities present within German security thinking. The
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next section discusses at some length the evolution of US perspectives
on the use of force within the changing context of transatlantic relations.
The changing contours of transatlantic relations
The change in German security thinking at the beginning of the twenty-
ﬁrst century took place within an already evolving context of
transatlantic relations. Developments on both sides of the Atlantic in
the ﬁeld of foreign and security policy were setting out quite diﬀerent
European and American agendas and perspectives on the use of force
in international politics in the 1990s. Two processes stand out here as
illustrative of the nature of this evolution: the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP); and the emergence of a neo-conservative strand
in US foreign policy thinking.
Eﬀorts at emboldening the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy with a military dimension had been largely ineﬀectual until the end
of the 1990s, when the project was given a greater impetus by the war
in Kosovo together with a renewed Franco-British commitment to the
project. The events of 1999 compelled EU member states to create a
viable military component to empower their collective external role and
voice in the world. While disputes arose regarding the extent of the
ESDP’s potential autonomy and its relationship to NATO, many of
these issues were resolved over time, and by September 11 the EU
seemed to be on course to fulﬁl its security policy ambitions.
In Germany, meanwhile, although it appeared that Berlin had been
getting to grips with the use of force, as seen in the resolution of the
out-of-area debate by the mid-1990s and the subsequent deployment
in Kosovo, the change in leadership from Kohl to Schröder in 1998
witnessed a more domestically focused German foreign policy, as seen
in the new chancellor’s initial apparent lack of interest in foreign aﬀairs.
Soon after the Federal election there appeared to be a predilection for
preserving Germany’s interests, especially in the context of the EU.3
Furthermore, there were quite substantial anti-military elements on
the left of the SPD, now in government, which, combined with the
presence of the Green Party, with Joschka Fischer as the newly
appointed foreign minister, suggested that the former security policy
trajectory pursued by the CDU–CSU might be aborted. Although the
Greens had gone some way in the 1990s in modifying their position
on the use of force vis à vis civil war in the former Yugoslavia, at its
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grassroots paciﬁsm remained a central tenet of the party’s ideology.
Given these factors, the Red–Green coalition was not exactly poised to
continue along the route proposed by the previous CDU-led Govern-
ment. In short, Germany’s security policy seemed set to become far
more introverted and conditional. Although it was the Red–Green
coalition that in 1999 had sanctioned the Bundeswehr’s Kosovo deploy-
ment, one with an overtly combative character, the decision to deploy
was accompanied by a strong humanitarian rationale, thus enabling the
Government to shore up domestic and parliamentary support.
Change was also afoot across the Atlantic with the emergence of new
foreign policy thinking, which in its essence cut across the grain of the
EU’s (and Germany’s) overtly multilateralist approach to security
issues. The neo-conservative narrative, as Elizabeth Pond calls it, was
already in gestation in the 1990s, but it was not until September 11
2001 that it gained the currency to move more centrally into main-
stream US security thinking. The core elements of this body of thought
drew on a strong belief in US supremacy and espoused the use of pre-
emptive military action and ad hoc coalitions. Undercurrents of change
in this direction were evident in Charles Krauthammer’s 1990 Foreign
Aﬀairs article ‘The Unipolar Movement’, Paul Wolfowitz’s 1992 draft
defence policy guidlines, which espoused the merits of pre-emptive mil-
itary strikes and in Robert Kagan and William Kristol’s calls for a
‘neo-Reaganite foreign policy’,4 notions which were to later inform
Bush’s strategy for the war on terror.
The core tenets of this foreign policy thinking did not, however,
ﬁgure prominently in the pre-September 11 period of the new Bush
administration. As Pond notes, given that the Bush presidential cam-
paign had barely touched on foreign policy issues and that the new
president appeared to be quite unfamiliar with international aﬀairs,
there was a widespread assumption that he would ‘govern from the
middle’ and opt for continuity, especially in transatlantic relations.5 The
terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 provided a powerful source
of justiﬁcation, indeed self-righteousness, for those who had sought to
revise US thinking and espoused the merits of pre-emptive military
strikes. Thus over the course of the subsequent twelve months Bush’s
foreign and security policy came to be imbued with clear traits of neo-
conservative thinking which were ultimately codiﬁed in a new US
national security strategy in 2002 and subsequently applied to Baghdad
in 2003. This policy was also underpinned by a powerful intellectual
discourse which extolled the virtues of US supremacy and, crucially,
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the vast divergences between American thinking about power and the
use of force and that of Europe, with its preference for ‘soft power’. In
this vein, Robert Kagan argued in 2002 that Europeans and Americans
did not share a common view of the world, expressed in the phrase
‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’.6 Kagan’s
take on European and US diﬀerences resounded in US foreign policy
circles and helped bolster the new foreign policy paradigm, or ‘big idea’
underpinning US foreign policy.7 Moreover, such thinking contributed
to US–European divergence and discord in the foreign policy sphere
which, disguised to an extent by the solidarity exhibited straight after
September 11, became increasingly marked in early 2002.
This brief consideration of the changing context of transatlantic rela-
tions would seem to indicate that even without the events of September
11 quite substantial diﬀerences relating to the use of force were already
in place within the Atlantic community. The ramiﬁcations of these
changes had particularly strong eﬀects upon US–German relations.
Diﬀerences between Washington’s and Berlin’s positions on a range of
international questions had seen a marked change in tone in bilateral
relations well before autumn 2001. The extent of the Bush adminis-
tration’s willingness to forgo multilateralism, as seen in the proposed
National Missile Defence (NMD) system, the US refusal to ratify the
Kyoto Treaty and the International Criminal Court, was already of
profound concern for Berlin.
September 11 and Germany’s ‘unconditional solidarity’
Germany’s initial response to the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, DC, on September 11 2001 was a pledge of unlimited sol-
idarity with the US, a response which contrasted sharply with that of
Bonn’s position during the Gulf War of 1991. The chancellor was also
quick to claim that Germany was obliged to participate with military
means in order to secure stability in the world. Schröder’s early decla-
ration of solidarity was subsequently backed at home by ﬁrm cross-party
support, except for that of the PDS.8 Berlin’s solidarity also extended to
its full support for the US’s invocation of NATO’s (article 5) collective
defence mechanism. Unlimited solidarity did not, however, translate
into unconditional support for an immediate US military response to
the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. Crucially, at both elite and
societal levels reticence on the use of force and fear of US unilateralism
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pervaded the German debate. Subsequently, Schröder’s pledge of soli-
darity, coupled with domestic restraint, led to protracted problems on
the home front, as well as to altercation with the US.
Germany’s reserved stance on a war in Afghanistan focused on the
fear that the US would over-react and respond unilaterally, which could
lead to an uncontrolled escalation of conﬂict in the wider Middle East.
Consequently, Germany pursued its traditional preferences for a mul-
tilateral approach explicitly aimed at tackling the roots of terrorism via
political as well as military means, as was evident in both Schröder’s
and Fischer’s international diplomacy shortly after September 11. In
this early phase Germany had an important role in the consolidation
of an international alliance against terrorism, Fischer in particular
working to forge a common EU diplomatic response to the attacks on
the US and seeking also to embolden the UN. Illustrative of the Ger-
man approach was Berlin’s facilitating of the UN-sponsored conference
in Bonn in late November on the construction of a post-Taliban regime
for Afghanistan, a process in which both Fischer and Schröder invested
considerable personal credibility and which led to the Bonn accords
and subsequently to the establishment of an interim Government in
Afghanistan.
The attacks of September 11 also prompted great concern within
Germany regarding its internal security, when it transpired that a num-
ber of the hijackers had resided and been educated at universities in
the Federal Republic. Moreover, intelligence suggested that Germany
was home to over 30,000 members or supporters of militant Islamist
organisations, some having links to Al Qaida. Given such revelations,
interior minister Otto Schilly introduced two ‘security packages’,
approved by the Bundestag in December 2001, aimed at clamping down
on the operations of such groups. Additional measures were introduced
by Finance Minister Eichel which focused on undermining the ﬁnanc-
ing of these groups by establishing new measures to scrutinise unusual
patterns of cash-ﬂow in bank accounts.9
The call to arms
The US waited until early October to commence its war in Afghanistan.
The US strategy, despite the invocation of NATO’s article 5, reﬂected
a strong US desire to lead the military campaign and to forge a ‘coali-
tion of the willing’. It was in this context that Schröder’s pledge of
solidarity with the US was tested, when in November President Bush
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made a formal request for a German military contribution. At this
point, the unlimited solidarity pledged and consistently reaﬃrmed by
the chancellor, together with his statement of 11 October pledging a
military contribution to the war in Afghanistan,10 met with staunch
domestic opposition. Schröder was thus caught in his own rhetoric,
while aside from the PDS no party would openly condemn the US’s
right to pursue the perpetrators of September 11 at the same time there
was no great enthusiasm, generally or among the Red–Green coalition
itself, to have German troops engaged in what was seen as an unde-
sirable and risky military campaign. Consequently, the chancellor had
to have recourse to the full range of possible tactics if he was to fulﬁl
his pledge to the US.
On 6 November 2001 Schröder announced, in response to the US
request, that 3,900 Bundeswehr troops would be made available for the
campaign against terror. To rally support around this contribution of
troops, proponents pointed to Germany’s international responsibility,
its role as a transatlantic partner and the general credibility of German
foreign policy; they pointed also to UN resolution 1368, passed after
September 11, condemning terrorism and recognising the right of
nations to self-defence. Those opposed to the deployment pressed for
continued restraint, urging that multilateralism was important and that
vital political and social measures needed to be integrated into Oper-
ation ‘Enduring Freedom’ if it were to properly address the sources of
global terrorism. While the Cabinet approved Schröder’s plan for the
Bundeswehr’s deployment, which also met with broad approval from
the CDU, the CSU and the FDP, support was far from forthcoming
from substantial elements of the governing coalition, with both SPD
and Green members of Parliament arguing vociferously against the
chancellor’s designs, for the reasons mentioned above. Consequently,
the stability of the coalition was under stress. In the case of the Bun-
deswehr’s deployment in Macedonia, Schröder had been content to
allow the Bill to run on the back of support from the opposition par-
ties; in this instance, however, given the gravity of the issues and his
own weak domestic position, Schröder saw it as crucial to get the back-
ing of his own coalition. The chancellor subsequently decided to tie the
issue of a Bundeswehr deployment to a vote of conﬁdence in his Gov-
ernment. The Vertrauensfrage had been used only three times in the
Federal Republic’s history, and in this instance Schröder used it to ask
those disagreeing with his policy to either support him or to let the
Government fall.
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The Vertrauensfrage
On Friday 16 November the Bundestag debated whether Germany
should make available 3,900 Bundeswehr troops to participate in the
war in Afghanistan and whether the SPD–Green coalition should
remain in government. On these two issues Bundestag members were
permitted a single vote.
In his opening statement Schröder explained why the Vertrauensfrage
was being used, together with the reasons why Germany should send
troops to Afghanistan. The Vertrauensfrage was legitimate, Schröder
posited, as the deployment issue was one of fundamental importance.
Broad support was required, as Germany needed to show both at the
international as well as the domestic level that the governing coali-
tion was willing and able to back the deployment. On the second
point, Schröder stressed that German foreign and security policy should
be seen as consistent and in line with multilateralism, that it was
important for Germany to be seen as a reliable ally, able and willing
to make contributions to international security alongside allies and
partners. Schröder also emphasised that the Bundeswehr deployment
was part of a broad eﬀort to bring peace to Afghanistan and that in
this sense it was not a war of aggression. The chancellor made it clear
that the military campaign was only one element of the wider polit-
ical and humanitarian eﬀort to rebuild Afghanistan and reinstate
civil society. Throwing his weight behind the chancellor, soon-to-be
defence minister Peter Struck argued that should Germany renege on
the deployment all chances would be lost for it to have a stake in the
post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan.
The Bundestag debate which followed illustrated the various strands
of thinking apparent in German politics on the use of force. Speaking
ﬁrmly against the war, the PDS saw that a military campaign in
Afghanistan was not the most appropriate means of tackling interna-
tional terrorism; moreover, such an undertaking could spark a new
divide between the Islamic world and the West. Since the CDU and
the CSU supported the deployment, criticism was instead levied directly
at the coalition’s inability to govern. Aside from noting the damage
inﬂicted on Germany’s international reputation and relations with the
US by Schröder’s recent dalliances, the CDU pointed to the disastrous
record of economic under-achievement since 1998. In a similar vein,
the CSU charged the chancellor with incompetence and naïvety in the
ﬁeld of international politics.
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Although support for the chancellor was eventually forthcoming,
Schröder was berated from all sides for linking the deployment issue
to a vote of conﬁdence. The CDU accused Schröder of playing politics
with an issue which, while they fully supported, should not have been
attached to a vote of conﬁdence in his Government. Stalwart paciﬁsts
in the Green Party, meanwhile, as well as many SPD parliamentarians
were aﬀronted that they should be forced to forgo their fundamental
principles and support going to war in order to save the Government.
In the end the conﬁdence vote was supported by 336 to 326 votes. Of
the 8 Greens who had opposed the sending of troops, in a symbolic
move 4 voted with the Government and 4 against, in demonstrating
both their allegiance to the Red–Green coalition and their sustained
opposition to the war and Germany’s contribution to it. No doubt
Schröder was helped in his endeavours by an improving situation on
the ground in Afghanistan: by the time of the Vertrauensfrage the
Northern Alliance was holding Kabul, many Taliban strongholds were
weakening, and it appeared that war might not a prolonged undertak-
ing – all factors which would have encouraged both the Greens and
the SDU to run with the chancellor.
The Red–Green coalition was thus saved and Germany committed
3,900 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.11 The
contours and the substance of the Vertrauensfrage demonstrated, how-
ever, important factors that were to shape German security policy
behaviour over the coming year. Crucially, although the leadership was
able to garner support from within its Red–Green ranks, the loyalty of
16 November was highly conditional, thus demonstrating that the coali-
tion remained far from united regarding the US-led war on terror and
Germany’s role within it. Crucially, over seventy members of Parlia-
ment who had supported the motion added to their vote a written
explanation, mainly to qualify that they had substantial doubts about
the military deployment, but voted ‘yes’ in order to keep the coalition
in power.
Extending the war on terror
The rather delicate domestic setting of Germany’s contribution to
Operation Enduring Freedom was to evolve further during the next
half year, taking German thinking even farther away from that of the
US about extending the scope and intensity of its war against terror.
The German discourse remained focused on the need to address the
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underlying social and economic sources of terrorism and to do so with-
out relying on a purely military approach. What emerged around this
time in Germany was a clearer articulation of the essence of Berlin’s
security thinking, as seen in the notion of a ‘New Era of Engagement’,
a comprehensive strategy aimed at closing the poverty gap, re-engag-
ing in a new North–South dialogue and intercultural exchange between
the West and the Muslim world.
Early 2002 saw an entrenching of Germany’s reluctance to extend its
participation in America’s anti-terror campaign. Afghanistan was one
thing, but the notion of pre-emptive strikes against other states – now
part of the Bush administration’s political rhetoric – clashed head-on
with German perspectives and reasoning. The increasing belligerence
of US policy, its identiﬁcation of ‘rogue states’ and its articulation of
the ‘axis of evil’, which included Iran, Iraq and North Korea, fanned
ﬂames of mistrust and disbelief over US policy already existing in the
Federal Republic, as well as elsewhere in Europe.
The annual Munich Security Seminar in February 2002 became a
platform for both Americans and Europeans to air their views over the
international situation. Unsurprisingly, the war of words in Munich led
to a ﬁrming-up of the contrasting European and US perspectives on
how to proceed with the war on terror. Paul Wolfowitz berated the
Europeans for their lack of military prowess and conﬁrmed that the
US would, in the future, feel quite free to pick and choose its allies and
partners, warning that NATO states should no longer consider them-
selves to occupy positions of privilege.12 In a similar line of argument
Senator John McCain trumpeted the US’s right of unilateralism, stat-
ing his belief that the US already held a mandate for military action
against terrorism worldwide. Focusing on Iraq, McCain argued:
A day of reckoning is approaching. Not simply for Saddamm Hussein,
but for all members of the Atlantic Community, whose governments face
the choice of ending the threat we face every day from this rogue regime
or carrying on as if such behaviour, in the wake of September 11th, were
somehow still tolerable.13
While the US delegates ‘bought home’ the message to the Europeans,
and in doing so clearly spelt out their agenda for Iraq, German Defence
Minister Rudolf Scharping stated that there were no plans afoot for an
invasion (of Iraq) and, furthermore, that it would be naïve to believe
that Europe would support such military action.14
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Iraq – a step too far
Bush’s identiﬁcation of Iraq as a rogue state and part of the ‘axis of
evil’, with links to Al Quaida, led the US administration to view it as
the next battleground in its war on terror. The US held that Baghdad
was in direct violation of the 1991 peace agreement and UN Security
Council resolutions, and reasoned that the best way of adressing this
situation was to bring about ‘regime change’. Unsurprisingly, this con-
clusion and the strategy of pre-emption that it implied collided with
current thinking in a number of – mostly – West European capitals,
especially Berlin and Paris.
The German response to the US’s expansion of the war against ter-
ror to include Iraq was always going to be less than unenthusiastic. As
argued earlier, the ‘domestics’ of the Macedonia deployment, the
fragility of elite support for the deploment to Afghanistan, combined
with the overwhelmingly negative reception in Germany of US neo-
conservative foreign policy thinking with its preference for pre-emption
and unilateralism, were vital indicators of Schröder’s inﬂexible policy on
Iraq. Indeed, opposition to US foreign policy objectives could arguably
be observed even in the days after September 11 2001: Germany’s
‘unlimited solidarity’ was coupled to a commitment by Schröder that
Germany would not participate in ‘adventures’ and that if it were to
come to the aid of its allies Germany would have to be fully consulted
prior to the initiation of any military force.15 In other words, the chan-
cellor had already laid down his ‘red-lines’ for consultation and a pref-
erence for restraint back in September 2001.
Towards the end of the summer of 2002 the question of Iraq moved
to centre-stage. The heightening rhetoric in the US, which was point-
ing to a military strike in the near future, strengthened Schröder’s
resolve to give the situation and diplomatic means more time, and,
crucially, to have the UN, not the US, rule on how much longer the
weapons’ inspectors should remain in Iraq. Denouncing the US’s
‘military adventurism’, Schröder also maintained that a US-led war in
Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would detract from the war against ter-
rorism and endanger the West’s relations with the Islamic world. It was
in this context that the notion of a Deutsches Weg, ‘a German way’,
was articulated by the chancellor in describing a speciﬁcally German
approach to international aﬀairs, and also to demonstrate to the US
that it would be Berlin’s objectives and priorities that would determine
the German stance on Iraq. Schröder’s critics berated the idea of ‘a
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German way’, arguing that it sent out confusing messages to Germany’s
allies, suggesting a return to some dangerous new Sonderweg, out of
kilter with the Federal Republic’s foreign policy tradition.
The transatlantic discussion, such as it was, about extending the
scope of the war on terror and the use of force to Iraq was cut some-
what short when, on 26 August 2002, US Vice-President Dick Cheney
called for preventive military action to oust the regime of Saddam Hus-
sein, an announcement allegedly not communicated to Germany in
advance.16 Thus a wide-ranging debate was eclipsed, America’s resolve
to use force in Iraq, unless Saddam Hussein left the country, intensi-
ﬁed and Europe’s divisions over the issue hardened, with Germany’s
position drifting even farther from that of the US.
War and the Federal election
During the course of the SPD–Green Government’s term in oﬃce,
Schröder was transformed from a chancellor with little apparent inter-
est in foreign policy and an election agenda in 1998 front-loaded with
domestic reform issues to a leader who in 2002 mobilised anti-war sen-
timent to successfully win a second term in oﬃce.
Weakened by a poor economic record and facing a strong challenge
from the CDU–CSU led by Edmund Stoiber, Schröder seemed certain
to lose the forthcoming Federal election in September 2002. Seizing the
initiative and responding to the widespread domestic reticence towards
US policy and anti-war sentiment in the country as well as within the
governing coalition, the chancellor aﬃrmed his opposition to a war
with Iraq, even were there to be a UN mandate, and pledged to keep
Germany out of any conﬂict. On September 22 the Red–Green coali-
tion secured a victory, albeit the slimmest in the Federal Republic’s
history. Schröder’s electoral success was not, however, celebrated across
the Atlantic. With reverberations still fresh in the air from the German
justice minister’s likening of Bush’s foreign policy endeavours to those
of Adolf Hitler, US Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld claimed
that the chancellor had poisoned US–German relations. Moreover, at
a NATO defence ministers’ meeting in Warsaw held shortly after the
German election, Rumsfeld refused to meet with his counterpart Peter
Struck.
The resolute stance taken by Schröder in September 2002 left little
room for any adaptation or modiﬁcation and, importantly, lost Ger-
many any real leverage that might still have been possible to pressure
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Bush into pursuing a more restrained approach towards Iraq. More-
over, the eﬀect was to isolate Berlin, nullifying any inﬂuence it might
have exerted on other European partners. In this way, Germany actively
contributed to the EU’s inability to present a common voice, and in
this context it became apparent, shortly after the election of Septem-
ber 2002, that Schröder’s strategy had perhaps been a step too far. The
German press was already decrying him for damaging American–Ger-
man relations and after a direct intervention by the US ambassador to
Germany objecting to the anti-Americanism pervading the Govern-
ment, the chancellor set about trying to pull Germany out of its
self-inﬂicted isolation
A temporary semblance of normality to relations was reached when
Bush and Schröder declared their mutual intention to get back to
‘business as usual’. Berlin was keen to throw oﬀ the anti-American
label while seeking to reaﬃrm that still more time was needed to ﬁnd
a diplomatic solution to Iraq and that Germany would not partici-
pate in any military adventure. At the same time, the Germans were
keen to prove their value as allies, able and willing to pull their weight
in international security. Defence Minister Struck announced in
November that, together with The Netherlands, Germany would take
joint-leadership of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
emphasising that Germany was now a substantial contributor to inter-
national peacekeeping missions, with over 10,000 Bundeswehr troops
currently deployed overseas. Despite these overtures, a standoﬀ over
Iraq was clearly visible on the horizon, with Germany standing
alongside France.
Europe divided
By Spring 2003 European perspectives on the US’s Iraq strategy had
become polarised between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’.17 On 20 January Ger-
many and France initiated a debate about terrorism, including the issue
of Iraq, in the UN security council, a move which, according to Eliz-
abeth Pond, left Colin Powell feeling ambushed and led directly to a
hardening of his rhetoric, especially as the Franco-German manoeuvre,
later conﬁrmed by the French foreign minister, had essentially put the
break on a second UN resolution.18
The Franco-German initiative unleashed a wave of indignation across
both Eastern and Western Europe. The substance of the emerging
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intra-European discord revolved around the question of ‘who speaks
for Europe?’.19 While the Franco-German proposal at the UN claimed
to be speaking in Europe’s name, contrary voices proposed a diﬀer-
ent European discourse, one which appeared in the form of a letter
(on behalf of ‘the Eight’) on 30 January 2003 in the Wall Street Jour-
nal. Published under the header ‘Europe and America must stand
united’, the letter was signed by the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy,
the UK, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark, and
testiﬁed to the central importance of transatlantic solidarity after
September 11 and the enduring underlying value of the relationship.20
The letter was essentially an overt signal of support for US policy
towards Iraq. In quick succession an even bolder declaration of kinship
and support for the use of force vis à vis Iraq came in a similar let-
ter from ‘the Vilnius Ten’ group of Central and South-East European
states.
This profound lack of consensus in Europe revealed a number of
things. Not only did it pose serious doubts about the EU’s capacity to
construct a coherent foreign and security policy, but it demonstrated
the relative demise of the Franco-German dynamo in an EU of twenty-
ﬁve members and with it the notion that this very special bilateral
relationship could continue to set the EU’s foreign policy priorities and
agenda.21 Maintaining that their position was more representative of
the European perspective – since even within those countries that had
signed the letter of the Eight domestic opposition to a war was
extremely strong – Berlin and Paris continued to claim the moral ‘Euro-
pean’ high ground. However, with the subsequent letter of support
from the ‘Vilnius Ten’, also endorsing a US war on Iraq, the idea that
the Franco-German perspective was still truly representative of an
enlarged EU was clearly swept away. Intra-European acrimony was fur-
ther exacerbated by President Chirac’s lambasting of Central European
states for their behaviour and for having ‘missed a good opportunity
to shut up’.22 But Chirac took it a step further, revealing innate French
fears that the forthcoming enlargement of the EU would bring in Cen-
tral European ‘trojan horses’, more Atlanticist than European in their
preferences,23 in his castigation of Warsaw et al. by threatening that
France would not ratify their entry to the European Union.
Unsurprisingly, the Franco-German move at the UN at the end of
January and the subsequent acrimony in Europe prompted a set of
responses from Washington. As noted above, even Colin Powell, pre-
viously a voice of reason within the US administration, now seemed
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set on going to war, not least because by this time America had built
up a sizeable military presence in the Gulf. Moreover, the American’s
believed that, despite its rhetoric, France would come on board at the
eleventh hour and support the use of force without the need for a sec-
ond UN resolution. These events also prompted Donald Rumsfeld to
articulate the notion of an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ Europe, denouncing both
Germany and France as ‘Old Europe’ and praising ‘New Europe’,
including Central European states, for supporting the US stance on
Iraq.24
Europe’s fractured perspectives on Iraq had the eﬀect of empower-
ing the US administration’s resolve to go to war. As Washington
observed, ‘France and Germany do not speak for Europe’, while the
‘majority of Europe’s democracies’ backed a war to oust the regime of
Saddam Hussein.25 Rumsfeld et al.’s lambasting of Germany and France
did not abate, Germany being singled out as lacking gratitude for Amer-
ica’s role in rescuing the country from Nazism in 1945 and in bringing
about uniﬁcation in 1990. Furthermore, given Berlin’s clear refusal to
honour its NATO commitments, questions were posed as to whether
the US should relocate its troops away from Germany to East-Central
Europe after the war. Typically, Rumsfeld went a step further than most
and grouped Germany together with ‘those states’, such as Cuba and
Libya, not helping the US.26
Germany’s behaviour during February and March remained
grounded by the desire to avoid a military conﬂict. To that end Ger-
many, together with France and Russia, pressed for an open-ended
extension of the UN weapons’ inspectors’ remit in Iraq and, at the same
time, in the context of NATO discussions refused to support the for-
mal authorisation of advance military planning, instigated by the US,
to help Turkey defend itself in the event of war. While Schröder was
quick to assure Turkey that if push came to shove Germany would
indeed come to Turkey’s aid, the chancellor was resolute in his oppo-
sition to such a move, and with France and Belgium argued that NATO
should not pre-empt any decision by the UN Security Council on a
second resolution and that by implementing such plans NATO would
be locked into an intractable ‘logic of war’.27 The rift over Turkey
prompted commentators on both sides of the Atlantic to decry the
death of multilateral security institutions. While the Bush administra-
tion placed the blame ﬁrmly on those European states, but particularly
France and Germany, for their profound lack of support and of under-
mining NATO by failing to fulﬁl their alliance obligations, Germany
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saw that it was America’s drive, no matter the cost, to invade Iraq and
its consistent disregard for consultation that had actually undermined
multilateralism.
From mid-February until the beginning of the invasion little ground
was made up between the two camps. Although the German Govern-
ment shifted its position somewhat by identifying with the EU’s stance
on the use of force as a last resort, a move which met with the strong
approval of the CDU–CSU, Schröder was quick to deny that he had
done a U-turn.28 The chancellor’s pledge to reject German participa-
tion in any war and his refusal to sign up to a UN resolution that
permitted one remained set in stone. Interestingly, it was around this
time that the CDU and the CSU appeared to be departing from
Stoiber’s previous dictum, not dissimilar to Schröder’s, that Germany
should not participate in any military adventures. After chiding
Schröder for the damage inﬂicted on German–American relations, the
leader of the CDU, Angela Merkel, declared that military invention
should be supported if peaceful attempts to disarm Iraq failed and, fur-
thermore, that German participation would be possible in such action
‘in accordance with our means’.29
Germany, alongside Russia and France continued to pursue the UN
route and on 5 March issued a joint statement that they would not let
through a resolution authorising the use of force, a move which had
little eﬀect in holding back the impetus towards war, as two days later
the US and the UK issued Iraq with a deadline. On 16 March a pre-
war council was held between the US, the UK and Spain, and two days
later it became evident that the US was to give up its pursuit of a sec-
ond UN resolution. The invasion of Iraq commenced on 19 March,
the task force being overwhelmingly American and British.
Speaking in early April, Schröder defended the stance he had so res-
olutely taken over the previous six months, reaﬃrming that Germany
would not take part in the war and arguing that there had been an
alternative, ‘but we were not able to prevent the war unfolding’. The
chancellor went on to argue that the Iraq crisis presented an opportu-
nity for Europe to improve its collective mechanisms and policies in
the ﬁeld of security. Schröder also conﬁrmed that Germany would meet
its alliance obligations, and to that end Germany sent Fuchs NBC
reconnaissance vehicles to Kuwait (under the auspices of ‘Enduring
Freedom’), permitted allied forces to use Germany for their staging
areas, provided 3,500 additional Bundeswehr soldiers to guard US
military installations in Germany, and sent Patriot missile defence
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systems to Israel and Turkey. Schröder also used the opportunity to
pursue the agenda for the post-war Iraq and, in particular, stressed
the central role that must be played by the UN in constructing a new
political and economic order.30
Conclusion: Iraq and its aftermath
The period after the war in Kosovo saw German security policy diverge
sharply with many of the expectations of Berlin’s allies and partners
about how German attitudes to the use of force had been largely ‘nor-
malised’. Over the course of the previous decade Germany had come
to say ‘yes’ fairly routinely regarding Bundeswehr deployments; thus by
issuing an uncompromising ‘no’ on Iraq, Germany’s behaviour seemed
almost like a reversal of the previous policy trajectory. A close inspec-
tion of events shows that it was primarily the ‘domestics’ of German
security policy that were diametrically opposed to US strategy on Iraq,
and it was these that obviated Germany’s support. Already in Mace-
donia, and then more strikingly over Afghanistan, domestic weariness
at both elite and societal levels about the necessity of a German deploy-
ment had set in. However, whereas a strong case for the use of force,
as in both of these examples, could be coupled with policy initiatives
for post-conﬂict reconstruction and stabilisation with strong humani-
tarian elements – all factors important to the capture of German
domestic support – in the case of Iraq this was not possible. Schröder’s
room for domestic manoeuvre over Iraq was fairly limited, and the task
confronting him, of somehow deﬁning a role for Germany in the war
on terror and ensuring that this was compatible with a fragile domes-
tic consensus, was not easy. The ﬁnal result, though inﬂexible and at
odds with Germany’s professed multilateralism and transatlantic soli-
darity, transpired since the US’ perception of the threat posed by Iraq
and the best means for dealing with it contrasted sharply with that of
Berlin.
In the aftermath of Iraq German security policy came to be focused
on three interrelated matters: the re-building of relations between Ger-
many and the US; the construction of a viable ESDP; and the reform
of the Bundeswehr.
Already by the end of April 2003 US–German relations were improv-
ing, although, despite a series of high-level meetings, it remained
unclear whether the relationship would resume ‘normality’ in the full
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sense. Despite Schröder’s claim that the relationship was ‘vital’ and
Fischer’s declaration that the ‘United States is a totally decisive factor
for peace and stability in the world’, adding that he believed that
‘Europe would never be militarily strong enough to guard its own secu-
rity’, a former US ambassador to Germany saw that Schröder’s dispute
with the US over Iraq ‘was an opening shot of a new disloyal, confused
and weak Germany’.31 While Germany remains committed to the ESDP,
towards the end of 2003 foreign policy pundits were pointing to a pos-
sible ‘swing back’, albeit of limited extent, in Germany’s security policy
perspectives and, importantly, a return to Atlanticism, though its rela-
tionship with the US would be more one of equals than it had been
prior to 2001.32
The fractured European perspectives on the use of force which tran-
spired over the course of 2002–3 had important ramiﬁcations for the
EU’s ambitions as a security actor and crucially for the relationship
between NATO and a future ESDP. Prior to September 11 2001, EU
states had made moderate progress towards their commitment to pro-
duce a collective military capacity, but Iraq had the eﬀect of potentially
turning the ESDP into a mini-project of France, Luxembourg, Belgium
and Germany as a vehicle to rival NATO with its own ‘autonomous’
planning staﬀ. Over the course of 2003 such fears largely died down,
not least because Germany largely back-tracked from France’s goal of
an exclusive ‘defence union’. When Britain became a contributor to the
debate over a separate planning staﬀ, the German position was aligned
more with that of the UK, which was that any EU planning staﬀ should
be located within NATO.33
The ESDP was given further shape and form through the drafting of
an EU security strategy paper by Javier Solana in mid-2003. The objec-
tive of the paper, to be accepted by the European Council at the end
of year, was to set out the substance and priorities of the ESDP. Much
of the document was not new, since it referred to the importance of
international law, multilateralism and the variety of ‘soft’ power tools
already available to the union. What was innovative about the docu-
ment was an articulation of the need, in extraordinary cases, for
pre-emptive military action.34 Unsurprisingly, it was this particular
dimension of the draft paper that the Germans sought to water down.
An issue that had been gaining in clarity since 1999, though one
which was brought into sharper relief by the war in Iraq, concerned
the deﬁciencies in the Bundeswehr’s post-1990 reform programme.
The war on terror focused attention on the military prowess of the
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US and in turn the manifold ways in which Europe’s collective mil-
itary capacities paled in comparison. In this context, the rather
unhurried pace of the Bundeswehr’s modernisation became a point
of concern for both domestic and external audiences. It is to this
issue that I turn in chapter 5.
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5Redesigning the Bundeswehr?
Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the Bundeswehr has faced, and
mastered, a series of singular situations: unexpected reuniﬁcation of East
and West Germany; the imperative to absorb the East German People’s
Army (NVA); and the calls for German out-of-area deployments in crisis
areas. Yet, despite successfully responding to all of these challenges, the
Bundeswehr has still to master another formidable obstacle: reforming
itself.1
The enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s remit to embrace a far wider set
of security tasks in the 1990s called for a realignment of its structures
and capacities. At the forefront of this project, at least in the early
1990s, was a need to modernise the Bundeswehr, to create a deploy-
ment capability based on rapid reaction for low-intensity peacekeeping.
In time, and especially after the war in Kosovo of 1999 and renewed
eﬀorts at the EU level to create an eﬀective military dimension (ESDP)
to boost the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), expecta-
tions and pressures for swifter and more far-reaching reforms emerged,
with many of Germany’s allies and partners eager to see a greater com-
mitment to modernise the Bundeswehr as well as increase defence
spending. Stimulus for change was then provided by the events of
September 11 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism, which
served to ﬁnally explode the longstanding assumption that national and
alliance territorial defence was central to the Bundeswehr’s mission and
rationale.
Certainly, the Bundeswehr at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century is
a very diﬀerent entity from that of the Cold War era. Reﬂecting the
developments discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the process of defence
reform in Germany over the past decade has been remarkable. How-
ever, as this chapter shows, all eﬀorts at reforming the Bundeswehr, to
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make it more suited to contemporary security challenges, have been
characterised by controversy and hampered by ﬁnancial uncertainties.
As a consequence, a considerable inconsistency emerged between
Germany’s stated security policy goals and the growing willingness to
use armed force, on the one hand, and the Bundeswehr’s physical and
materiel capability to respond eﬀectively. This chapter considers the
numerous phases and highlights key developments in the Bun-
deswehr’s transformation since the ending of the Cold War, starting
with the reduction of the forces’ overall size and moving on to the sub-
sequent reviews and measures adopted to improve the eﬀectiveness and
deployability of the Bundeswehr.
Phase 1 (1990–97): a new role for a streamlined Bundeswehr
The most immediate sources of change impacting upon the design of
the Bundeswehr came from external impetuses at the end of the Cold
War. Speciﬁcally, the strictures of the Two + Four Treaty’s framework
and the size limitations of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty both enforced an upper limit of 370,000 on the Bundeswehr by
1994. Furthermore, the process of absorping parts of the former East
German armed force, together with the demise of NATO’s forward
defence strategy, presented a new set of coordinates within which to
redesign the uniﬁed Germany’s post-Cold War armed forces.
New thinking about the design of the armed forces, above and
beyond the question of overall size, began to emerge thereafter as part
of the nascent debate in Germany about the kind of security actor the
new Germany should be, especially against the background of the Gulf
War. Bringing this new thinking into focus was the so-called
‘Stoltenberg Paper’, drafted in February 1992 by Defence Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg, oﬃcially called Militärpolitische und Militärstrate-
gische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung
der Bundeswehr (The Reform of the Bundeswehr: Conceptual Framework
for Military Policy and Strategy). This document challenged the exist-
ing tenets of (West) German security policy, conceiving as of ‘vital’
interest to Germany any conﬂict in the world, but especially in the
Middle East or North Africa, and in global trade and access to resources.
Unsurprisingly, the paper met with expressions of disquiet and was seen
by many to herald a dangerous new era of Germany ‘going it alone’.2
Such thinking was clearly too much too soon, bearing in mind the
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highly contested and at this stage far from certain notion of an extended
remit for the Bundeswehr, as chapter 3 indicated.
The Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Defence Policy Guidelines;
hereafter VPR) of November 1992 represented the most cohesive pol-
icy document thus far. Though in substance much the same as the
Stoltenberg Paper, Volker Rühe’s VPR managed to present its pro-
gramme and the enlargement of German security interests in a more
palatable form. The VPR’s programme was premissed on the assump-
tion that Germany was ‘no longer exposed to a direct military threat
involving an oﬀensive war in Europe’.3 Subsequently, ten vital security
interests were identiﬁed, including:
• the prevention, containment and resolution of crises and low-inten-
sity conﬂicts;
• the active maintenance of nuclear and naval powers of the transat-
lantic alliance;
• the continuation of European integration and the development of a
European defence identity, a continued partnership as equals with
the US and the maintenance of the US military presence in Europe;
• the consolidation of democratic, economic and social progress in
Europe;
• the maintenance of free world trade and unhindered access to raw
materials in the framework of a just world economic system; and
• a continued commitment to progress in arms’ control processes for
stability in and for Europe.
In the Defence White Paper of 1994, published after the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision ( July 1994) on the legality of out-of-area
deployments, the Bundeswehr’s mission was deﬁned as contributing to
‘multinational NATO and WEU crisis-management activities, together
with the capability to participate in an appropriate manner in opera-
tions conducted under the auspices of the UN and the CSCE on the
basis of the Charter of the UN and the Basic Law’,4 alongside the exist-
ing ‘capability to build and employ defensive forces adequately to deal
with what is at present an unlikely contingency, but at the same time
the worst-case scenario, namely having to defend Germany and the
Alliance’.5 By broadening the scope of German security interests, con-
ceiving of a new role for the Bundeswehr and facilitating a wider range
of deployments, these review documents and policy directives laid the
basis for a series of defence reforms, which honed in on the need to
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streamline the Bundeswehr and prepare it for a wider set of missions.
Two main issues were addressed at this stage: the control of the armed
forces and their structure.
Since its inception, the Federal armed forces had been devoid of a
national command and control structure. Moreover, on the basis of the
Blankenese Erlass, the generalinspekteur – the highest ranking Bun-
deswehr soldier – was never part of the chain of command between
the civilian defence minister and individual inspekteuren of the three
services, in peace and war. However, in the context of Germany’s
greater engagement in peacekeeping missions, the VPR of March 1992
saw that some form of national operational command body spanning
all three services would be required to facilitate the eﬀective delivery
of Germany’s crisis-management activities.6 A tangible result of these
demands was the establishment of the German Army Operational Com-
mand in August 1994, which came into force in January 1995 7 and
uniﬁed the command structure for all three services in peacetime oper-
ations, being independent of but parallel to NATO multinational
structures. The enhanced the role of the generalinspekteur, again justi-
ﬁed as aiding the smooth running of operations, was enacted,
propelling the generalinspekteur into the chain of operational com-
mand in ‘peacetime only’. This implied that in peacetime operations –
meaning all operations outside of the defence of German and/or NATO
territory (i.e. out-of-area operations) – the generalinspekteur became
part of the chain of command between the defence minister and the
three service inspekteuren. Further enhancing the generalinspekteur’s
position a führungszentrum of around sixty-ﬁve staﬀ was assigned to
him in early 1995.8
Step-change in Bundeswehr force structure was prompted ﬁrst by
NATO’s London Declaration of 1990, which heralded the move away
from forward defence. Reacting to this, already in 1991, Generalin-
spekteur Klaus Naumann outlined what change in the European
security environment meant for the Bundeswehr. In addition to the
usual protection of German citizens, he stressed that to remain credi-
ble within the alliance an enhanced readiness to partake in collective
actions to preserve peace within the framework of the UN Charter
would have to be realised. This, he said, would require a re-orienta-
tion of the Bundeswehr to include also verfügbar (rapid reaction) forces.
Again it was Volker Rühe’s VPR which provided a greater focus to these
ideas by delineating force structure into rapid reaction, main defence
and basic infrastructure–augmentation forces.
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The crisis-reaction forces (Krisenreaktionskräfte; hereafter KRK), cre-
ated in the mid-1990s, were a manifestation of Germany’s adaptation
to new security demands.9 Seen as a ‘priority element’ of the Bun-
deswehr, the KRK were created as a 50,000–strong body comprising
elements of all three services and designed for the whole spectrum of
guerrilla warfare to Gulf-style combat missions with high mobility and
a geographically unlimited operational capability. This critical delin-
eation of Bundeswehr tasks into crisis management, out-of-area and
national–NATO defence was conﬁrmed in the Konzeptionelle Leitlin-
ien zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr (conceptual guidelines for
the further development of the Bundeswehr; hereafter, KLL), issued
directly after the Constitutional Court’s ruling in July 1994.10 The KLL
based its plans on a 340,000 strong Bundeswehr, including a large
conscript body whose service period was reduced to one of 10 months.
The mainstay of manpower would continue to reside in the ‘main
defence force’, designed for the territorial defence of Germany with
elements of the KRK deployable in 3–7 days and the rest in 15–30
days. Guidelines issued later in the decade, including the Bun-
deswehrplan 1997, conﬁrmed again the Bundeswehr’s commitment to
develop a crisis-management aptitude, expecting that by 2009 the Bun-
deswehr would be armed with the appropriate weaponry. For such
tasks as freeing hostages and combating terrorism Kommando
spezialkräfte (special commando forces) were established, between them
comprising around 100 soldiers who were to be ready by the year
2000. Such proposals were issued on the basis of a large armed force,
with a peacetime strength of some 338,000 soldiers and an Aufwuchs-
fähigkeit (augmentation strength) of some 650,000–700,000. Crucially,
all planning documents were premissed on the maintenance of
conscription.
By the close of the CDU–CSU–FDP’s long tenure of oﬃce much had
been accomplished in the sphere of defence reform, especially regard-
ing the size of the armed forces, which had shrunk to 333,000 by 1998.
Through a combination of external and internal pressures the political
will had emerged in Germany to underwrite the expansion of German’s
capacity to project its forces beyong its borders and the commitment
to redirect the Bundeswehr towards a crisis-management role. How-
ever, as Mary Elise Sarotte noted in 2001, ‘will’ is not a synonym for
the actual ‘capacity’, for force projection, and that too much gradual
and unhurried reform retarded the overall modernisation of the
Bundeswehr and, in turn, hindered Germany’s ability to act.11 At the
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heart of the matter was that bold political statements and new defence
policy guidelines were not met or followed through by tangible and
far-reaching defence reforms.
Three interrelated issues lay behind this. First, although in practice
the chief role of the Bundeswehr had de facto moved from being a stolid
bulwark of deterrence towards active participation in crisis manage-
ment, as seen in the process of change from Cambodia to Kosovo
discussed in earlier chapters, national and alliance defence remained
enshrined as the core tasks of the Bundeswehr. Second, and as a result
of this mismatch, the Bundeswehr of the late 1990s was very much ‘two
armies’, comprising the larger and less well equipped main defence
forces, with a substantial conscript element and geared to territorial
defence, and the smaller all-professional crisis-reaction component,
better equipped and geared for out-of-area missions. Third, maintain-
ing a commitment to this divided structure, as well as to keeping
conscription, in the context of ever-increasing Bundeswehr deploy-
ments placed acute strains on the German defence budget, which
remained stagnant in the 1990s. Defence spending dipped to an
unprecedented low of around 1.6 per cent of GDP in the 1990s at a
time when the European NATO average remained at around 2.2 per
cent of GDP. Coupled with this, Germany was spending too much on
Bundeswehr personnel and infrastructure costs to the detriment of
equipment and research and development, areas of investment needed
to enhance Germany’s capability to project force.
Clearly the upshot of this was that on the eve of the Red–Green coali-
tion’s assumption of power in 1998 the reform process was incomplete.
Competing priorities, a mismatch of role conceptions and realities com-
bined with inadequate defence spending stymied the Bundeswehr’s
eﬀorts at capacity-building in this ﬁrst phase of reform.
Phase 2 (1998–2001): Red–Green efforts at reform
Against this background, fresh eﬀorts were made to re-focus the reform
of the Bundeswehr in the immediate wake of the Federal elections of
September 1998, eﬀorts were then given greater impetus by the 1999
war in Kosovo and the lessons drawn from it for the future of Euro-
pean security. The Kosovo experience exposed the serious deﬁciencies
in Europe’s collective ability to present a common voice on foreign pol-
icy questions and to project armed force without recourse to US
Redesigning the Bundeswehr? 103
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd  30/06/2004  16:25  Page 103
leadership. A result of this was a renewed eﬀort at emboldening the
EU’s CFSP mechanisms and in particular to develop an eﬀective mili-
tary arm into what came to be known as the European Security and
Defence Policy. Germany’s own plans for defence reforms at this time
dovetailed with broader eﬀorts in motion at the EU level to enhance
Europe’s crisis-management military capacity and, particularly in the
light of Kosovo, to be able to deal with any future deployments at the
higher end of the Petersburg (peacekeeping) tasks. The relevance of
Germany and its defence reforms to the ESDP project is considerable
and should not be underestimated. As the largest EU state, and having
made signiﬁcant pledges to the ESDP and the ‘Headline Goals’ estab-
lished at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 – to make
a national contribution of around 15,000–20,000 troops to the pro-
posed pool of 50,000–60,000 EU operational forces to be in place by
2003 12 and to commit itself to covering 15–20 per cent of the overall
costs of this project – Germany’s capacity to address shortcomings in its
defence spending and force structure reform now had broad European
ramiﬁcations.
The context of reform
The need for a full appraisal of German security policies and attendant
considerations on Bundeswehr force structure was outlined as an objec-
tive by the SPD when in opposition in 1997. Once in government in
1998 the Red–Green coalition re-ﬁred the momentum, initially through
a Bestandsaufnahme, or stocktaking, of the status of the German armed
forces. This led the new SPD Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping to
conclude that the Bundeswehr was still organised for Cold War sce-
narios, that it lacked the necessary capabilities for crisis-management
tasks and that interoperability with Germany’s allies was under threat.
Finally, he saw that consistently low levels of defence spending had
meant that the Bundeswehr had suﬀered from a lack of investment, a
problem which was becoming even more acute due to rising expecta-
tions presented by NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative and the ESDP.
In sum, a situation had transpired whereby the Bundeswehr was on the
brink of becoming an ineﬀective ‘hollow force’, with the enormity of
its problems and deﬁciencies pointing to the urgency of a thorough
review.13
On the back of this conclusion, which was widely shared by politi-
cal and military elites, a renewed eﬀort at rooting out the problems
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associated with the Bundeswehr’s current structure and articulating
concrete plans for reform was initiated. A ﬁrst step was the creation of
an independent ‘blue ribbon’ commission body chaired by former pres-
ident Richard von Weizsaecker comprising experts on security and the
armed forces drawn from politics, the media and academia.14 The
Weizsaeker Commission, as it came to be known, was joined by a fur-
ther investigation headed by Generalinspekteur Hans-Peter von
Kirchbach as part of a BMVg review of the Bundeswehr. A third report
and set of recommendations were then delivered by Defence Minister
Scharping himself, which, while corresponding in some ways to the
other two reports, were quite distinct and subsequently provided the
broad framework within which defence reforms were enacted.
Why there were three parallel review processes underway in 1999
became the subject of intense interest and speculation. Theories about
Scharping’s own career ambitions and rivalry with Chancellor Schröder
entered the mix, with suggestions that up until 2000 Scharping’s
mind was not fully focused on the job of reforming the Bundeswehr.
At this point he realised that the tenor of the Weizsaeker Commis-
sion was already going to be too radical and far reaching in its
recommendations and thus prompted Von Kirchbach to draw up a
BMVg-led report, which, he believed, would be more grounded, mod-
est and realistic. Certainly, Von Kirchbach’s set of recommendations
was more realistic and ‘do-able’ than that of Weizsaeker, though for
Scharping they were far too conservative and out of step with the
times. This line of reasoning suggests, therefore, that Scharping con-
cluded that he would have to write a report himself. A second take
on why three reform proposals emerged suggests that Scharping was
indeed very much in control of the process and masterminded an
ethos of competition and conﬂict between Weizsaeker and Von Kirch-
bach. Perhaps knowing all along that the two sets of recommendations
would diverge, Scharping was able to emerge with his own report as
the voice of reason and pragmatism. A ﬁnal interpretation of how
the reform process got underway suggests that Scharping sought to
garner the greatest possible extent of expert input and broad consul-
tation to ensure that all angles of the reform process were covered,
hence the two expert reports, plus his own interpretation and set of
recommendations.15
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The Weizsaeker and Von Kirchbach reports
The Weizsaeker Commission’s remit, outlined early in 1999, was to
perform a thorough stocktaking of developments over the previous
decade, to assess current demands, needs and provisions of German
security policy, and to make recommendations and proposals regard-
ing the future organisation and direction of the armed forces in terms
of both quality and quantity. The commission was tasked with identi-
fying medium- to long-term solutions to them. At the core of the
commission’s report, published on 23 May 2000,16 was the crucial claim
that the ‘Bundeswehr is too big, badly organised and increasingly out
of step with the times’; furthermore, the report asserted that the Bun-
deswehr had ‘no future in its current structure’. It was scathing about
the eﬀects of the present form of military service which, it was argued,
produced an excess of manpower to the detriment of actual operational
forces and also thwarted attempts at much-needed modernisation.
The commission saw that the ‘yardstick’ for Bundeswehr reform
should be the capacity to participate, simultaneously and indeﬁnitely,
in two crisis-response operations. Against this scenario was the pro-
posed diminution of the Bundeswehr from around 320,000 to 240,000
by the year 2006. Of that number, around 140,000 would be fully oper-
ational, equipped and trained for crisis-management activities in an
alliance context. In the cause of improved eﬀectiveness the report also
argued for greater streamlining in the command structures of the Bun-
deswehr and, principally, to bring the generalinspecteur more centrally
into the chain of command. Twinned with this, Germany’s response,
coordination and conduct in crisis-management activities should be
enhanced through the creation of an Einsatzrat (deployment council).
A new ‘strategic partnership’ with industry was proposed as a source
of more funding for research and development to jump-start the mod-
ernisation of the Bundeswehr. Other reinforcing measures were
proposed, including sizeable cuts in civilian posts and general infra-
structure, and the closure of some 40 per cent of army bases. Finally,
the Weizsaeker Commission proposed a DM2–3 billion rise in annual
defence spending to realise a more eﬀective modern armed force.
The tone of Von Kirchbach’s report was far less ambitious and
paled in comparison to that of the Weizsaeker Commission, giving
greater emphasis at the beginning of the report to territorial and
alliance defence as prime functions of the German armed forces. Con-
sequently, thinking guided by the status quo pervaded the document,
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which posited that the Bundeswehr should be reduced to 290,000 by
2010, a signiﬁcantly smaller reduction over a longer time-frame from
what was envisioned by the Weizsaeker Commission. That said, Von
Kirchbach was mindful of the investment needs of the Bundeswehr
and, like the Weizsaeker Commission, proposed a refocusing of defence
spending and a greater emphasis on research and development and
the acquisition of modern weaponry with a view to improving the
Bundeswehr’s strategic deployability and Germany’s interoperability
with its allies.
The Weizsaeker and Von Kirchbach proposals illustrated the scope
of German thinking about security at this crucial time of the Bun-
deswehr’s post-Cold War development. Elements of both continuity
and change characterise the two reports, suggesting that the Bun-
deswehr, still in 2000, was caught between ‘old’ and ‘new’ security
thinking. This statement is particularly apt when considered in the con-
text of how the documents attempt to prioritise the role of the
Bundeswehr and the related issue of conscription. Both sets of pro-
posals regard the territorial defence of Germany and its alliance as a
key task, if not the priority, of the Bundeswehr, a notion quite out of
step with developments elsewhere in Europe and the doctrines of Ger-
many’s partners. Certainly, Weizsaeker’s report was concerned with
other security challenges and an array of non-traditional security prob-
lems, but ultimately it regarded territorial collective defence as the most
signiﬁcant task for German security policy. As noted above, Von Kirch-
bach’s report was even more conventional in its risk-prioritising, citing
article 87a of the German Basic Law as the continued rationale for the
Bundeswehr.
What ﬂows from this conception of the role of the Bundeswehr is a
continued strong preference for conscription which is present in both
sets of recommendations. To be brief, as this is discussed in chapter 6,
although the number of conscripts inducted annually and the length
of their service time would have to be changed, both reports subscribed
fully to the vitality of conscription within the new Bundeswehr’s man-
power structure. For the Weizsaeker Commission, conscription
provided a good insurance policy and ﬂexibility against an uncertain
future, while also acting as an indispensable means of recruitment. Von
Kirchbach’s report viewed conscription as similarly crucial, especially
to the Bundeswehr’s capacity to raise a reserve component for the
‘backbone of Germany’s national territorial defence capability’.17
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Scharping’s programme of reforms
Subsequent to the issuing of the Weizsaecker and Von Kirchbach
reports, Scharping drew up his own programme for reform, entitled Die
Bundeswehr – sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert: Eckpfeiler fuer eine Erneuerung
von Grund auf (The Bundeswehr – Advancing Steadily into the Twenty-
First Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal). The plans
proposed by Scharping, which were approved very rapidly by the
Cabinet, presented ideas and prognoses that on most points fell roughly
between the recommendations of the two earlier reports.
The programme of reforms tackled the themes of renewal, re-orien-
tation and optimisation, and began with an analysis of Germany’s new
security situation, seen as characterised by a ‘large range of military and
non-military risks that are hard to estimate in terms of how they will
develop’. Taking account of this new context a Neues Fähigkeitsproﬁl
(new capabilities’ proﬁle) set the political and military parameters of
the Bundeswehr’s role, emphasising above all that Germany should be
equipped and able to help shape NATO policy through both qualita-
tive and quantitative contributions. According to the proﬁle Germany
would be equipped for the early detection of crises, to initiate moves
to enhance the interoperability of command and control structures, to
improve on the mobility and ﬂexibility of the Bundeswehr, while main-
taining the capability to substantially augment the armed forces at times
of crisis. Underlying Scharping’s articulation of new tasks for the Bun-
deswehr was an emphasis on territorial defence as the basic role of the
armed forces. The content of planned manpower reform was premissed
on the requirement that in the event of NATO–EU missions, the Bun-
deswehr is able to ﬁeld up to 50,000 troops for a year or conduct two
medium-sized operations requiring up to 10,000 troops, each for a
number of years, simultaneously ﬁelding forces for a number of smaller
missions.
The ‘cornerstones’ of Scharping’s reforms related to the size, struc-
ture and composition of the Bundeswehr, so that:
• it would be a fully alliance-compatible and ‘Europe-capable’ force
capable of carrying out both collective defence and peace-support
operations;
• the three services would be equipped with technologically up-to-date
armaments, especially in areas urgently needed for the broader
mission spectrum; and
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• the implementation of the reforms was enabled by a ‘dynamic ﬁnan-
cial framework’.18
Following Cabinet approval of Scharping’s proposals for the Bundes-
wehr on 14 June 2000, the BMVg set about detailing how the guidelines
would be implemented in the form of a Grobausplanung, which was
issued in September 2000. The key aspects of these planning documents
are outlined below:
Size and composition of the Bundeswehr
There would be 255,000 active troops, 22,000 ‘non-active’ troops
undergoing long-term professional training and 5,000 reservists under-
going full-time service. This total of 282,000 was to be constituted by
some 200,000 professional soldiers, around 80,000 conscripts, 3,000 of
them undergoing active-duty training (a reduction by 40 per cent), and
2,000 reservists (a 50 per cent reduction). This conﬁguration was to be
achieved by:
• a reduction in the peacetime civilian infrastructure (down from
140,000 to 80,000), giving the Bundeswehr an overall strength of
around 360,000, and an augmented wartime strength of 500,000 mil-
itary personnel;
• an increase from 66,000 to around 150,000 in the Bundeswehr’s
operational forces – 80,000 to be available after a very short period
of preparation – with a further 105,000 troops forming the basic
military organisation, assigned to national defence tasks; and
• the number of conscripts to fall by around 40 per cent, from 135,000
to 80,000, with ﬂexible service time introduced.
Structure and funding
• There was to be a streamlining of Bundeswehr command and con-
trol structures to enhance its role in multinational missions,
including the establishment of a joint-operations command to lead
all three services, and an increase in the power of the generalin-
spekteur.
• An increase in investment as part of the overall defence budget from
around 25 per cent to 30 per cent would be made by directing the
projected savings through manpower reforms and the pruning of
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infrastructure, with no substantial rise in defence spending, in order
to improve capabilities.
• The Bundeswehr’s strategic deployment capacities were to be
improved, together with a build-up of air- and sea-transportation
competences, and the creation of a space-borne reconnaissance
capacity enabling Germany to make its own assessments of crisis
situations.
The reception of the reforms
Even prior to the oﬃcial release of Scharping’s report, debate on the
future of the Bundeswehr had centred principally on the issues of con-
scription and the ﬁnancing of the reforms. After the premature leakage
of the Weizsaecker report, the SPD defended the commission’s work
and argued that the report had more value than any previous discus-
sions on the role of the Bundeswehr, though at the same time Scharping
charged that the commission’s proposal on conscription would, if
implemented, undermine equity and fairness in its practice. The
Green element of the coalition conceded that the report’s recommen-
dations were a ‘Zeichen des Mutes für notwendige Reformen’ (an
indication of a strong desire to enact necessary reforms).19 The CDU
meanwhile charged that the report threatened the future of conscrip-
tion, which, were it to be abolished, would endanger the stability of
the Bundeswehr. The CSU had similar reservations, seeing the recom-
mendations as tantamount to the abolition of conscription ‘through
the back door’.20
There was domestic concern over the reform of the Bundeswehr, in
particular whether it could be accomplished without a rise in defence
spending. The Weizsaecker Commission had argued that to meet new
objectives the defence budget would have to be increased in the short
term so that savings could be made in the long term, but Scharping
posited that the reform process could indeed be ﬁnanced exclusively
through the redirection of existing funds via cuts, rationalisation and
a ‘strategic partnership’ between the armed forces and industry. Scharp-
ing’s rather scant attention to ﬁnancial detail in his reform plan and
continued insistence that much of the reform could be achieved by
expected savings and greater eﬃciency proved problematical, especially
when confronted with the economic plans of Finance Minister Hans
Eichel and his concern to see an decrease in overall defence spending.
Despite Eichel’s agreement in May 2001 to provide additional ﬁnance
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to the BMVg, Scharping’s programme of reforms was carried out in
the context of a diminishing defence budget, which in real terms has
been reduced by around 25 per cent since 1990.
At the international level, Scharping’s proposals met with broad
approval on both sides of the Atlantic by Germany’s allies and part-
ners, who saw that the general pattern of the reforms, when
implemented, would help bridge the deﬁciencies that had hitherto been
apparent in the Bundeswehr’s performance. However, while allies gen-
erally responded positively to Scharping’s initiatives, there was some
concern that the proposed internal restructuring would not be enough
to bring the Bundeswehr up to scratch: US Secretary of State for
Defence William S. Cohen, for example, commenting on the German
reforms, stated that all European NATO members must acknowledge
that ‘real dollars’ would have to be put behind their defence reforms.
Nevertheless Cohen was conﬁdent that Scharping’s reforms would
enable Germany to play a leading role in the building of Europe’s
defence capabilities.21
A discrepancy between means and ends
Developments in this second main phase (1998–2001) of defence
reform in Germany brought into focus once more the complex web of
issues and problems surrounding attempts to restructure the Bun-
deswehr. Despite renewed eﬀorts by the Red–Green coalition after 1998,
the reform of the Bundeswehr continued to be characterised by mutu-
ally conﬂicting goals. At the crux of this lay burdensome ﬁnancial
constraints, which limited defence planners’ scope to enact radical and
far-reaching reforms, so that the reshaping of the armed forces and the
defence sector generally could be carried out only via eﬃciency and
cost-cutting measures. There was subsequently little bold thinking
either about changes to Scharping’s own proposals or about ﬁnance for
much-needed major projects, including procurement, during this
period. There was also the issue of risk prioritisation, which diﬀered
between the expert reports commissioned by Scharping in 1999. Ger-
man security thinking appeared to be caught between two eras, with
plans for the reform of the Bundeswehr exhibiting the need to prepare
for national and alliance territorial defence, while at the same time cre-
ating an enhanced readiness to partake in peace-support operations.
Again, this way of thinking was burdensome for the reform process. It
kept Germany’s defence doctrine out of step with those of its partners
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and allies, and brought into question Berlin’s ability to fulﬁl capability
pledges made at the EU and NATO levels
A conclusion to draw here is that, despite the war in Kosovo and
the enlargement of NATO, which also took place in April 1999, Ger-
man thinking about security remained stymied by old preoccupations,
which manifested themselves in Scharping’s defence reforms. The
eﬀects of this were captured neatly by commentator Francois Heisbourg
who called the process ‘Germany’s non-revolution in military aﬀairs’,
decrying Germany for not doing enough, especially for reducing
defence spending maintaining the size of the Bundeswehr and for
keeping conscription.22
Phase 3 (2001–3): reforming the reforms
It was against this background of still inadequate Bundeswehr reform
that a further phase of activity aimed at modernising the armed forces
and enhancing Germany’s capabilities emerged. This time, the imme-
diate impulse for change, the events of September 11 and the
subsequent US-led war on terrorism, was arguably more profound and
of greater signiﬁcance than any previous episode. Crucially, these events
were almost to pulverize the residues of old security thinking in Ger-
many and to instigate a more radical programme of reform. In this
context it is not surprising that the full eﬀects of Scharping’s reform
programme of 2000 were not felt. The events of September 11 notwith-
standing, those earlier reforms had been plagued by ongoing ﬁnancial
constraints, as well as problematical timing, and they were also bruised
by the political spin and scandal emanating from the resignation of
General Von Kirchbach shortly after the submission of his report and
then the sacking of Rudolf Scharping just before the Federal election
in 2002. As a consequence, plans were already afoot to reform the
existing reform process.
Despite Berlin’s aversion to the war in Iraq in 2003, the events of
September 11 2001 and what followed unquestionably provided a
powerful impetus to a reconsideration of the principles guiding German
thinking on the use of force, which in turn produced a greater resolve
to reform the Bundeswehr.
Other factors came in to play, ampliﬁed by the war on terrorism.
By early 2003 Germany had large numbers of troops deployed abroad
in peacekeeping missions, and was thus over-stretched, moreover
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relentless cuts in public spending in Germany continued to impinge
upon the Bundeswehr’s capabilities. The existing reform programme
was doing little to ease this; nor was it able to provide an indication
that things would get any better in the short–medium term. Moreover,
continued eﬀorts to save and redirect funds via a scaling down of large
procurement projects, such as the order of A400M military transport
aircraft and the promise of further base closures to release more imme-
diate funds for the Bundeswehr’s operational tasks were proving
insuﬃcient. Such attempts to ‘square the circle’ – to do more in the
absence of additional funds, while maintaining a declaratory commit-
ment and a sizeable element of the Bundeswehr geared towards
territorial defence – were proving to be undeliverable. Berlin’s ultimate
response to this emerging quandary came in May 2003 in the form of
a fresh formulation of Germany’s Defence Policy Guidelines.
Guidelines for a changed security environment
The new Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (VPR) were issued by
Scharping’s successor Peter Struck. Succeeding those drafted by Volker
Rühe back in 1992, the new VPR set out new principles shaping Ger-
many’s security policy, identiﬁed new challenges and began to prescribe
the types of response and programme of reform required to meet Ger-
many’s contemporary security environment.23 Struck’s guidelines
represent Germany’s consolidated response to the events of September
11 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terrorism. The ambitions
sketched out in the document demonstrated that lessons had been
learnt and that Germany was cognisant of the military capabilities
required of it. Moreover, the new VPR contains an eﬀort to ‘re-found’
US–German relations in the wake of the Iraqi War, as well as to con-
solidate the ESDP and NATO as a ‘partnership’ rather than a ‘rivalry’.
What marks out the 2003 guidelines from all previous statements and
reform programmes is the document’s more contemporary conceptu-
alisation of security risks, which is less at variance with the doctrines
of Germany’s allies and partners than had hitherto been the case. Per-
haps the most signiﬁcant aspect of the VPR is a reprioritising of the
likely challenges to Germany’s security and, consequently, of the ration-
ale and tasks of the Bundeswehr, with implications for the areas of
defence reform to be prioritised.
The main proposition of the document is that ‘defence’ has to be
understood as exceeding traditional responses to conventional attacks
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on Germany or its allies: defence has to be reinterpreted to include
the prevention of conﬂicts and crises, and the joint-management of
rehabilitation following crises and conﬂicts. Capturing Struck’s new
conceptualisation is the notion that German interests have to be
defended at the Hindukush. The new VPR sees that ‘defence can no
longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes
to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy’.24 Substanti-
ating this fresh conceptualisation of defence is a re-founding of the
main tasks of the Bundeswehr to include a far wider spectrum of
operations. Since there is no conventional threat to German territory
at present or in the foreseeable future, ‘the Bundeswehr will focus on
operations in the context of conﬂict prevention and crisis manga-
ment, as well as in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory’.25
Bringing these claims together is the clear articulation of a new main
task for the Bundeswehr: international conﬂict prevention and crisis
management, including the ﬁght against international terrorism, are
seen as the ‘likelier tasks to be fulﬁlled by German armed forces for
the foreseeable future’.26 Certainly, the new VPR maintains that it is
prudent for Germany to maintain the capability to guard against a
conventional attack on national territory; it dismisses, however, the
notion that capabilities should continued to be sustained purely for
this purpose.
This bold articulation of a broader, potentially more proactive, set
of tasks for the Bundeswehr will determine its structure and shape a
renewed eﬀort at reform. The VPR states that ﬁve main capability objec-
tives will provide the contours for the Bundeswehr’s modernisation:
command and control; intelligence collection and reconnaissance;
mobility; eﬀective engagement; support and sustainability; survivabilty
and protection. It sees that the enhancement of Germany’s aptitude
in these areas, alongside the capabilities of its allies, will enable the
Bundeswehr to deliver its new tasks.
As bold as Struck’s VPR may be, tight ﬁnancial constraints are still
in force, curtailing real innovation and casting doubts on the capacity
to deliver tangible change. Given that the defence budget will remain,
until at least 2006, at Euro 24.4 billion per year (around 1.5 per cent
of GDP), getting the Bundeswehr ready for its new tasks will have to
be accomplished again through savings and the redirection of funds
into much needed investment projects. In an attempt to counter his
ﬁnancial conﬁnement, Struck continued in the same vein as his pred-
ecessor to prune back Bundeswehr infrastructure, close bases and
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reduce the scope of large-scale procurement projects, often to the
annoyance of European partners, with the aim of saving around Euro
2.4 billion. Struck’s room for manouevre will also be shaped by the
commitment to conscription, also present in the VPR of 2003, a pol-
icy which will continue to make sizable manpower demands on the
defence budget.
Domestic reception of the VPR again honed in on two crucial areas:
conscription and ﬁnance. Both the Greens and the Liberals support the
abolition of conscription and consequently called for amendments to
the guidelines. The CDU, meanwhile, supported the general direction
of the guidelines, but argued that the current defence budget was far
too low to modernise the Bundeswehr for its new tasks.
Adding ﬂesh to the VPR were details delivered in early 2004 regard-
ing the size and structure of the Bundeswehr. In mid-January,
Defence Minister Struck together with Generalinspekteur General
Wolfgang Schneiderhahn set out further drastic cuts for the defence
sector. Again the Defence Ministry’s plans were not without contro-
versy. Not only did Struck’s reform programme prompt a discussion
on the future of conscription and the Zivildienst, but the projected
cuts to the army’s budget gave rise to disagreement within the min-
istry and the early retirement of Heeresinspekteur Gert Gudera.
Headlining the announcement was the slashing of defence spending
by Euro 26 billion, to be attained principally through the planned
closure of some 110 bases over the next 8 years. Accompanying this
were plans for the greater stratiﬁcation of the Bundeswehr and a
reduction in its overall size by around 35,000. Struck announced that
the Bundeswehr would comprise 35,000 rapid-deployment troops, a
70,000 strong stabilisation force for Balkan-type peacekeeping mis-
sions, together with a force of 137,500 soldiers providing a general
supporting and logistical role.
Outlook: the Bundeswehr in the twenty-first century
I began this chapter by asserting that during the 1990s a mismatch
emerged between Germany’s greater readiness and political will to use
armed force and its actual capacity to deliver and meet new expecta-
tions. The overview of the reform process and attempts at modernising
the Bundeswehr makes it apparent that at the start of the twenty-
ﬁrst century Germany is ﬁnally catching up with its allies in respect
Redesigning the Bundeswehr? 115
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd  30/06/2004  16:25  Page 115
of defence sector reform. Although much has changed over the course
of the past thirteen years – and, certainly, the extent of that change has
been remarkable – strong structural factors remain in place and serve
to impede a fuller realisation of reform. If success is measured by the
meeting of targets and deadlines, the adequate performance of given
tasks and being seen by allies and partners as a credible actor, then
Germany’s performance is somewhat patchy; in short, Berlin should be
doing better.
As Sarotte notes a profound lack of urgency, especially in the 1990s,
a rather closed-minded approach to security issues, an unfaltering sup-
port of conscription, together with limited funds all contributed to the
slow pace of Bundeswehr reform throughout the period.27 Although the
events of September 11 2001 and the war on terror have helped to ini-
tiate fresh thinking in Germany, most of the constraining factors and
forces of inertia persist and are likely to keep the reform momentum
at its sluggish current pace. One area on which the impact of reform
eﬀorts has been particularly ineﬀectual is conscription, an issue to
which I turn in chapter 6.
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6The endurance of conscription
Universal conscription is an element of Germany’s security insurance and
will continue to be indispensable.1
I believe that conscription is an essential instrument for the Bundeswehr’s
integration into society. Therefore, it shall remain.2
The conscription puzzle
When considered against the expansion of the Bundeswehr’s remit dur-
ing the 1990s and the associated eﬀorts at restructuring its armed forces,
Germany’s stalwart commitment to retaining conscription is an area of
profound stasis, an anomaly warranting further investigation. In the
face of ever-more acute strategic, economic and social challenges to the
utility of compulsory military service since the ending of the Cold War,
conscription was maintained and developed in Germany in the 1990s
by both the CDU- and the SPD-led Government to enhance its rele-
vance and thus ensure its survival. Moreover, the issue of conscription’s
future, whenever it has been debated in Germany over the past decade,
has been hampered by the overwhelming support given to the practice
by the Volksparteien, as well as the Ministry of Defence; as a conse-
quence, no serious consideration has been given to alternatives to
conscription.
This situation sets Germany apart from countries across Europe (and
beyond) where the trend has been away from the mass-armed force pre-
missed on compulsory military service and towards fully professional
smaller forces. Germany’s lack of engagement with the issue of con-
scription derives from the prevailing belief among the political and mil-
itary elite that, stripped of its compulsory military service element, the
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Bundeswehr would become irretrievably undemocratic and that unde-
sirable changes to the form and substance of Germany’s foreign and
security policy would follow. The potency of this conviction is apparent
in the discourse surrounding Bundeswehr staﬃng structures and, more
speciﬁcally, in the justiﬁcations levied in support of conscription
throughout the 1990s.
This signiﬁcance of conscription in Germany after 1989 has been
noted by a number of commentators who have generally seen that the
endurance of the practice is best explained by socio-historical reasons,
or ideational factors, relating to ‘the weight of the past’, an entrenched
political–military culture informed by Germany’s past and culture –
features, it has been argued, that ensure the policy’s path-dependence
and obstruct the way to change.3 Even the most ardently realist prog-
noses of German security policy have acknowledged conscription’s
special status. Geoﬀrey van Orden, for example, commented: ‘The
debate over conscription goes to the heart of the contemporary Ger-
man dilemma over the function of the armed forces.’ 4 Others, coming
from a more constructivist perspective, have made similar observations
about the signiﬁcance of the draft. John Duﬃeld, for one, posited that
the anti-militarism innate to German political culture ‘has fostered a
strong, if not universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disad-
vantages in the circumstances of the post-Cold War era and even
though it has no longer been necessary to prevent a replay of the mil-
itaristic excesses of the past’.5 Thomas Berger came to the same
conclusion, maintaining that the reality of a speciﬁc political–military
culture within Germany is the chief reason for the perpetuation of con-
scription, expressive of the drive to weld together German society and
its military.6 Such comments about the peculiar, historically deter-
mined, inertia surrounding conscription have rarely issued in analysis
beyond this labelling of conscription as somehow ‘special’. With such
observations as a starting-point, I attempt in this chapter to explore
the puzzle of conscription and to explain why, in the face of factors
that challenge the eﬃcacy of conscription, its practice has been per-
petuated and seems set to form a substantial part of the Bundeswehr’s
current mixed personnel composition.7
It is worth sketching out the place of conscription in the context
of West German rearmament before considering the present state of
play. As explained in chapter 2, conscription acted as a linchpin in the
rearming of West Germany, meeting a range of military, social and
political requirements prevalent at the time. Crucially, the introduction
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of conscription enabled the new Bundeswehr to build up a substantial
personnel base and augmentation strength within the context of NATO,
thus contributing to West Germany’s international rehabilitation. Fur-
thermore conscription, alongside a number of other new civil–military
mechanisms, served as a bridge-builder between the new armed forces
and a society largely opposed to the rearmament process and suspi-
cious of all things military. An upshot of this was that conscription
over time became more than just a staﬃng mechanism, symbolising
the new democratic ethos of the Bundeswehr and playing a signiﬁ-
cant role in building up the Federal Republic’s political capital and
credibility as a security actor.
Annually throughout the Cold War up to 200,000 young men were
inducted to the armed forces as Grundwehrdienstleistende, alongside its
regular personnel and reservists, to enable the Bundeswehr to reach its
augmented wartime strength of around 1 million personnel. During the
Cold War, as was noted in 1973 in a government report, a move away
from compulsory military service was deemed plausible only in the
instance of a ‘substantially changed security situation [that would] per-
mit a considerable reduction of standing forces’, and which could lead
to ‘an examination of the conversion of the Bundeswehr into an all-
volunteer force’.8 The enduring Cold War bipolarity and the sustained
burden of expectation on the Federal Republic to produce a land-based
large armed force naturally perpetuated conscription, the practice of
which was largely uncontested throughout this period. Consequently,
until the watershed of 1989–90, the only changes made to military serv-
ice came in the form of lengthened or shortened service time in
response to changes in the intensity of the security environment and
the projected number of young men available at given times for mili-
tary service. Between 1956 and 1961 conscripts served for a period of
12 months; after 1962 and until 1971 service time was extended to 18
months, but was subsequently shortened to 15 months after 1972. Then,
in 1984, it was decided, partly in response to the declining birth rate,
that from 1989 the length of military service woul return to eighteen
months.
The ending of superpower hostilities in 1989–90 nulliﬁed existing
plans to extend the duration of military service from 1989 onwards.
Beyond this, little else changed in Germany’s conscription policy there-
after. Indeed, in spite of the seismic geopolitical changes of 1989–90 –
and considering the ongoing unpopularity of compulsory military serv-
ice, especially among young people, as seen in consistently high levels
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of conscientious objectors which had begun to soar already in the 1970s
– in successive reform documents and eﬀorts to reshape the Bun-
deswehr to meet new post-Cold War security challenges, continuity
rather than change characterised the policy and politics of conscrip-
tion. This static situation in Germany stands in stark contrast to change
elsewhere in Europe and sets Berlin aside from its main partners in
terms of the personnel structures of its national armed forces. The
diminishing utility of conscription has already been recognised by many
other European states, where moves have been underway since the end-
ing of the Cold War to abolish the practice in favour of fully
professional or ‘all-volunteer forces’ (AVFs). For example, France, Bel-
gium and The Netherlands had concluded already in the mid-1990s
that their security needs were better served by smaller, more mobile,
forces comprised purely of professionals. Spain, Italy, Portugal and the
Czech Republic have also followed suit and begun the process of estab-
lishing smaller AVFs, processes which have not, however, been without
diﬃculties and controversy in all of these countries.
The reasons why these states decided to make the switch to fully pro-
fessional force structures are clear. They relate, ﬁrst and foremost, to a
proven need, which emerged over the course of the 1990s to enhance
the operational readiness and interoperability of national armed forces,
necessitating smaller, better trained, better paid and better equipped
modern armed forces – a model which tends to negate the value of the
conscript. The norm of small and eﬃcient armed forces has emerged
and has shaped the decision by most NATO and EU member states to
go fully professional. Meanwhile, the more steadfast conscript states in
Europe have remained so due to exceptional circumstances. They are
either neutral, like Switzerland, are engaged in ongoing territorial dis-
putes, as are Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, or are not part of a security
alliance, the situation, for example, with Austria.9 Appreciated in this
context, Germany’s inability or unwillingness to commence with a full
debate on the merits of conscription is quite unique.
What characterised the issue in Germany in the 1990s was a per-
vasive ‘non-debate’ surrounding conscription. Certainly, the issue
bobbed in and out of the political commentary, the abolition of the
draft being promoted by fringe elements of the political class, as well
as by interest groups; but a measured and comprehensive appraisal of
conscription was bypassed. Conscription did acquire greater topicality
soon after 1998 when the Red–Green coalition came to power and
launched a renewed eﬀort at Bundeswehr reform through processes
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which, as chapter 5 explained, focused on both reducing its overall size
and its modernisation for new missions. What this eﬀort at reform
brought into focus were the inherent diﬃculties associated with simul-
taneously redesigning the Bundeswehr as a modern armed force and
perpetuating conscription, diﬃculties which would continue to under-
mine Bundeswehr eﬀorts at reform.
Although Rudolf Scharping’s reform programme made some signiﬁ-
cant changes and began to bring the Bundeswehr more in line with Ger-
many’s allies and partners, it side-stepped the endemic problem of
funding and, crucially, failed to engage fully with the issue of conscrip-
tion.10 The commitment to conscription was also bolstered at the con-
stitutional level, after the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe conﬁrmed
the legality of conscription in April 2002 and, moreover, found its prac-
tice to be independent of the intensity of the security environment, but
dependent on government policy.11 This decision was, unsurprisingly,
embraced by the SPD, which declared that the practice was still a suc-
cess and that Germany would stick with it in the long term, Defence
Minister Scharping adding that he hoped the court’s ruling would bring
to an end the legal discussion of the future of conscription.12 The main
opposition parties, the CDU and the CSU, also welcomed the court’s
ruling, regarding conscription as necessary both to Germany’s security
needs and in integrating the armed forces within society.13 In the sec-
ond wave of defence reforms initiated by the Red–Green coalition a
pledge was made as a bargain between the pro-conscription SPD and
the pro-reform Greens to examine the future of conscription, which was
outlined by the coalition treaty in the wake of the Federal election in
September 2002. However, rather than heralding a far-reaching discus-
sion about the merits of conscription or signalling the beginning of the
end of conscription, as some quarters believed, eﬀorts at reforming
the Bundeswehr in the Red–Green coalition’s second term of oﬃce
stuck with the pro-conscription orthodoxy. This stance was ultimately
conﬁrmed in the VPR of May 2003, which stressed, inter alia, the
continued vitality of conscription and its importance for German secu-
rity policy. Subsequently, in line with current plans but prior to the
ﬂeshing out of the defence reforms articulated by Peter Struck in Janu-
ary 2004, around 107,000 conscripts served in the Bundeswehr, for a
period of nine months, indicating that around one-third of its ‘active’
personnel in 2002–3 was made up of conscripts.14
Peter Struck’s reform plans of January 2004 to reduce defence spend-
ing by around Euro 26 billion, accompanied by drastic cuts (of around
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35,000) in the overall size of the Bundeswehr have raised, perhaps for
the ﬁrst time, serious questions about the viability of maintaining con-
scription; Struck was, however, quick to conﬁrm his commitment to
the draft at least until 2006.15 Despite this commitment, it is possible
that 2004 will mark the beginning of the end of the draft in Germany.
Already, Struck’s reform programme has prompted many to conclude
that conscription will be abolished in the medium term, together with
the Zivildienst, the civilian alternative to military conscription, a
prospect with immense consequences for Germany’s social services and
health sector. These points notwithstanding, the ending of conscrip-
tion, when it comes, will certainly be a complex phenomenon,
accompanied by protracted political debate.
Conscription: under fire from all fronts
By perpetuating conscription Germany is committed to a policy at odds
with both the Bundeswehr’s de facto main role and the personnel struc-
tures of key allies and partners, a discrepancy of increasing concern
outside of Germany. Challenging the utility of compulsory military
service are a number of factors and processes, resisted by Germany,
which are now discussed.
Conscription’s diminishing strategic rationale
Fundamental changes to the intensity of Germany’s strategic environ-
ment after 1989 challenged the role, organisation and purpose of its
armed forces, presenting an opportunity, or critical juncture, for an
appraisal of its practice of conscription. Crucially, the entire range of
strategic assumptions, and with them the rationale for conscription, of
West Germany began to dissipate with the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact and implosion of the Soviet Union. Manifesting this change, the
German Ministry of Defence declared in its ﬁrst post-Cold War White
Paper, in 1994, that ‘for the foreseeable future there exists no existen-
tial threat to the territorial integrity of Germany and that of her allies’.16
The evaporation of this threat was underlined in April 1999 when
NATO was enlarged to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic. From that point on, Germany has been bordered to the east by
NATO fellow-member states. The point here is that, already by the end
of the century, the territorial defence rationale for conscription was
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substantially weakened. NATO’s second eastern enlargement, in 2004,
to embrace another seven states – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – erodes the territorial defence ration-
ale for conscription even further.
Chapters 3 and 4 detailed the changes in German security thinking
after 1989–90, as seen most vividly in the incremental alterations to the
role of the Bundeswehr, that gradually extended its remit to include
out-of-area crisis-management missions. Through deployments in
Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, and then Kosovo, Macedonia, East
Timor and Afghanistan, German security policy came to be focused
more on out-of-area missions, which became the principal role of the
Bundeswehr, a focus largely accepted across the nation’s political spec-
trum. Germany’s combat role in Kosovo in 1999, a critical juncture in
this development, considerably increased the momentum to modernise
the Bundeswehr, an objective given even greater impetus by the events
of September 11 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism, imposing
on German security thinking a global perspective and exploding the
notion that traditional national and alliance defence remained the core
tasks of the Bundeswehr. In short, the nature of Bundeswehr deploy-
ments throughout the 1990s and beyond have demonstrated the extent
to which German armed forces have shifted from a remit based on ter-
ritorial defence, necessitating a large land-based force, towards a more
active role in out-of-area missions requiring highly trained and well-
equipped forces, deployable globally with rapidity. Certainly, much in
the Bundeswehr’s personnel structure has altered over the past decade,
with modernisation eﬀorts proving to be moderately eﬀective in build-
ing up a crisis-reaction capacity and reducing the ratio overall of
conscripts to professional soldiers. However, the key point here is that
as the Bundeswehr’s role extends, especially in the context of the secu-
rity challenges after 2001, as already depicted in the VPR of 2003, the
strategic rationale for conscription is irreversibly diminishing.
Who serves? Violating the universality of conscription
Alongside the diminishing strategic rationale for conscription are a
range of additional factors that cast doubt on its relevance. One issue
which, over the past decade, has become increasingly problematic is
that of Wehrgerechtigkeit, or the extent of equity in who is inducted to
perform military service and who is not. The issue promises to con-
tinue to become increasingly pertinent in the current context of the
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fewer young men needed for conscript service, which challenges the
constitutional claim for the universality of the practice and, ultimately,
the notion of ‘citizen in uniform’. The situation has arisen in Germany
in which only around half of an age cohort actually undergoes basic
military service; many of the rest wait to complete their conscript serv-
ice but never get drafted; others, as conscientious objectors, opt for the
Zivildienst; while a further portion are exempted on health grounds or
are ineligible for other reasons. In short, all this implies that Germany
has moved unwittingly from universal conscription to a selective prac-
tice. Consequently, the notion that conscription is the ‘legitimate child
of democracy’ and a central tenet in the democratic framework of
civil–military relations in Germany is under stress.
Financing the Bundeswehr – squaring the circle?
Further pressure on the sustainability of conscription is exerted by the
dictates of defence spending discussed in chapter 5. The crux of the
problem is how conscription, which claims a sizeable proportion of the
defence budget, can be balanced with equipping the Bundeswehr for
its new missions, which requires greater expenditure on research and
development and on the professional element of the force. This
quandary and the pressure it exerts on conscription will become only
more acute in the context of a static defence budget, coupled with sus-
tained demands on Germany to commit more readily to European
procurement projects, NATO deployments and ESDP requirements.
Not only is the German defence budget relatively small, but the way
in which it is spent presents problems for the Bundeswehr. Germany
currently spends around 1.6 per cent of its GDP on defence, compared
to 2.4 per cent in the UK and 2.6 per cent in France; moreover Berlin
spends less than half of what France and the UK currently do on
research and development. It is in this context that Germany is trying
to reconcile a commitment to conscription with enhanced Bundeswehr
deployment and crisis-management capacities. It is clear that by shed-
ding conscription this ﬁnancial quandary would be at least eased,
releasing much needed funds to kick-start the modernisation process.
These strategic, social and ﬁnancial pressures on conscription have
mounted in Germany since the ending of the Cold War, and they have
increased since September 11 2001. Moreover, international interest
and concern about the pace of German defence reforms, and con-
scription in particular, has grown in recent times. While Brussels and
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Washington once stopped short of calling for Germany to abolish con-
scription, focusing rather on defence spending and the need to invest
more heavily in research and development to help the ESDP as well as
NATO modernisation goals, in more recent times criticism of con-
scription has become less ambivalent.17 The continuation of
conscription and the bottleneck it represents in the process of Bun-
deswehr modernisation have ﬁnally been acknowledged and were
among the key issues raised by the outgoing NATO Secretary-General
George Robertson during a visit to Germany in November 2003. Speak-
ing about NATO’s changing role and the need to enhance collective
capabilities by comprehensive modernisation programmes, Robertson
urged Germany to do more in the way of modernising the Bundeswehr
and referred explicitly to professionalisation as a means of increasing
eﬀectiveness.18
In the long run, therefore, the tasks of equipping the Bundeswehr
for new missions while sustaining conscription within a horizontal
defence budget appear to be increasingly problematic. Put simply, in
the unlikely event of the defence budget rising in the near future and
given that the Bundeswehr continues to expand its crisis-management
capacities, ﬁnancial considerations point to a winding down of con-
scription. However, despite these pressures and incentives to abolish
conscription, there is in Germany a resolve to maintain, indeed to
enhance, the practice of conscription. Both the CDU- and the SPD-led
Governments sought to fudge these increasingly complex issues by
declaring a commitment to establish a core capability for crisis
management while making ‘intelligent’ use of universal conscription.
The substance of the German (non-)debate
An active resistance to abandoning conscription was apparent through-
out the 1990s and continues in the current reform process. A complex
web of mutually reinforcing arguments sustains conscription, with
debates running along lines of argument similar to those levied in estab-
lishing conscription in West Germany in the 1950s.
Four interrelated categories of justiﬁcation and legitimisation lodged
in support of conscription form the basis of a sturdy cross-party con-
sensus incorporating the mainstay of the SPD, the CDU–CSU and the
Ministry of Defence. Dissent from this consensus comes from the Green
Party, the PDS and the FDP, plus small elements of the SPD, especially
the Young Socialists. As ‘gatekeepers’ of the pro-conscription consensus
126 Germany and the use of force
Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd  30/06/2004  16:25  Page 126
the Volksparteien have guarded against its abolition since the ending
of the Cold War. Consequently, over the past decade there has been no
assumed need for a fundamental discussion on the merits of conscrip-
tion. A taboo has come to surround the issue, and conscription has
become almost sacrosanct, with any questioning of the status quo
viewed as bordering on the heretical.
When in government with the CDU–CSU until 1998, elements of
the FDP attempted to make the abolition of conscription part of the
party’s proﬁle. A group of younger Liberals began to argue that con-
scription was no longer strategically or socially functional and should
be abolished. In a series of newspaper interviews Jürgen Koppelin and
Rainer Brüderle countered all of the pro-conscription arguments of the
CDU–CSU–SPD, but especially that a shift to AVF would inevitably
lead to the return of the ‘state within a state’ syndrome.19 Throughout,
these young Liberals’ involvement with the issue, the party leadership,
the CDU and the Ministry of Defence defended conscription by well-
worn and familiar arguments. Towards the end of the summer of 1997,
with the ﬁnal decision on the Liberal Party’s stance pending, the issue
became particularly volatile, with Defence Minister Volker Rühe warn-
ing that the issue, unless satisfactorily resolved, could become a
‘coalition matter’.20 The Liberals’ decision, reached in the autumn, was
that the continuation of conscription would be party policy for the
1998 Federal election.
The taboo surrounding conscription kicked in once more in the
spring of 2000, even before Scharping had announced his programme
of defence reforms. The leaking of the recommendations of the
Weizäcker and Von Kirchbach reports for the reform of the Bun-
deswehr, commissioned by the Government, elicited a swift
condemnation from the CDU which charged that the planned reforms,
speciﬁcally the shortened duration of service for conscripts which
would allow little time for training, threatened the future of military
service, and that, in turn, would destabilise the Bundeswehr.21 The CSU
was even bolder in expressing its concerns, arguing that the plans
amounted to the abolition of conscription ‘through the back door’.22
The Green Party’s opposition to military service naturally became of
greater consequence when they formed a governing coalition with the
SPD in September 1998. The oﬃcial party position was, and remains,
that conscription is obsolete, an Auslaufmodell, and should be abol-
ished in favour of a smaller AVF of some 200,000 soldiers with greater
transparency of structure and subject to enhanced parliamentary
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control, well-equipped for its main tasks – collective security, peace
support and humanitarian missions. Conscription, from the Greens’
perspective, acts as a block to the eﬀective reform and modernisation
of the Bundeswehr and is unnecessary as a means of integrating the
armed forces within society.23
Having backed down on the issue in 1998, the FDP made the abo-
lition of conscription part of its election manifesto for the 2002 Federal
election. The party argued that the maintenance of conscription was
not only ill-suited to Germany’s security needs, but that the very notion
of compulsory military service was out of step with patterns of con-
temporary citizenship. The Liberals’ contribution was to point to the
imperative of shedding conscription in favour of an all-professional,
well-trained and highly deployable military, equipped with modern
weaponry.24 The third anti-conscription voice is that of the former-
communist PDS. The party’s position on conscription is bound up with
its broader aims of abolishing the Bundeswehr and securing the grad-
ual demilitarisation of German foreign and security policy, as expressed
in the party’s slogan: Nein zur Wehrpﬂicht ist ein nein zum Krieg (‘A
“no” to conscription is a “no” to war’). On this route towards demil-
itarisation, the PDS envisages a Bundeswehr of some 100,000 soldiers,
twinned with the pursuit of non-military crisis-resolution mechanisms
in the form of the UN and the OSCE.25
In defence of conscription
Although the gatekeepers of the conscription consensus may disagree
on the length of military service and the degree of ﬂexibility to be per-
mitted in the system, they remain united in promoting its continuation
and levy the same kinds of arguments in its support. It is this broad
consensus which has ensured that conscription remains sacrosanct.
The ﬁrst line of argument in support of conscription emphasises con-
tinuities in Germany’s security requirements. The 1994 Defence White
Paper posited that national and alliance territorial defence remained
the core task of the Bundeswehr, ‘supplemented’ by German partici-
pation in multinational conﬂict prevention and crisis management.26
It dictated a fairly sober geopolitical analysis of Germany’s perpetual
Zentrallage, leading to a role conception ‘of defending the heart of
Europe’ and a force structure which necessitated conscription.27 The
‘continuity of role’ argument rose in prominence at the time of France’s
decision to suspend conscription in the spring of 1996 and its potency
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continued, despite Germany’s disposition to use armed forces in out-
of-area deployments in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan. Both the
Weizäcker and Von Kirchbach reports on the future of the Bundeswehr
viewed national and collective defence of the alliance as a priority, thus
necessitating conscription. Even after the events of September 11, the
continuity of role argument was applied, Generalinspekteur Harald
Kujat arguing that among the Bundeswehr’s tasks national and alliance
defence remained a high priority.28 Similarly, in his spring 2002 paper
for the CDU on the reform of the Bundeswehr, Volker Rühe stated the
necessity of conscription on security grounds, seeing that without the
draft the armed forces would not be able to reach the numbers neces-
sary to meet its national and alliance defence commitments, as well as
its crisis management tasks.29 Even in the VPR of 2003, which in many
ways represented a dramatic shift in the fundamentals of German secu-
rity thinking by signalling a departure from the primacy of
national–alliance territorial defence, conscription was justiﬁed on the
strategic grounds of ‘operational readiness’ and ‘eﬀectiveness’.
A second line of argument levied in support of conscription draws
directly on the lessons of German history and combines both the neg-
ative aspects of Germany’s pre-1945 military past and the positive
aspects of the Federal Republic’s experience with the Bundeswehr as
the ﬁrst conscript army in the democratic German State. At the heart
of the argument is the conviction that conscription is the best means
of preventing a return to the ‘state within a state’ syndrome. This line
of reasoning ﬁnds its expression in a raft of arguments positing con-
scription’s vital function in ﬁrmly establishing the Bundeswehr and
matters of security within every sector of politics and society, thereby
guarding against alienation and acting as an eﬀective form of societal
control over the military. Throughout the 1990s this line of argument
served as a powerful restraint on discussions over the future of con-
scription, ﬁguring prominently in Bundestag debates over the
Bundeswehr’s structure. The balancing role played by military service
in civil–military relations continued in the context of the 2002 elec-
tions. For example, in the SPD’s manifesto it was claimed that
conscription would continue to assure that the Bundeswehr of the
future is ﬁrmly anchored in society.30 In a similar vein, the CDU’s posi-
tion on the future of the Bundeswehr and its critique of Scharping’s
reform programme depicted conscription as providing meaning to the
notion of ‘the citizen in uniform’ and as a societal anchorage for the
armed forces.31
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A third principal argument in support of conscription revolves
around the notion of Kultur der Zurückhaltung (culture of restraint),
denoting the long-term restraint and general amilitary character of Ger-
man foreign and security policy, stemming from the former Federal
Republic’s security identity. This line of argument was particularly
prominent in the 1990s’ out-of-area debates, but has subsided some-
what since the Bundeswehr’s Kosovo deployment. The argument’s
rationale was that, in the absence of conscription, defence planners
would be freed from a number of moral questions and hindrances con-
fronting decisions on Bundeswehr deployment, because, as an AVF, it
would be a readily deployable tool of foreign policy, disposed to mili-
tary adventurism.32 This argument views conscription essentially as a
force for cautious restraint in security policy, rendering policy-makers
more accountable to society and democratic politics. The Kultur der
Zurückhaltung argument was a particular favourite of Chancellor Kohl:
when speaking in 1996 of not giving up the ‘time tested system of mil-
itary service in Germany’, he was making a clear connection between
conscription and the self-restraining and checking policies of the Bonn
Republic.33
The fourth argument is that the participation of conscripts is the
best means of assuring the professionalism and high performance
standards of the Bundeswehr, and that conscription is a source of
continuous regeneration. Policy-makers do not accept that the pro-
fessionalism of the Bundeswehr is determined by the preponderance
of voluntary career soldiers in its composition, preferring to see its
professionalism as shaped by the societal inﬂuences brought into the
military by young conscripts, whose participation engenders a more
‘intelligent armed force’. This message has been strongly reinforced
by the Bundeswehr itself, Harald Kujat arguing that conscription is
necessary for the rejuvenation of the armed forces from ‘the bottom
up’.34
The broad pro-conscription body mobilised these four arguments
successfully, ensuring that the future of conscription was secure and
seemingly untouchable. Such lines of justiﬁcation, however, became
increasingly untenable over the course of the 1990s, so that by 2003
the perpetuation of conscription had come to be at odds with the Bun-
deswehr’s role, eﬀectiveness and credibility. To begin with, the strategic
rationale for conscription, Germany’s Zentrallage, has largely evapo-
rated. As noted earlier, NATO’s enlargement in 1999 created a new
strategic reality for Germany by eliminating its frontline status. The
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inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary within the
alliance provided a fundamentally new context to Germany’s eastern
border. Moreover, the notion that Russia is a military threat is now
arguably redundant, with relations between NATO and Moscow ﬁrmly
framed in the ‘19 + 1’ mechanism. Moreover, the pro-conscription
lobby’s notion that the practice remains essential for assuring Berlin’s
Bündnistreue (alliance commitment) and Bündnisfähigkeit (eﬀective
capacity within the alliance) is questionable. Again, changed strategic
realities since 1989–90 are such that Germany’s standing within the
alliance is now arguably best promoted by a military capacity that is
readily deployable, rather than by maintaining a large land-based force
geared to deterrence. George Robertson’s comments, in Berlin in late
2003, calling for swifter and more comprehensive reforms in Germany,
underline this argument.
The Kultur der Zurückhaltung argument is also inconsistent with
post-1990 realities, especially given that the remit of the Bundeswehr
was extended during the 1990s to include out-of-area and combat mis-
sions, previously deemed unconstitutional, despite the maintenance of
conscription. The civil–military relations argument also is rather weak:
conscription is important in ensuring contact and exchange between
society and the armed forces, though in doing so it is just one element
of an elaborate framework of civil–military relations aligned with a
range of parliamentary organs that ensure democratic control over the
armed forces and security policy-making in general. Viewed from this
perspective, the argument that in the absence of conscription demo-
cratic oversight of the Bundeswehr would be lost, resulting in an
isolated and undemocratic military force, is diﬃcult to sustain.
Two ﬁnal considerations provide strong incentives to switch to an
AVF. First, a scaled-down professional force would bring about savings
in personnel costs. The French experience provides a positive example
here: since suspending conscription, personnel costs in the French
armed forces have been cut by around one-sixth, allowing resources to
be redirected to modernisation projects. Second, that conscription
serves to maintain the professional standards of the Bundeswehr is con-
tested by the view, generally held outside of oﬃcial circles, that
conscription, far from infusing the armed forces with quality, is a source
of lowly educated, unmotivated, young men who ‘end up’ undergoing
military service.35
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Breaking the conscription taboo?
Conscription as it is practised in Germany is imbued with distinctive
qualities, making it as argued earlier an issue of more than just man-
power. It is regarded as a key factor in sustaining aspects of the former
Federal Republic’s security policy, especially its restraint and in inﬂ-
uencing democratic civil–military relations. In terms of the broader
transformation of the Bundeswehr and its mission, attempts to deal
with conscription have been characterised by inertia.
The evidence presented in this chapter, in particular the manifest
mis-match between Germany’s changed strategic environment and the
raft of arguments raised in support of conscription signiﬁes that a
‘taboo’ surrounds the practice. Clearly, elites are cognisant of the highly
complex issues surrounding conscription – the fragile public consen-
sus that upholds conscription and the range of auxiliary tasks
conscription serves, most notably the beneﬁts of the Zivildienst. They
are also attentive to the need to present German security policy to both
the domestic audience and neighbours and allies as continuous with
the old Federal Republic’s restrained and self-monitoring security poli-
cies. Such concerns were evident in the governmental management of
the conscription debate throughout the 1990s, particularly at critical
junctures, including the French decision to move to an AVF as well as
the FDP’s intra-party activity on the future of conscription. These
episodes were witness to the swift condemnation of any questioning of
or dissension from the pro-conscription consensus and the invocation
of well-deﬁned and familiar lines of justiﬁcation. This pursuit was by
and large supported by the main opposition of the time, the SPD, which
came to conﬁrm its position in support of conscription, defending its
perpetuation along the same lines as the governing CDU–CSU. Cru-
cially, this level of governmental support for conscription continued
after the change of government in 1998.
That conclusion notwithstanding, the prospects for change in the
context of the ongoing modernisation of the Bundeswehr are not to be
ruled out. Developments during 2004 may mark the beginning of a
national debate about the future of conscription. An opportunity has
long been available for Germany to reappraise its conscription prac-
tice, though conditions thus far have been insuﬃciently permissive to
bring about innovation and change. However, to bring about change,
not only do the political conditions have to be right, but the change
process itself has to be initiated and managed by sets of individuals.
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Peter Struck’s tenure since 2002 as SPD defence minister has coincided
with permissive international and domestic conditions which are
increasingly taken to undermine the value and purpose of conscrip-
tion. Indeed, ever since Germany’s engagement in Kosovo in 1999
conscription has been a thorn in the side of the Bundeswehr’s mod-
ernisation endeavours. Moreover, the SPD’s coalition partner, the
Green Party, has long given well-reasoned and ﬁrm support to the
change to an AVF and has thus been able to exert pressure on the SPD.
Moreover, the burden of international expectation on Germany to shed
conscription has become far more marked in recent times.
Indications of the likely shape of debate in Germany over con-
scription will become clearer in the ﬁrst half of 2004 as the ramiﬁcations
of Struck’s latest plans become apparant. What is already evident is
that opposition parties are gearing up for a confrontation over the
issue, with the CDU and the CSU condemning Struck’s plans for
focusing on purely ﬁnancial matters to the detriment of strategic con-
cerns. Of even greater consequence, and illustrative of the
interconnectedness of conscription with other policy sectors, has been
the response of the Federal ministry dealing with the alternative Zivil-
dienst. With around 90,000 young men each year undertaking a
ten-month duty of alternative service in the social sector, the possi-
bility of conscription’s abolition has prompted planners already to
consider how they might deal with Germany’s growing demand for
social and health provision in the absence of the ‘Zivi’. An idea already
mooted has been the introduction of a voluntary ‘social year’ for both
males and females.36
Struck’s ever bolder resolve to reshape the Bundeswehr, to better
equip it for its new missions and to lessen defence spending, demon-
strates that he is already what Hyde-Price and Jeﬀery call an
‘entrepreneur of change’,37 able to head up sizeable reform initiatives
in line with broader national reform goals. Will Struck extend his entre-
preneurial skills to tackle conscription? Will Struck be the German
defence minister to preside over its abolition? Whether the demise of
conscription is forseeable or not yet on the horizon, its abolition will
be a protracted process, characterised by complexity, political emotion
and ﬁnancial wrangling.
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7Conclusions: Germany, the use of force
and the power of strategic culture
German perspectives on the use of force have evolved rapidly since
the ending of the Cold War and today Germany is one of the key
contributors to global peacekeeping missions, with an estimated 10,000
Bundeswehr soldiers currently deployed overseas. Seen in this way,
Germany has become a ‘net contributor’ to European and international
security. Certainly, taboos have been broken and in many ways Ger-
many has cultivated a less rigidly restrictive approach to the use of
armed force, in particular circumstances. It is, however, clear that,
despite changes, current German thinking about the use of force is
pervaded still by signiﬁcant continuities with the past, largely because
of the enduring role and inﬂuence of Germany’s distinctive strategic
culture.
By returning to the central conceptual concerns of the book, my aim
in this chapter is to consider the three key questions posed in the Intro-
duction in relation to the evidence presented in chapters 1–6. The ﬁrst
of these questions concerns identiﬁcation: what is German strategic cul-
ture? The second is about change: to what extent and in what form did
change in the external security environment after 1989–90 impact on
German strategic culture? The third relates to behaviour: in what ways
has strategic culture aﬀected behaviour and shaped policy choices?
Identifying Germany’s strategic culture
In identifying West Germany’s strategic culture I began by character-
ising its formative period, during which all previous values, beliefs and
practices regarding the use of force were rendered obsolete, as exem-
pliﬁed by the notion of Stunde Null. A state of ‘collective infancy’, or
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strategic cultural rupture, followed in that new aﬀective and evaluative
schemes regarding the use of force have had to be constructed ab ini-
tio. These new policies and practices are grounded in a fresh set of core
values and beliefs, born of domestic contextual factors, combined with
the will and demands imposed by the Western allies in their conﬁgu-
ration of what is required externally and what can be oﬀered internally.
What makes up (West) German strategic culture are properties of three
kinds, identiﬁed as:
• foundational elements – the core values and beliefs of the strategic
culture;
• security policy standpoints – the intermediary dispositions or prefer-
ences arising out of the foundational elements that shape actual
policy choices and practices; and
• regulatory factors – the governing premises and normative devices
that promote core values to the external environment as dictated by
the intermediary security policy standpoints.
The foundational elements, extrapolated from a consideration (in chap-
ter 2) of aspects, both domestic and international, of the rearming of
West Germany, were identiﬁed as historical rupture, the relegation of
the use of force, depletion of militarism and the exhaustion of nation-
alism. The policy preferences arising out of the foundational elements
were seen to be determined by a range of security policy standpoints,
which also were extrapolated from the consideration of West German
rearmament. During the Cold War, those security policy standpoints
were:
• an aversion to singularity, unilateralism and leadership in security
matters;
• the promotion of stability, with an emphasis on deterrence;
• a general restraint in military matters, reinforced by widespread anti-
military sentiments;
• dedication to the pursuit of responsible and calculable security poli-
cies generated by the need to ‘make amends’;
• a commitment to fully integrate the Bundeswehr within society and
the parliamentary system; and
• co-operation, compromise and consensus-building, domestically
and internationally, on security matters.
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These security policy standpoints created strong dispositions which
translated further into observable policies comprising governing
premises and normative devices. Brieﬂy, the governing premises
represent the spatial, strategic and political parameters governing the
Bundeswehr’s organisation and role; while the normative devices
relate to the broad civil–military framework in West Germany; the
parliamentary control of the armed forces, the limited role of the Gen-
eralinspekteur, Innere Führung and Bürger in Uniform, and conscription
and conscientious objection.
West German strategic culture did not fundamentally change, fol-
lowing its initial consolidation, during the Cold War; and, after its
ending, there was a relatively settled period throughout which the foun-
dational elements and the external environment were largely mutually
reinforcing, thus obviating fundamental alterations in policy direction.
Any changes that did result from challenges to existing practices were
seen to be in line with the postulates of German strategic culture and,
moreover, actually sought to further them. An important aspect of this
was the consolidation of security policy through a strong consensus
among the main parties as to the basic substance, organisation and
direction of West German security policy.
Strategic culture, change and the ending of the Cold War
The second question, relating to change after 1989–90, considered that
if the existing (West) German strategic culture was the product of the
Cold War – ‘a settled period’ – during which the foundational ele-
ments, security policy standpoints and, subsequently, the regulatory
factors were in synch with external realities, then the exogenous shocks
and changes – an ‘unsettled period’ – brought about by the ending of
the Cold War could usher in a state of collective infancy and a cultural
rupture–discontinuity with previous aﬀective and evaluative schemes
similar to those of 1945 and the years immediately afterwards. In sum,
the principal question here is if, as a result of the ending of the Cold
War, Germany’s strategic culture has changed, and if so in what forms
have the changes taken?
Chapter 1 posited that change in a strategic culture comes in ‘ﬁne-
tuning’ and ‘fundamental’ forms (see pp. 18–19). On the basis of the
evidence here presented, change in German strategic culture after
1989–90 did not happen as strategic cultural theory might dictate: the
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rupture brought about by the ending of the Cold War should have led
to a fundamental break in strategic culture and a reconstruction of all
aﬀective and evaluative schemes in line with fresh foundational ele-
ments relating to the uniﬁed Germany’s new position in Europe and
acquisition of full sovereignty. Instead, through an examination of
changing perspectives on the use of force in Germany throughout this
period, it can be argued that the ending of the Cold War was not fol-
lowed by a state of ‘collective infancy’ in Germany akin to that which
followed the Second World War. Essentially, none of the foundational
elements of the existing strategic culture was fundamentally challenged,
disregarded or rendered obsolete, but, as I argue below, rather came to
be reinterpreted and reapplied through adjustments in security policy
standpoints and, subsequently, into policies and practices, some of
which were adjusted to suit the new external environment.
German strategic culture, then, was ﬁne-tuned rather than funda-
mentally changed after 1989–90, with diﬀerent readings and
prescriptions being drawn from the negative and positive points of ori-
entation set in the strategic culture. Moreover, and importantly here,
even in cases of observable and purposeful policy changes and seem-
ing departures from existing practices, namely Kosovo, such moves were
in line with the original postulates of the strategic culture. I demon-
strate below that German security policy behaviour after the ending of
the Cold War was informed more by West Germany’s experiences after
1945 than by its immediate circumstances arising since 1989–90.
The impact of the ending of the Cold War
The Gulf War, as the ﬁrst major challenge to Germany’s security pol-
icy after the Cold War, began the prising open of strategic culture by
dislodging the neat consistency that had held during the Cold War
between external realities and foundational aspects, a dislocation which
had a number of eﬀects.
First, various aspects of German security policy came into tension
or even confusion with each other. This was manifest in the emergence
among the political elite of diﬀering and often opposing ‘readings’, pre-
scriptions and views to the change and as to what form Germany’s
response should take. Certainly, these faultlines had already begun
to surface in the 1980s but gained greater prominence at the end of
bipolarity, which provided Germany with more room for manoeuvre
to potentially broaden its repertoire of policy options. At the same
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time, and reinforcing the prospect of change, international expectations
rose in favour of greater German participation and burden-sharing in
collective security.
These central tensions and quandaries revolved around the notion
that since the Second World War a deﬁning feature of the Federal
Republic had been that bellicosity should be renounced, militarism
rejected and that never again should German soldiers be sent to a war
front. However, at the same time West Germany had, over the past ﬁfty
years come to cherish and proﬁt from a set of security policies heavily
imbued with notions of responsibility and reparation, twinned with an
enduring commitment to act as a reliable member of the Western com-
munity and especially to avoid unilateralism and any notion of a
renewed Sonderweg. Crucially, whereas during the Cold War these prin-
ciples could all be equally and, more or less, satisfactorily met, with the
ending of bipolarity, and especially during the Gulf War, these aspects
came to contradict each other. Essentially, how could a principled pol-
icy of military abstention be maintained if a commitment to responsi-
bility and membership in the Western community would be potentially
jeopardised by not partaking in peacekeeping operations? Equally, how
could a renewed singularity, or Sonderweg, be avoided if Germany was
unable or unwilling to participate in multilateral security ventures?
A deep sense of confusion thus emerged within Germany in the 1990s
as to how best to respond to new crises and to meet all of the demands
on and expectations of it, in terms both of its allies and of the dictates
of its strategic culture. Commenting on this in 1991, Uwe Nehrlich said
that ‘Germans were geared to show they weren’t a danger, and they
then were asked to do something very much outside familiar patterns’.1
Similarly, Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann noted: ‘The
Gulf War showed very clearly just how confused and sensitive many
Germans are when it comes to the use of military force, in particular,
German military force.’ 2
The outbreak of armed conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia exacerbated
these tensions and confusions, reinforcing the question of whether Ger-
man history still pointed to restraint from military engagement or
whether that same history now led Germany to embrace active mili-
tary participation. More than the Gulf War, Yugoslavia showed how
there could be a possible option for the use of military force that was
between the excesses of paciﬁsm and militarism, showing that for Ger-
many a principled practice of non-violence was no longer tenable in
post-Cold War Europe.
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In short, this period saw the rupture of a consensus which had
thus far been a central characteristic governing German strategic cul-
ture. New paradigms of varied intensities challenged the dominant
practices of restraint and reticence, all of which, importantly, were
grounded in the same historical memory but proﬀered diﬀering
responses and prescriptions. In other words, agents contested what
the foundational elements through security policy standpoints now
meant and should mean, and what new security policies should
subsequently be pursued.
After the breach of the Gulf War there was a protracted period of
adjustment in strategic culture and the playing out of ideas, as can be
seen in the emergence of the CDU-led paradigm which espoused Ger-
many’s greater disposition to use military power and in the numerous
political and legal challenges mounted against it. Bundeswehr deploy-
ments to the Gulf region after the war, as well as to Cambodia and
Somalia, together with domestic endeavours to reform the Bundeswehr,
are representative of the concrete steps taken by the CDU in adjusting
the governing premisses to match the foundational elements in line
with the CDU’s own reading of the changed external realities and its
prescription of the appropriate German response to them. During this
and the subsequent period of negotiation, the various ‘cultural agents’
referred to in chapter 1, most prominently the political parties and
ministries, were actively pursuing the hegemony of their own readings
and policy prescriptions.
Following this period of negotiations consolidation of the dominant
reading proceeded, as was manifest in the ﬁnal decision of the Consti-
tutional Court, in July 1994, and thereafter in the broad support given
to the governing coalition for its deployment of Bundeswehr troops in
Bosnia and Kosovo later in the decade. Nevertheless, as noted in chap-
ter 4, a full consolidation and the building of a new domestic consensus
regarding the use of force on a scale similar to that of pre-1989, proved
elusive.
The mechanisms of change
Something of the historic rupture of 1945 persists still within German
strategic culture, with Stunde Null remaining a central and deﬁning ele-
ment in the construction of policy, principally as a compass by which
to steer a course between what is possible and what is not. Stunde Null
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thus remains a central focus of remembrance and as a point of trauma
shared collectively by post-war generations, as witnessed in the sys-
tematic mobilising of Germany’s past and the rupture of 1945 to
legitimise or delegitimise, as the case may be, particular policy options.
This was especially evident in the party-political debates over the out-
of-area deployment of the Bundeswehr and in the continued promotion
of conscription. Here policy choices were clearly shaped by shame and
guilt and by a continuing commitment to reparation. Crucially, no ‘new
root of legitimacy’, unrelated to Germany’s historic rupture with the
past after 1945, emerged, and this is further conﬁrmation that German
security policy continues to depend more on the formative implica-
tions of the ‘collective infancy’ of 1945 than on the more immediate
inﬂuences emanating out of 1989–90.
The second foundational element, relating to the relegation of the
use of force, has also persisted. Although the Bundeswehr has been
deployed with increased frequency since 1990 and has broken its for-
mer out-of-area constraints, the use of force is clearly still not regarded
as the means for the resolution of all crises and conﬂicts; neither is
it seen as an automatic or natural tool for the pursuit of national
interests. This was particularly the case following September 11 2001,
when German perspectives on the use of force clashed with new Amer-
ican thinking about pre-emptive military strikes. Bundeswehr
deployment is still viewed largely as a last resort and then only in
circumstances where military force is unambivalently required for the
resolution of a conﬂict and where a goal is in sight. In short, no
assumption that the Bundeswehr should be deployed in a full range
of missions has taken hold, and reticence continues to govern the
question of the Bundeswehr’s deployability.
Militarism remains an illegitimate ideology. The Bundeswehr has not
sought to reconstruct itself as a more traditional form of armed force
nor has the practice of conscription been reconﬁgured in the form of
a Schule der Nation in the context of national uniﬁcation. The nega-
tion of militarism has been manifest in the reluctance to shed
conscription and in the continued commitment to maintaining and
strengthening the tools of Primat der Politik and existing civil–military
relations.
Finally, the pursuit of multilateral options in dealing with security
matters and the conceiving of interests via institutions have continued
to be actively promoted, and both testify to the enduring exhaustion
of nationalism. The broad institutional setting of German security
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policy has been further conﬁrmed through a number of bilateral and
trilateral initiatives. Moreover, the ongoing desire to avoid singularity
and to maintain its status as a reliable ally has prompted Germany
to participate more readily in military deployments, since to abstain
would jeopardise its place within the alliance and put it out of step
with its allies. In this sense, then, the Bundeswehr is regarded as an
armed force within an alliance rather than an embodiment of purely
national military strength.
The explanation for the endurance of these foundational elements of
Germany’s strategic culture was alluded to earlier when it was observed
that the events of 1989–90 did not herald an emergent collective
infancy, as had been the case in 1945. This time the existing founda-
tional elements inherited from West Germany were simply writ large
on the uniﬁed Germany and were deemed both valid and workable.
Crucially, although since 1989–90 new formative experiences have
entered the domain of strategic culture, in the absence of a collective
infancy following major trauma, all new challenges to and expectations
placed on Germany have been ﬁltered and assessed through existing
strategic cultural milieu.
Reaﬃrming German strategic culture
What, then, accounts for the observable changes in German perspec-
tives on the use of force since 1989–90, allowing the Bundeswehr to
become involved in missions during the 1990s? Change is explained by
a number of adjustments facilitated by the security policy standpoints.
To reiterate, during the Cold War the foundational elements of West
German strategic culture found expression through the security policy
standpoints. As detailed in chapter 1, these standpoints were: an aver-
sion to singularity and unilateralism combined with a commitment to
reliability as an ally; the promotion of stability; the preferment of deter-
rence and of the political role of the Bundeswehr; a general reticence
regarding the use of armed force; the pursuit of responsible security
policies; a commitment to extensive civilian control of the armed forces
and to consensus-building in security matters at both domestic and
international levels. Prior to 1989–90 these standpoints found expres-
sion in the regulatory practices of West German strategic culture – the
governing premises and normative devices.
It is signiﬁcant that with the ending of the Cold War a number of
the security policy standpoints came into tension or contradicted one
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another, or else lost relevance and had to be adjusted to maintain the
consistency of the foundational elements and policies. The important
aspects of this change are outlined below.
The aversion to singularity–unilateralism, which had previously been
assured through West Germany’s ﬁrm allegiance to the alliance, of
which it was a member, and through a commitment to the defence
of national and alliance territory, could be assured in its new post-
Cold War incarnation only by a demonstration of its reliability as an
ally and its readiness to participate in out-of-area crisis-management
activities. This then furthered the broader political role of the Bun-
deswehr of assuring Germany’s position and credibility within the
alliance. Crucially, if Germany was to successfully resist being rele-
gated to the position of junior partner within the alliance a greater
capacity and willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr had to be created
in the 1990s.
Tied to this is the objective of practising a set of responsible secu-
rity policies. Whereas prior to 1989–90 this was best achieved through
West Germany’s low-proﬁle stance of restraint and by meeting allied
requirements, after the ending of the Cold War responsibility dictated
a more active restrained stance. Had Germany not extended the remit
of the Bundeswehr, then some of its basal functions – generating cred-
ibility within the alliance and exercising responsibility in security
policies – would not have been fulﬁlled. These ideas were apparent in
the CDU’s prescribed role for the post-Cold War Bundeswehr. In an
unpublished essay of 1991 Karl Lamers called for Germany to acknowl-
edge its own strength and the responsibility that this entailed, seeing
that it would be irresponsible of Germany to act as if oblivious to its
strength, which would only engender mistrust. Lamers thus advocated
that Germany, without forgetting its history, become as ‘normal’ as
possible.3 Kohl voiced a similar conviction in 1991 that ‘minimalist
solutions’ (Blue Beret) missions would not suﬃce, and that participa-
tion in UN Chapter VII missions would display Germany’s willingness
to shoulder some of the burden for international security. Defence Min-
ister Rühe concurred that Germany’s credibility rested on such actions,
emphasising that Germany’s ‘diﬀerence’ from other countries in secu-
rity matters was clearly undesirable.4
A number of security policy standpoints were, then, put under pres-
sure in Germany’s adjustment to new circumstances. An aversion to
singularity, the furtherance of the Bundeswehr’s broader political role,
responsibility in security policy and the maintenance of restraint were,
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to varying degrees, articulated in new ways in order to best serve the
existing foundational elements. Restraint or reticence in security mat-
ters changed in the sense that it became less rigid and uncompromising,
although restraint remains a distinctive quality of German strategic
culture and policy as a whole. Likewise, a preference for stability and
consensus-building has remained intact; while in the area of civil–
military relations and the civilian control of the armed forces no tension
developed and no adjustment has been required.
The preferences expressed by Germany’s security policy standpoints
in some cases took on diﬀerent implications, thereby facilitating cer-
tain policy changes, all of which pointed to the necessity of extending
the Bundeswehr’s remit. The persistence of the existing foundational
elements as well as the security policy standpoints meant that unless
Germany extended this remit it would be acting against the dictates
of its strategic culture, a situation which, as argued earlier, would not
transpire if a strategic culture is intact.
This, then, conﬁrms the continuation of the German strategic cul-
ture after the ending of the Cold War. Following the ideas of culture
and change advocated in chapter 1, change in strategic culture is per-
fectly consistent with culturalist postulates if it occurs in the form of
an adaptation to an altered situation and if the function of the change
is to maintain the consonance of existing cultural patterns.
To further substantiate this idea it is important to identify the
options and possible policy paths that were rejected or excluded from
the outset. What is clear is that at the time of the debates over the
out-of-area role of the Bundeswehr, there was no question but that
Bundeswehr action would be undertaken within a collective frame-
work, whether of the UN, the OSCE or NATO. Likewise there was
no real questioning among the political elite as to the continuance of
NATO membership – earlier consideration of this by some SPD politi-
cians was dubbed an ‘abortive debate’.5 Any moves towards a
re-nationalisation of German military force was totally excluded, as
was the idea of a neutral Germany. A new, more reﬂexive, armed
forces with a global reach, able to be deployed with rapidity, was
never considered a possibility – it took time enough for the Bun-
deswehr’s crisis-reaction forces to be created. Furthermore, the
institutions that exercise parliamentary control over the armed forces
and the broader framework of civil–military relations were not ques-
tioned; nor did the Bundeswehr come to seek the enhancement of its
position in politics and society.
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On the basis of these considerations, it can be asserted that German
strategic culture was not changed by the ending of the Cold War; rather,
it successfully adapted during the 1990s to its new circumstances.
Strategic culture and policy behaviour
The issue of change within a strategic culture is intimately tied to the
latter’s relationship to security policy behaviour. It was posited earlier
that all security policy behaviour is dependent on strategic culture and
that behaviour outside of the domain of a given strategic culture will
occur only if that culture has fundamentally changed or collapsed. A
second hypothesis was that the inﬂuence of strategic culture on behav-
iour will depend on contextual factors. In settled times of certainty
strategic culture will inﬂuence behaviour indirectly, at a distance, while
in unsettled periods of greater ambivalence strategic culture will directly
govern behaviour almost as an ideology. With the ending of the Cold
War the impacts of strategic culture on German security policy behav-
iour were far more direct, with the nexus between policy and strategic
culture being close.
From the time of the Gulf War onwards German security policy
behaviour has visibly been governed by strategic culture, as can be seen
most vividly at the level of discourse and in the multifarious processes
of inclusion and exclusion that characterised the formulation of stand-
points and policies. In the form of strategic culture both positive and
negative points of orientation were provided, thus setting the parame-
ters of possible options, by providing decision-makers with a ﬁnite
repertoire of policies to pursue. At the same time policy-makers became
acutely aware of strategic culture as the framework for their actions
and of the pressures and expectations this placed on them. This was
evident in the vocabulary of strategic culture discourse – ‘the weight of
the past . . .’, ‘responsibility leads us to . . .’, ‘history does not permit us
to . . .’ – and so on – use of which became more pronounced to add a
sense of legitimacy or to justify the adoption or rejection of certain pol-
icy paths, for example in the of the out-of-area debate and the issue of
conscription.
Facilitating change: the Bundeswehr’s out-of-area role in the 1990s
Change in the Bundeswehr’s remit to include the possibility of out-of-
area deployments came about via the facilitating role played by strategic
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culture. After the initial tensions, a protracted period of negotiation
and policy adjustment, followed by the emergence and broad accept-
ance of the CDU-led paradigm, German strategic culture actively
provided the impetus for the enlargement of the Bundeswehr’s role.
In the context of change within German strategic culture after
1989–90, while the foundational elements remained intact, security pol-
icy standpoints took on new signiﬁcance, leading to changes in
observable policies. Of central importance here were the new interpre-
tations of the responsibility and calculability of security policy, of what
constituted a solid and credible ally and of what equality meant within
the alliance that eventually came to force the change apparent in the
Bundeswehr’s remit. That change, however, was neither immediate nor
unbounded. In the period immediately after 1989–90 strategic culture
impacted on behaviour by actively constraining change in the Bun-
deswehr’s role. At the time of the Gulf War, there was resistance to a
shift to a more participatory contribution that went beyond Germany’s
traditional role of paymaster. Strategic culture at this time thus inﬂ-
uenced German policy by acting directly as a brake, preventing action
outside of familiar patterns.
Subsequent change in strategic culture’s role was initiated by a num-
ber of factors which served to invalidate how that culture aﬀected
behaviour. First, an overt imbalance emerged between the demands and
expectations of allies and domestic audiences as to the kind of role Ger-
many should now play. Germany came under ﬁre from Western allies
for lack of commitment, reliance on cheque-book diplomacy and a
stance seemingly justiﬁed by increasingly questionable constitutional
claims. At the same time German society was coming to terms with
uniﬁcation and was thus disposed to see the continuation of restrained,
low-proﬁle, policy. Thus tensions transpired since elites had to mollify
an anti-war public while showing a commitment to the anti-Iraq
alliance. This tension was bridged by considerable ﬁnancial commit-
ments on the part of Germany, plus the deployment of Bundeswehr
Alpha Jets to Turkey, a NATO partner, a move legitimised to a weary
German polity as being for defensive purposes only.
In the wake of the Gulf War and the onset of the break-up of
Yugoslavia, the tensions within strategic culture became both more
acute and of a kind that were not so easily bridged using existing poli-
cies and practices. From this point onwards, then, strategic culture
came to more actively facilitate change in security policy behaviour as
notions of responsibility, credibility within the alliance and the desire
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to resist a renewed singularity steered a course towards a more varied
Bundeswehr remit and, with it, a greater crisis-reaction capacity.
Hindering change: conscription as sacrosanct
In contrast to the Bundeswehr’s remit, change did not occur in the
practice of conscription; indeed, as chapter 6 showed, every opportu-
nity was taken to strengthen the practice after 1989–90. This situation
came about because there was, at least until 2001, no tension in strate-
gic culture acute enough in those areas governing conscription to force
a change in policy. Essentially, the prevailing strategic culture actually
validated the continuance of conscription in Germany following the
Cold War.
The initiation of conscription in 1956 and its incorporation within
the Basic Law issued directly from two facets of the Federal Republic’s
strategic culture: deterrence and civil–military relations. In this way
conscription performed a dual role, enabling the Federal Republic to
create a vast augmentable armed force, thereby positioning the Bun-
deswehr as the central feature in NATO’s European defence, while also
performing a normative role in the Federal Republic’s prescription for
civil–military relations in preventing the Bundeswehr’s re-emergence as
a state within a state. Throughout the Cold War, with West German
strategic culture in consonance with the external environment, con-
scription endured as a means by which to service Bonn’s position within
the alliance and to fulﬁl civil–military requirements.
The chief (strategic) rationale for conscription in Germany was
largely eclipsed by the ending of the Cold War, as seen most vividly in
the Bundeswehr’s out-of-area crisis-management remit. This should
have led to a diminished use of conscription, or at least have seen the
onset of serious debate on the utility of the practice, whereas conscrip-
tion has in fact endured as a practice: it has been reworked and endorsed
through a range of essentially non-strategic lines of argumentation.
Crucially, the practice of conscription is sustained by a broad and
apparently robust range of factors in German strategic culture in the
form of civil–military arguments tied to Germany’s past. This is evi-
dent in the way the majority of the political elite read the ending of
the Cold War and what it meant for conscription. It is also manifest
in the very nature of the post-1989–90 ‘non-debate’ over conscription
and in the well-worn arguments invoked in its support, as detailed in
chapter 6.
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Tensions in strategic culture are, however, apparent still, and these
will come to challenge the perpetuation of conscription. As external
security conditions change, especially after September 11, and German
society evolves new meanings and values to assign to the foundational
elements of its strategic culture, the practice of conscription may come
under terminal stress. In particular, it is the emergent tension between
the Bundeswehr’s extended remit and broader political role, on the one
hand, and the commitment to conscription, on the other, factors
increasingly at odds with one another, that will ultimately bring strate-
gic culture to render conscription obsolete. Thus far, this tension has
been managed by eﬀorts to modernise the practice of conscription while
preparing the Bundeswehr for its out-of-area role and retaining a size-
able commitment to national and alliance defence.
In short, strategic culture has actively worked for the continuance of
conscription and against the switch to an AVF. It is clear, then, that
the maintenance of conscription cannot be satisfactorily explained by
anything other than strategic culture.
September 11 2001 – a critical juncture?
The events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent war on terror
brought fresh challenges to German thinking about the use of force, in
many ways bringing about a new unsettled period. Two interrelated
questions arise in this context. First, did September 11 lead to a rever-
sal of trends in German security policy on the use of armed force?
Second, has German strategic culture undergone a transformation as a
result of the recent changes in the security environment?
Germany’s perspectives on the use of force over the course of 2001–3
were in line with the existing postulates of German strategic culture.
Rather than signifying an actual reversal of the post-1989 trend, which
saw the Bundeswehr being deployed in ever wider missions,
Afghanistan and Iraq signiﬁed that there were clear limits to this trend
and, crucially, that the use of force was contingent on particular factors
and conditions. Moreover, German security policy after September 11
brought into focus the complex domestic consensus regarding the
Bundeswehr’s role. The tenor of US foreign policy thinking and its
strategy for Iraq had little resonance with German strategic culture
and thus mitigated against Germany’s active military support in three
main ways. First, US strategy posted military force at its core; second,
it failed to take into account consultative and multilateral fora; and,
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third, it was largely bereft of a vision or strategy for post-conﬂict
reconstruction.
With regard to the question of change, German strategic culture was
certainly challenged by Afghanistan and Iraq, though the result was one
rather of ﬁne-tuning than of fundamental change. Germany’s com-
mitment to Afghanistan as contrasted to its inﬂexibility towards Iraq
demonstrated the strength of the inﬂuence exerted on policy, at diﬀ-
erent points, by strategic culture. Nevertheless, in the face of quite
adverse challenges German strategic culture remained robust at its core.
What transpired during this phase was arguably a ﬁrming-up of Ger-
man strategic culture through a more orthodox reading and its
application to an inﬂexible policy. A hypothesis that might be spun
from this would be that in the light of the challenges thrown up by
September 11 Germany’s existing strategic culture peaked in its capac-
ity to sanction a wider range of military missions and Germany may
subsequently opt to deploy the use of force in more predictable, less
sensational, overtly humanitarian contexts.
Outlook: Germany, the use of force
and the power of strategic culture
From a contemporary vantage point a Germany more self-assured in
security issues seems to be emerging. Berlin is likely to be increasingly
able and willing to decide whether to deploy its troops and, crucially,
to defend its stance and choices on the basis of its own interests and
priorities. This is a symptom of a broader undercurrent of intellectual
change in German politics and society, and suggests that German strate-
gic culture is maturing in line with the Berlin Republic’s growing sense
of conﬁdence. Additionally, the ‘domestics’ of future German security
policy may remain fragile and complex, and as a result the role of the
Bundeswehr and its reform programme, not to mention the issue of
conscription, will continue to be highly contested and politicised issues.
In conclusion, it can be said that Germany’s strategic culture has not
changed in a fundamental sense since its inception in the aftermath of
the Second World War. Its vitality and relevance have persisted and
continue to govern contemporary German perspectives on the use of
force. Although the ending of the Cold War heralded a formative period
for German security thinking, and while its security policy clearly has
come a long way since 1989, Germany’s negative experiences prior to
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1945, coupled with positive formative experiences post-1945, as embod-
ied in its distinctive strategic culture, have had – and will continue to
have – a decisive impact on Germany’s thinking about the use of force.
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